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-INTRODUCTION 
Wherever one looks, be it Russia, Spain or Mex-
ico, the relation of Church and S:&a.-te holds the center of 
the stage. Nor is the United States any exception. Yet 
it has often been assumed by all too many Americans that 
'. the question of this relation of Church and State, which 
under other forms of political organization has proved so 
baffling, has been finally and forever settled in our 
country through the wisdom of the framers of our Federal 
Constitution. Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple. 
There are many points at which, in fact, the true relation 
proves difficult to define. 
For many, relation in no way connotes complete 
separation. In Church and state, the Catholic sees not 
merely institutions, but the spiritual and temporal poles 
of all human life, individual and social, expressions of a 
duality to be found in every sphere, reflecting the con-
comitance of sense life and spiritual life in man. The 
distinction between them'is never absolute, for they arer 
made up of human individuals and reflect the complexity of 
human minds; their action is interweaving, the one consoli-
1 
i1 
dating something of what the other conceives. Some Protes-
tants too, are quite in agreement that Church and State can-
not be divorced. For once a man confesses belief in God, and 
, . 
thus, in an absolute norm of moralft;, he should logically 
admit that politics and economics come under the moral law. 
Christopher Dawson in his Religion anf ~ State, frequently 
reminds us that "business and politics belong to the sphere 
of the relative, while religion is the fixed pole on which 
human life revolves and to which all parts must be relatedtt • l 
In the United States, unhappily, our political 
representatives are too often oblivious of any connection be-
tween the spiritual and temporal orders. An iron curtain 
has been dropped between Church and State, separate fields 
of operation have been marked out for each of them. The 
Church to influence the State must now descend to the level 
of lobbying like any politician or big business agent, for 
the pressure of potential votes serves as a marvelous spur 
for moving a Congressional member to action. Fortunately, 
for the interest of religion and morality, the Church has 
the religious press at her disposal. 
1 Christopher Dawson, Religion and the State, Sheed and 
Ward, New York, 1935, 124. 
,---
iii 
To obtain some appreciation of this indirect rela-
tion between Church and State, a definite period would have 
to be studied and all the elements examined as they are 
. 
~~ 
mixed into the political pot in which the governing power's 
policy is brewed. Many times, these elements, like the 
causes of a disastrous fire, are as '~distinguishable ashes 
of the resulting ruin. The formula, however, of Woodrow 
Wilson's Mexican Policy has been sufficiently preserved 
through records, documents and newspapers, so that an analy-
sis of it will reveal in large measure the political, econ-
omic and religious elements contained therein. Mexico, more-
over, during this period of Wilson's Administration absorbed 
the interest of her northern neighbor, for its rich re-
sources and unsettled condition served as a magnet to at- ~ 
tract the exploiting capitalist and Protestant missionary, 
who dreamed of luring Catholic Mexicans away from the Faith 
of their fathers. In addition, revolution, religious perse- , 
cution and the conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism 
forced th~ religious issue into a prominent position. Along 
with the interests of the statesman and capitalist, Wilson 
also had to consider those of the Churchman. There were, 
though, many sincere persons, both within the Church and 
-iiii 
without, who with the best will in the world, conceived the 
interests of the Church differently_ The Catholics and 
protestants, by and large, ended up on the opposite sides 
, . 
. 9 4; 
of the fence, with the result that our President during the 
course of years was verbally pommelled from both sides, and 
was stranded without any avenue open.for compromise. This 
division complicated the Church and State relations and con-
siderably weakened any ultimate influence on the President's 
policy making. 
To better un~erstand the interplay of these dif-
ferent elements, a separate study of each will be made in 
the following chapters. After drawing the historical set-
ting of the principal political and economic considerations, 
the conflicting views of the religious press will be 
sketched one at a time on the same canvas. The Mexican pic-
ture thus portrayed will enable us to view in a clearer 
light the interests and justified concern of the Church as 
J 
well as its successes and failures in influencing State 
policy_ 
CHAPTER I 
WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY 
Without a consideration of Don Porfirio Diaz, a 
, . 
~. 
study ot any period of modern Mexican history would be in-
complete, if not senseless. This leader chose the proper 
moment for jumping into the saddle, 'tnd once the reins were 
in his control, he alone, was the driver tor over thirty 
years. These were the thirty years of the famed Porfirian 
peace. The nightmare of chaos between the downfall ot 
Maximilian in 1867 and Diaz's accession in 1876 paved the 
way tor the welcomed advent ot a strong ruler. The Excel-
~ has well summed up that turn in Mexican government 
rule in one of its editorials: 
~ 
When President Diaz took 
office for the second time, the 
Mexican people had lost faith in 
democratic institutions, in con-
stitutional guarantees, in law 
and order ••• They had only one as-
piration: to be protected from 
banditry on t~e high road and in 
politics. Therefore, they lay 
back in the arms of General Diaz. l 
During the years of peace when the people "lay back in his 
arms", Mexico progressed until she became the leading re-
I Excelsior, Mexico City, Sept. 15, 1930. This was daily 
paper with capable editors, among whom was Salado Alvar-
ez. 
1 
2 
public south of our border. 2 
Diaz had his fingers on the pulse of the Mexican 
people as he shaped his policy to make Mexico a safer place 
for people to live. .• 47 Foreigners too, were protected who 
would bring in capital and technical training to develop as 
quickly as possible "Mexico's fabulois resources and thus 
advance the standard of living, especially for the ellte".3 
His principle was one of expediency, with the Ten Command-
ments replaced by the creed of laissez-~air!. Yet it would 
certainly be unjust to hold the great dictator personally 
responsible for all the ugly abuses inherent in the system: 
land distribution for instance. During his regime the 
number of individual holdings increased three hundred per-
cent. So when President Wilson took over affairs in 1914, 
there were over 55,000 individual owners. 4 As Toribo 
2 Henry F. Pringle, ~ Life ~ Times 2! William~. ~, 
Farrar & ~inehart, New York, 1939, Vol. II, 700. 
3 Samuel Flagg Bemis, Ib! Latin American Policy ~ la! 
United States, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1943, 
~69. 
4 Toribo Esquivel Obregon, Influencia ~ Espana ~ les !i-
tadosUnidos sobre Mexico, Madrid, ~ ed. Calleja, 
19l.8, 322. Except otherwise noted, all the translatiOn 
of Spanish works into English are the work of John Del-
mar, a resident of Mexico, who has contributed many ar-
ticles to leading American periodicals. 
Esquivel Obregon observes, such bright spots in the Diaz 
regime have frequently been smudged by the dirt of enemy 
propaganda: 
Facts have bee~~deliber­
ately misrepresented for the pur-
pose of obtaining sympathy and 
aid, more or less direct, from the 
Anglo-American government for rev-
olutionary movements.6 
OQtside Mexico, though, Diaz's friends far out-
numbered his foes. While still Theodore Roosevelt's 
3 
secretary of State, Elihu Root in an exchange of encomia 
in Mexico City probably sinned on the side of hyperbole in 
referring to President Diaz as "one of the greatest men to 
be held up for the hero worship of mankind'''. 6 Taft, how-
ever, more sanely evaluated Diazts real worth by saying, 
"My own impression has been that Diaz ha~ done more for 
the people of Mexico than any other Latin American has done 
for any of his people d • 7 His achievements from a material 
standpoint command the extremest respect: In 1880 Mexico 
possessed but 430 miles of railroad, in 1911 it possessed 
J 
5 Ibid., 328. r 
6 Latin America ~ ~he !Inited states, Addresses IDL Elihu 
Boot, Harvard University Press, 1917, 168. 
7 Pringle, Taft, II, 700. 
4 
over ~5t488 miles; imports increased from $19,793,493 to 
$205,874,273; exports skyrocketed from $27,318,788 to 
$293,753,638. The national income also naturally rose from 
$19,776,638 to nearly $100,000,000:&; The Mexican nation 
had prospered but a glance at the shameful wages indicated 
that the profits were going to someone else. And this ,. 
Itsomeone else tf was the foreigner to whom Diaz had pawned his 
nation's resources. Such a regime was welcomed by the Amer-
ican financier seeking another Eldorado for his investments, 
and he was 'more than eager to invest his capital, effort and 
ingenuity in such a promising enterprise_ Within a quarter 
of a century American investments totaled nearly a billion 
and a half dOllars;9 English, German, French, Spanish, and 
others, together owned another half a billion dollars. 
tllndeed, foreign holdings totaled a greater value than na-
tive property, and of the foreign holdings citizens of the 
United States owned more than all other foreigners combinedtt!O 
8 Ernest Gruening, Mexico ~ Its Heritage, Century Company, 
New York, 1928, 561. 
9 ~ouse ~2S. No. 305, 57 Cong. 2 sess_, I, 503. Fall Com-
mittee Report II, 3322. 
10 J. Fred Rippy, !hi Unit~ Stat~s ~~exico, Alfred 
Knopf, New York, 1926, 312. 
I 
5 
Americans owned 78% of the mines, 72% of the smelters, 58% 
of the oil; and 68% of the rubber industry, while the total 
Mexican wealth was just half of her ~orthern neighbor, 
11 $792,187,242. 
....... , 
Yet all was not well with Mexico, for a portion of 
the educated aristocracy was becomin~irritated by the can-
ker of foreign exploitation, especially when the influential 
and high-salaried positions were going to foreigners. Bemis 
well indicates their disturbed state of mind at the invaders 
boldness: 
Their proprietary character, 
their dynamic energy, their pro-
testant outlook, disturbed and 
alarmed some of the disinterested 
creole aristocracy, despite the 
excellence of diplomatic relations 
between the governments. With 
grossly exaggerated fears this pa-
triotic elite felt that eventuall!2 
Mexico might go the way of Texas. . 
The older generation, with the exception of the 
above mentioned clique, had experienced the chaos that pro-
ceeded the dictator's regime, and they were content for the 
most part with conditions as they were, but their children 
wanted to realize their democratic political aspirations. 
11 aQuse Qg£., op. cit. 3322, 3313. 
12 Bemis, 170. 
I 
~~------------------~ 
6 
yet the discontentment of the small group of aristocrats was 
sufficient to strike the spark that ignited the keg of po-
litical opposition among the younge: generation against 
.. ~; 
Diaz t s despotic government. D1az, now an old man, no longer" 
could "play his supporters off against one another before 
they could develop sufficient strengj,h to oppose himtt.I3 
The General admitted this in March, 1908, in the widely pub-
lished Creelman interview which quoted him to the effect 
that the Mexican people were ready for democracy, and he 
went on to add: 
••• he would welcome the forma-
tion of a poli,tical party which 
should put forward an opposition 
candidate; that he would sur-
render the power to such a candi-
date if legally elected.14 
The challenge was accepted and the "Democratic 
Party" was formed. Francis I. Madero, a member 0f the 
wealthy privileged class wrote a pamphlet entitled, ~ 
suc,esion Qresidencial !!l 1910 (The Presidential Succession 
in 1910), stressing the feature of no ree,lections for presi-
dency. This little work not only won him the favor of t~e 
growing Democratic Party, but also the nomination for presi-
13 Herbert Ingram Priestley, Ih! Mexican ~ation, A Historx, 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1923, 380. 
14 Creelman, James; President g~, ~ £! 1h! America's, 
in Pearson's Magazine, Vol. XIX, March, 1908, 231. 
7 
dency in the promised elections.15 A p1at:rorm was adopted 
stressing many democratic re:rorms long since abandoned, such 
as restoration o:r the Constitution, :reedom o:r the press, 
.10 .;" 
promotion of education and wider suffrage. 
However, when the time came, General Diaz did not 
retire from office, but the 'tOld Chie,t had let it be known 
that he would again respond to pressure ana go through the 
torm of another election in spite of the Creelman inter-
view".16 Even his enemies admitted his motives were patri-
otic, since no one could deny the hard truth of one of his 
tormer statements on the same issue: 
I have tried to leave the 
presidency several times, but it 
has been pressed upon me and I 
remained in office for the sake 
o:r the nation which trusted me. 
The fact that the price of Mex-
ican securities dropped eleven 
points when I was ill at Cuernav-
ca indicates the kind of evidence 
that persuaded me to overcome my 
personal inclinations to retire 
to private life.17 
The masses still might have favored the dictator's 
.. 
reelection, if he had not coromi tted a political el;'ror of the 
15 George B. Winton, lI.!exico, Past and Present, Cokesbury 
Press, Nashville, 1928, 170:-----
16 Wilfrid H. Calcott, Liberalism ~ Mexico, !§§1-~, 
Stanford University Press, 1931, 171. 
17 Creelman, 237. 
8 
first magnitude in arresting Madero on the charge of plot-
ting rebellion. I8 Madero soon escaped over the border into 
the United states, where he tormulated his revolutionary 
, . 
plans. When his plan of San Luis ~otosi was issued, it 
gained many adherents, among whom were the bandits, Villa in 
the North, and Zapata, leader of the'jeons, in the South.19 
The Federal troops were repulsed and the frontier town of 
Ciudad Juarez was taken on the ninth of May, 1911. General 
Diaz saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned with the 
announcement that he took tfthis step to spare the country 
bloodshed, the exhaustion of its credit, the destruction of 
its resources and the risk of international complications lf • 20 
However, at the very moment when negotiation-s 
were going on in Mexico for peace betore Diaz,I s resignation, 
"alleged fl representatives of the Standard Oil Company were 
effecting a contract with the Madero revolutionary junta in 
Texas, and offering this faction a substantial loan of money. 
The details of this transaction have never been full~ di-
18 Edward I. Bell, Ih! Political Shame 2f Mexico, McBride 
Hast & Co., New York, 37. ~ 
19 Priestley, 398. 
20 Francisco Bulnes, ~ Whole Truth About Mexico, M. 
Bulnes Book Co., New York, 1916, 168. 
.-
9 
vulged. Numerous intimations and allegations have been made 
to the effect that the Standard Oil Company was responsible 
for the success of the Madero revolution--all based ostens-
, . 
. ;J. .;, 
ibly upon this presumed deal. Testimony tending to confirm 
this suspicion was brought out in the Senate investigation 
of Mexican Affairs in 1919, but proot of collusion was dis-
tinctly lacking. 
The first substantial inkling that there may have 
been a tie-up between Madero and the Standard Oil Company 
was brought out by the American Ambassador, H. L. Wilson, 
in a public address delivered on the night of January 6, 
1914. On his own responsibility Wilson charged that 
••• it would be a big surprise in 
certain quarters if it should be 
known that certain international 
interests were suggesting the 
United States policy purs~ed dur-
ing the last six months. 2 
The State Department Archives in Washington recently made 
available all the documentary material pertaining to the 
Madero Revolution. The secret reports to which the Ambassa-
" dor refers have been located and carefully examined. Th~e 
memoranda disclose the fact that certain dubious transac-
tions were certainly made respecting the offer of between 
$500,000 to $1,000,000 by representatives of the Standard 
2~ ~ York ~imes, January 7, 1914. 
, 
--
10 
Oil Company to the Madero insurrectos, but they do not indi-
cate whether the money was ever received or forwarded by the 
standard. It was a well known fact, however, that Madero 
entered into peace negotiations wit~~the Diaz Government in 
order to stall for time. He desired to utilize the lull to 
reorganize his forces, and raise monel' which was vitally 
needed tor the continuance of the revolution. The mere 
prospect ot a SUbstantial loan, therefore, may have been 
sufficient to induce Madero to declare an end to all peace 
discussions. It is the timing of the loan which gives rise 
to the suspicions that there may have been an understanding 
between Madero and the Standard Oil Company. 
The details of the loan transaction between the 
representative of the Standard Oil Company and the Madero 
insurrectos is contained in a memorandum written on April 
19, 1911, by S. W. Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and submitted to the Attorney General. Finch included 
in his memorandum extracts of a report of one of the special 
agents tha~ undertook the investigation on the spot. The 
informant of the special agent disclosed the following: 
Yesterday morning, in com-
pany with my brother, a party 
came to us in the Sheldon Hotel. 
I am personally acquainted with 
this party, but do not wish to 
give his name at the present time, 
but will inform you of same later. 
I know him to be a representative 
of the Standard Oil Company. He 
asked me if I was not well ac-
quainted with the heads of the in-
surrectos. I told hi~ that I knew 
. . .. , 
a party here 1n El Paso who was 
very close to all the officers of 
all the insurrectos and then this 
party asked me if I did not know 
it to be a fact that t~e insur-
rectos were very short of money. 
He then stated that he was repre-
senting a dompany who would furn-
ish the insurrectos with from 
$500,000 to $1,000,000 on the con-
dition that the insurrectos would 
issue to his company 6% gold bonds 
and a certain concession which the 
company would ask of the insur-
rectos. I asked him what kind of 
a concession his company would ask, 
and he answered by saying, "You 
should know the nature of the con-
cession wanted by the connection". 
He then told us that if a meeting 
was brought by us between him and 
a party representing the insur-
rectos, and if they would agree 
mutually on this concession, he 
would make it paY2~s well for our 
time and service. 
.' 
The representative of the Standard, it was later revealed, 
was a person by the name of C. R. Troxel. The informant 
• 
11 
22 Attorney General to Knox, April 28, 1911, State Dept. ---Arch.' 
812.00 Mexican Despatches, VI, (File No. 812.00 1503). 
Encloses Memorandum for the Attorney General written by 
S. W. Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, which 
contains extracts of a report of one of the special 
agents dated April 19, 1911. 
12 
.' 
relates that the matter was discussed by the Madero junta, 
and it was decided that an appointment should be arranged a 
few hours later at the Zeiger Hotel. J. V. Smith acted as 
, . 
the representative for the insurrett~s. Smith and Troxel 
consulted alone at the latter's suggestion in Smith's room. 
Nothing is known of what took place. ,.Troxel appeared satis-
fied and Smith being shown a letter from John D •. Archbold of 
Standard Oil authorizing the contract was enthusiastic.23 
Smith believed that Madero would approve of the 
transaction, and the whole matter would be consummated in 
a few days. The reason for Standard Oil's concern in the 
Mexican situation was explained by Smith. He stated that 
Standard's concessions recently had been cancelled by the 
Mexican federal government and ftthey were now operating 
through Waters Pierce Company". Unreasonable taxes, however, 
were being imposed upon Waters Pierce. "Consequently, the 
Standard Oil Company thought they would have better sailing 
under the insurrectos form of governmenttt • 
~'egotiations continued wi th Madero appointing his 
brother to represent his interests. Apparently, a contract 
was duly entered into and forwarded to Francisco Madero by 
Troxel through a courier. An answer was expected on the 
23 Ibid. 
, 
13 
night of April 28, 1911. 24 The secret service reports do not 
state exactly what Madero's reply was. From all available 
information it is evident that Maderots reply would be in the 
, . 
affirmative. The next week, howeve~t on May 7, 1911, peace 
negotiations were declared at an end and without results. It 
may have been sheer coincidence that 'lhe two events occurred 
at the same time, but apparently the state Department did not 
think so. 
In view of these circumstances, Knox required an 
explanation from Standard Oil Company.25 Archbold, Vice 
President of Standard Oil, replied: 
All statements of this char-
acter emanating from whatever 
source are absolutely without 
foundation and I desire on behalf 
of the company to r~eister an em-
phatic disavowal ••• 
Standard Oil also sent a man to Washington to clear up any 
particulars, but the investigation was never carried further 
and Madero was given continued encouragement from Washington. 
By October, 1911, Diaz was sufficiently out of the 
.. 
24 Attorney General to Secretary of state, April 28, 1911", 
State Dept. Arch. (File No. 812.00/1542). 
25 Knox to J. D. Archbold, May 10, 1911, state Dept. ~. (File No. 812.00/1593). 
26 Archbold to Knox, May 15, 
(File No. 812.00/1796). 1911, 
state Dept. £U:.2h. , 
~'~--------------------------------------I 
14 
picture so that the promised elections finally took place and 
Madero was elected on a genuinely popular vote. -One of the 
noteworthy aspects ot this election was the spectacular rise 
. 
ot the Catholic Party in winning a fa~ge number ot seats in 
Congress, but Madero's henchmen saw that "in the most shame-
ful dirty, illegal and despotic manne~, the majority of their 
votes were discredited and thrown out".27 This tailure to 
respect suftrage rights was the beginning ot the chain ot 
Madero t s broken promises that was to drag him trom power; yet 
the overwhelmingly popular support of the newly elected pre~i­
dent at the polls seemed to augur well tor at least a few 
years ot peace, and President Taft's immediate recognition ot 
the new government was advised by many influential men. Tatt, 
though, foresaw only chaos in Diazts removal, as may be seen 
in a letter written to his wife a year previous: 
It is inevitable, that in 
case of a revolution or interne-
.c ine strife, we should interfere 
and I sincerely hope that the old 
man's (Diaz) otticial life will 
extend the limits of mine, tor 
that trouble would present a prob-
lem of the utmost difticulty.28 
27 Jose Lopez-Portilla y Rojas, Elavacio~ I Caida £! f2£-
tirio Diaz, Mexico, 1921, 481. . 
28 Tatt to his wite, June, 1910, ~ Papet!, President's 
Letter Book, Vol. 20, No. 235, Library ot Congress. 
15 
Taft·s prophecy was being ~ulfilled, for it looked like the 
United states would have to interfere, after Ambassador Henry 
L. Wilson's alarming reports o~ insurrection and destruction 
of foreigners t property. Troops were ~ent to the border un-
der the guise of umaneuvers". Later, though, President Taft, 
in a confidential chat with Hart Lyman, the Managing Editor ,. 
of the New ~ Tribune, Edward P. Mitchell, the President of 
the New York Sun, and Charles Hopkins Clark, the editor of 
the Couraq~ of Hartford, Connecticut, revealed the reason for 
the government·s misrepresentation of troop movements: 
I was in a situation where I 
eould not take the public into my 
confidence, because to do so would 
be almost a casus belli with the 
existing government of Mexico, 
which had minimized the insurrec-
tion in every way and had contemp-
tuously denied all danger from it. 
So I allowed the War Department to 
report that the going of troops 
was for maneuvers ••• 29 
Taft's military m'easures, however, were not the move 
of an alarmist. On the basis of the numerous and detailed re-
ports submitted to the State Department for the President's 
consideration, it was clearly apparent that the Madero revolu-
tion was a popular uprising. It was also evident that the 
29 Taft to various Editors, March, 1911, ~l! Papers, Presi-
dent's Letter Book, Vol. 24, No. 418, Library of Congress. 
I 
16 
strong anti-American sentiment was a threat to American in-
vestments which amounted to over a billion dollars. Previ-
ouS to Taft's decision, he had requested that a circular 
, . 
,10 "'? letter be sent to the consul resident in Mexico asking the 
••• fullest statement of' condi-
tions there in regard to the in-
surrection and its eff~ct on 
American residents and American 
interests ••• lt is essential that 
I should follow as closely as 
possible the conditions in Mex-
ico with respect to taking proper 
steps to protect American lives 
and interests.30 
The circular letter was sent and the replies came in almost 
immediately. Salina Cruz reported: "Strong anti-American, 
anti-Diaz tendencies, with widespread pro-revolutionary 
feelingtt • 31 Ninety-five percent of the district of Durango 
was stated to be Anti-American; seventy-five percent were 
pro-revolutionary_ The revolution appeared to be gaining in 
32 
strength, and the people were in sympathy with the movement. 
Anti-American feeling was general in Chihualua.33 The ma-
30 Taft t~Knox, March 20, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 812.00 
Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/1045). r 
31 Haskell to Carr, March 19, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 
812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/991). 
32 Freeman to Knox, March 19, 1911, State ~.l2..£. Arch., 
812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/992). 
33 Leonard, Vice-Consul to Knox, March 19, 1911, State 
Dept. Arch., 812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 
812.00/993). 
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jority of the people of Monterey were believed to be revo1u-
tionary.34 "My district is all anti-American", reported 
Donald Smith, Consul at Aguas Calientes, "and is ninety-
three percent pro-revolutionary"'. 3S .• 'ind so it went. Revo-
lutionary feeling was strong in San Luis potosi,3S Vera 
Cruz,37 and GUadalajara.38 Consul Millar stated that in 
'. Mazatlan there was ttpractica1ly unanimous revolutionary 
feelingtt • 39 From Acupulco, the report came: "Revolution 
will succeed when its organization is perfected. Owing to 
abuses by the authorities populace would certainly welcome 
change in Government."40 Finally, it was reported from 
Mexico City that the "Student, middle and lower classes" 
were "strongly anti-American and pro-revolutionarylt. This 
was especially noticeable in the cities.4l 
34 H. Hanna to Knox, March 19, 1911, (File No. 812.00/995). 
35 Donald Smith to Knox, March 19, 1911, (File No. 812.00/ 
996). 
36 Bonney to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/998). 
37 Canada to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1000). , 
38 Magill to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1001). 
39 Alger to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1004). 
40 Pangburn to Knox, March 19, 1911, (File No. 812.00/ 
997). .. 
41 Consul-General to Knox, March 21, 1911, (File No. 812.~0/ 
1029). 
From his experience in the Philippines Taft knew 
what a thankless task and expenditure it was to intervene. 
And the recognition of a Government unable to keep its elec-
. . ,. ~ ... , 
tion promises in any form is a certain way of forcing the 
hand of intervention. Mere good intentions never carried an 
administration through, and Madero w~ to prove no exception 
to the rule. This Mexican President pleased no one; the 
peons cried for land reform; teachers were lacking to insti-
tute the promised educational reform; the foreign investers 
lost some of their concessions; Diaz's favorites were over-
looked; but above all 
••• the success of the revolution 
had aroused all the military ambi-
tions put under an anaesthetic by 
the vigor of Diaz. Now, however'42 
all wanted a share of the spoils. 
Revolutionary l.eaders were to be found in every 
large district. When Madero appealed to the President of 
the United States to force American munition makers to cease 
shipping arms to the insurrectionists, Taft prevailed on 
Congress, &s a means of restoring peace, to pass a joint reso-
.. ' 
lution granting the president control of "such materials from 
the United States to any American country where conditions of 
domestic violence might eXist".43 Even such a measure failed 
42 Calcott, 201. 
43 Bemis, 171. 
~~------------------------------~ 
.' 
to quell the rebellions in north or south Mexico.44 
After a coup d'etat failed in early February, 1913, 
under the leadership of General Reyes, Felix Diaz, nephew of 
the former dictator, took over the c~~and of the insurrec-
tionists. As these forces gained in numbers and popularity, 
Madero made an effort to strengthen hi: army. Against his 
better judgment the President placed General Victoriano Huerta 
in charge of the palace guard and made him responsible tor the 
security of the capital.45 Huerta, tundamentally a man of 
porfirian antecedents and sympathies, soon joined forces with 
Felix Diaz. Huerta, this new figure of Aztec parentage, be-
lieved in ruthless suppression of all opposition.46 
The revolutionists informed Henry Lane Wilson, the 
United States Ambassador to Mexico, ot the forthcoming events. 
Wilson in turn immediately wired the State Department: 
Huerta notifies me to ex-
pect some action that will remove 
Madero trom power at any moment; 
plans fully matured, the purpose 
of delay being to avoid any vio-
lence or bloodshed ••• I am unable 
to say whether or4uot these plans will materialize. ,,/ 
44 Priestley, 407. 
45 Priestley, 411. 
46 Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame Qf Mexico, McBride 
Nast & Co., 1914, 211. 
47 Papers Relating to ~ For8ign Relation ~ 1h! United 
States, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1913, 718. 
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On February 18th, Huerta and Diaz seized the government. The 
world feared more bloodshed. "Apprehensive of what might en-
sue after the downfall of President Madero, I invited General 
, . 
Huerta and General Diaz to come t~the Embassy to consider 
the preservation of order in the cityM,48 was the Ambassa-
dorts assurance to WaBhington that the welfare of foreigners 
.. 
would be safeguarded. But before Wilson received an assur-
ance of order, he had to threaten American intervention if 
D' d H t d'd t t t . d' t 1 49 Th 'e 1az an uer a 1 no come 0 erms 1mme 1a e y. os 
terms were that "Huerta should be the Provisional President 
of the Republic and that Diaz should name the Cabinet, and 
thereafter he should have the support of Huerta tor the 
permanent presidencyK.50 
Meanwhile the imprisoning of the ex-President and 
Vice President in the National Palace caused Secretary of 
State Knox to warn Wilson that: 
••• ~General Huerta's consulting 
you as to the treatment of Ma-
dero tends to give you a certain 
responsibility in the matter. 
It moreover goes without saying 
that cruel treatment ot the ex-
P~esident would injure, in the 
48 Ibid., 720, 721. 
49 Henry L,. Wilson, Diplomatic E-gisodes 1:!l ~~, Belgium, 
~ Chile, Doubleday, Page & Co_, ~ew York, 280. 
50 Foreign Relations, 1913, 721. 
, 
eyes of the world, the reputa-
tion of Mexican civi1ization ••• n5l 
21 
Huerta, therefore, "swore on a scapulary of the Virgin of 
Guadalupe and a medal of the Sacred ijeart ••• that he would per-
.... , 
mit no one to attempt the life of Senor Madero u • 52 
A few days later, on February 23, 1913, Madero and 
suarez met their death trying to esca~ from an armed guard 
transferring them to the penitentiary. The American Press 
called it murder. 53 Nevertheless, the Ambassador counseled 
Washington Uto consider the deaths a closed incident" and 
"urged the recognition of the new government-.54 The Taft 
administration, however, had refused to move precipitately 
in the matter of recognition, and soon drew rein upon the in-
discreet Ambassador: 
••• you will ••• be carefully guided 
by the Presidentts direction that 
for the present, no formal recog-
nition is to be accorded those de 
facto in control, except upon spe-
cific instructions from the depart-
ment to do so.bb 
Although Washington had been shocked by the deaths of Madero 
and Suarez; the real reason for the withholding of recogni-
~ 
tion seems to be that Taft, in departing from office, did not 
51 Ibid-, 725. 
52 Prida, Ramon, De ~ dictadura ~ l! anarguial El Paso 
Printing Press, El Paso, 1914, 555-56. 
53 Foreign Relations, 1913, 747. 
54 112.!9.-, 736. 
55 illS.., 738. 
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want to saddle his foreign policy, which might prove embar-
rassing, on the incoming president.56 
At this moment there appeared on the scene a man 
, . 
~~ 
destined to have a drastic effect on the future of Mexico. 
A scholar and self-centered idealist, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 
succeeded Taft as President of the Un~ted States. He was 
born, the son of a minister, at Staunton, Virginia in 1856. 
During those first trying years after graduation when the 
young lawyer has so much time on his hands waiting for eli-
ents, Wilson devoted himself to the study of history and po-
litical science. This interest was greatly responsible for 
his abandonment of the courtroom for the classroom at Bryn 
Mawr. After going to Princeton he soon became its President. 
His next promotion was the governorship of New Jersey, where ~ 
he gained nationwide repute for his political reforms. His 
idealistic actions in this post paved the way for his Presi-
dential climb in 1913.57 
The President-elect was not prepared for the task 
ahead as h& himself admitted, stating, "that it would be the 
irony of fate if his administration had to deal chiefly 
with foreign ~ffairs when his own preparations had been ex-
56 
57 
Ray stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life ~. Letters, 
Vol. IV, Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1931, 238. 
Baker, III, 174. 
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58 
elusively in domestic problems". Yet he re~used the advice 
of authorities on important matters, selected a cabinet of 
inexperienced politicians, and flung himsel~ into the very 
. 
depths ot toreign entanglements trotit the very beginning, as 
is evident in Mexico.59 
By a statement to thepress'2t his foreign policy 
on March 12, 1913, the world soon became aware of the atti-
tude of the new President ot the United states. While there 
was no direct reference to Mexico, his attitude toward Huerta 
could not be doubted: 
Cooperation is possible only 
when supported at every turn by 
the orderly processes of just gov-
ernment based upon law, not upon 
arbitrary or irregular force ••• We 
can have no sympathy with those 
who seek to seize the power of 
government to advance 6eeir own 
interests or ambition •. 
Ambassador Wilson wired Secretary ot State Bryan on the fol-
lowing day hoping to prevent the President trom issuing any 
un~ortunate statement directly against the existing govern-
ment which might incite rebellion, and he concluded that 
~ 
••• unless the same type of gov-
ernment as was implanted here by 
General Porfirio Diaz is again 
established, new revolutionary 
58 Baker, IV, 237. 
59 ~., 344. 
60 Baker, IV, 68. 
movements will break forth and 
general unrest will be renewed. 
With BO% of the population un-
able to read or write permanent 
democratic government cannot be 
established in Mexic~~l 
24 
While our Mexican representative was clamoring for immediate 
recognition, the British Government let it be known that 
'. Huerta would soon be formally recognized as "interim Presi-
d t " ~ en • Its action prompted many other governments, 
anxiously waiting such a move by a major power, to acknowl-
edge the present £& fact2 government.63 
If a government, even the smallest, is to continue 
to exist, recognition by foreign powers is absolutely essen-
tial, for "recognition is the assurance given to a new State 
that it will be permitted to h'old its place and rank in the 
character of an independent political organism in the society 
of nations".64 Before the nineteenth century European na-
tions recognized governments only on a ~ Jyre basis, or in 
other words, only those governments which were established on 
the basis of legal succession. With the recognition of the 
United States of America, ~ facto governments were coming., 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Foreign Relations, 1913, 776. 
B. J. Henrick, Life ~1etters 2t Walter Hines Page, 
Vol. I, Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 1925, 19B. 
Calcott, 23B. 
John Bassett Moore, Digest of lnternational ~, Gov·t. 
Printing Office, Wash., n.c., 1906, I, 72. 
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into their own; yet in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century the European powers were loath to recognize a de 
facto government. Under the influence of Metternich, the 
, . 
Central European nations put down i~Aurrections in Spain, 
Naples and Piedmont, but when the central powers attempted 
to interfere with the establishment Qf the new republics in ,.. 
South America, they brought forth the Monroe Doctrine so ably 
supported by England's Foreign Minister, canning. 65 That, 
nevertheless, by the middle of the nine,teenth century de 
fac!~ governments were accepted, is evidenced in the ready 
recognition of the Southern States in the Civil War. 
President Pierce set forth the general policy of 
our government on May 15, 1856, when in discussing the ques-
tion of recognizing a new government in Nicaragua, he said: 
" 
It is the established policy 
of the United States to recognize 
all governments without question 
of their source, or organization 
or of the means by which the gov-
erning persons attain their power, 
provided there be a government s! 
facto accepted ~y the people of 
the country ••• 6 
When Porfirio Diaz came into power by revolutionary means·'in 
1876, President Hayes added a new element of delay to our 
65 Bemis, 53-59. 
66 Moore, I, 142. 
policy, delcaring that although the United States was: 
••• accustomed to accept and rec-
ognize the results of a popular 
choice in Mexico, and not to 
scrutinize closely tbe. regular-
ity or irregularityof'the meth-
ods by which those results were 
brought about, ••• the United 
States would wait before recog-
nizing General Diaz ••• ,q,ntil it 
is assured that his el~tion is 
approved by the Mexican people, 
and that his administration is 
possessed of stability to endure 
and of disposition to comply 
with the rules of international 
comity and obligation of treat-
ies.6~ 
26 
It will thus be seen in the Wilson-Huerta contro-
versy that it was not the mere fact of delayed recognition, 
but the meddling in Mexico's internal affairs, that was un-
precedented. Naturally without recognition, revolution was 
encouraged by our government -- at least implicitly. But, 
due to the pressure of international powers concerned about 
their investments in Mexico, Wilson realized that he must 
indicate the policy of the United States in an official 
statement. 4 It was at this critical moment that President 
Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene in Mexican affairs. ~My 
67 ~oreign Relations, 1877, 404. F. W. Seward, acting Sec-
retary of State, to J. W. Foster, May 16, 1877. Foster 
was our Minister to Mexico. In his J;li£:l;omatic. Memoirs, 
I, 92, he states that Hayes' failure to recognize Diaz 
was an attempt to draw the public mind away from his 
questionable victory over Tilden by creating a Mexican 
issue. 
~-----------------------------------------, 
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passion", he declared, "is for the submerged eighty-five 
percent of the people of that Republic who are struggling 
now toward libertytt. 68 From this statement, the Mexican 
. 
Herald sarcastically remarked that~tlson thought "he knew 
the aspirations of the Mexican people better than the Mex-
icans themselves had ever known them~l69 His ~onfidence 
in Ambassador Wilson was gone, and contradictory reports of 
the situation determined him to send a personal representa-
ti"e to make a report of conditions.70 William Bayard Hale, 
an unfrocked clergyman and newspaper writer, was selected. 
The President, ,iii th the inexperience of the neophyte, thus 
began his policy of selecting representati~es not only 
tempermentally unsuited7l but ignorant of the task as-
signed. 
Henry L. Wilson naturally resented Hale's pres-
ence in Mexico and he protested against the interference. 
His irritation was increased when his plan for recognition 
in return for a settlement of United States' grievances 
against Mexico received no reply. The long awaited reply 
.. 
68 
69 
70 
71 
Baker, IV, 236. 
Mexican., Herald, June 2, 1913. 
G~orge M. Stephenson, sL2!m Lind 9.!. r.,1innesotE!, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1935, 213. 
Baker, IV, 243. 
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.' 
was a "confidential note" to the Ambassador stating that 
recognition would depend on a fair election in which Huerta 
would under no conditions be a candidate. 72 
While the Ambassador w~i urging military interven-
tion to keep Huerta in power and restore peace, Hale was 
recommending armed force to put th: dictator out. Hale's 
reports to Washington, consequently painted Wilson in most 
odious colors. How influential these notes were in Washing-
ton, and how instrumental they were in the recall of the Am-
bassador, is seen in one of the President's messages to Sec-
retary of State Bryan: 
The document from Hale is in-
deed extraordinary. I should like 
••• to discuss with you very seri-
ously the necessity of recalling 
H. L. Wilson in one way or another, 
perhaps, merely for 'consultation' 
until we can have a talk with the 
man himself. 73 
The opportunity came with the Ambassador's next note: tlI am 
obliged to urge upon the President the pressing necessity of 
some action of a drastic and convincing kind".74 The answer 
was an lmmediate call to Washington for "consultation". The 
... 
meeting took place on July 28th, and on August 4th Bryan 
72 
73 
74 
Baker, IV, 238, 243-44, 263-55, 257-58. Senate Document, 
No. 285, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 2289-91. 
Baker, IV, 255. 
Foreign Relations, 1913, 808. 
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asked for the Ambassador's resignation, since the latter re-
fused to place 
75 dent's. 
his Mexican policy in line with the Presi-
, . 
,;p .. , 
Numerous accounts of the diplomacy of the Mexican 
Revolution have tended to emphasize the machinations of Am-
bassador H. L. Wilson, and attribut~to him responsibility 
for the overthrow of Madero. While no attempt is made to 
minimize the rather discreditable role played by the Ameri-
can Ambassador, the State Department papers clearly reveal 
that he was merely fulfilling a basic desire of the Taft 
administration. The main responsibility in the course of 
events which followed appears to rest squarely upon the De-
partment of State, and Taft, for both gave full support to 
Ambassador Wilson, and formulated the basic policy, whieh 
he carried out most faithfully and literally. 
The Ambassador's friendship and connections with 
the oil men and other vested interests in Mexico proved to 
76 be one of the chief" causes of friction with viashington. 
In early May a group of financiers had almost convinced the 
President of the need of immediate recognition,7? but 
75 Wilson, H. L., 313. 
76 Gruening, 561. 
77 Baker, 245. 
or 
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Wilson could not accept unasked for advice. 78 By July} he 
was convinced that his opponents were the monied interests 
of Great Britain and the United States: 
. 
. ;;. .. '7 I have to pause and remind 
myself that I am President of the 
United States, and not of a small 
group of Americans w~~h vested 
interests in Mexico., 
With such a determined view the Ambassador's opposition 
could result only in resignation; and with the demand for 
resignation, the President could never recognize the govern-
ment of Huerta. 
The increase of chaos in Mexico, and the deepening 
of secrecy in the W'hi te House, were gradually turning the 
nation against ~I}'oodrow ,!filson. He refused to take Congress 
into his confidence, because he believed the ft more quietly 
we go a tout it, the more likely success will be". 80 Yet 
something constructive had to be accomplished. The result 
was the choice of another personal representa.tive to inform 
Huerta of the President's policy in a clear cut, concise and 
unmistakab~e manner. The whole aim of the mission was to 
establish free elections without Huerta running for office. 
78 
79 
80 
Charles W. Thompson, Presidents ~ Known ~ ~ ~ 
Presidents. Bobbs-Merill Co., Indianapolis, 1929, 253. 
!:Ioseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow \'1ilson ru! I Krul!! !ll!!, 
Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 1921, 146. 
Baker, IV, 265. Letter of Wilson to T. R. Marshall • 
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Bryants personal friend, the former Governor of Minnesota, 
John Lind, was selected as the new mediator.8l Lind was 
commissioned to instruct Huerta to p~esent his resignation. 
, ... , 
Complete unfamiliarity with Latin American affairs, untried 
in diplomatic circles, not to mention his inability to speak 
a word of Spanish, made him the most ~fit person who could 
have been sent.82 With such a background, Lind's appearance 
in Mexico naturally caused some ttbarking of shinstt • 83 
Despite the insult to his government, Huerta re-
ceived the new unofficial representative. on August 16th, 
two days later, Gamboa, Huerta's Foreign Minister, replied 
in courteous terms to Lind's message. Gamboa mentioned that 
the United States must consider Huerta as Q& facto President, 
since he was requested to arrange for an election. In ad-
dition, all the other charges were well answered, and the 
question of Huertats candidacy "was to be decided only by 
Mexican public opinion expressed at the polls".84 
-
Again, on August 25th, Lind requested Huerta to 
withdraw h~s hat from the ring in the coming elections, offer-
81 Bemis, 176. 
82 Thompson, 261. 
83 Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife !a Mexico, Harper 
& Brothers, New York, 1916, 3. 
84 Foreign Relations, 823-27. 
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ing as bait the guarantee of the Presidentts assistance in 
procuring a loan from American bankers, but the dictator 
could not be bribed: 
••• the Government 01 the United 
states insinuates that it will 
recommend to American bankers the 
i~~ediate extension of a loan ••• 
to the end, that, move~ by petty 
interests we should re~ounce a 
right which incontrovertibly up-
holds us. When the dignity of a 
nation is at stake, I believe 
that there are not loans enoug~5 
to ••• permit it to be lessened. 
The failure of Lind's mission did not help in 
lessening the growing opposition to Wilson. Since the Presi-
dent's tariff bill in the Senate, and his currency bill in 
the House needed every possible bit of support, Wilson took 
Congress into his confidence on August 27th, by revealing 
the Lind instructions in an effort to gain adherents.86 His 
"watchful waiting" policy was clearly stated: 
85 ru,g., 835. 
There was no call for dras-
tic action ••• clearly everything 
that we do must be rooted in pa-
tience ••• The steady pressure of 
moral force will before many days 
break the barriers of pride and 
prejudice down, and we shall tri-
umph as Mexico's friends soon87 than we could as her enemies. 
86 Baker, IV, 270. 
87 Foreign Relations, 1913, Message to Congress, 820-23. 
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This talk to Congress surprisingly had a wonderful effect in 
restoring public confidence in the administration. In fact, 
Bryan was jubilantly confident that ttthings were going along 
, . 
.. ..... " 
quite well at present, and we only have to sit tight and 
await the election".88 
South of the border, howev,r, matters were not 
quite so happy- Lind warned Bryan that Huerta was manipu-
lating political strings which would force his puppets to 
h · . foP' 89 keep ~ ~n 0 k~ce. The dictator justified Lind's fears 
on October 18th~by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies with 
the aid of armed force, and by arresting one hundred and 
ten of the Congressman. "He didn't arrest members of the 
,Catholic Party, who, for the most part, had been trying to 
sustain order through him; they are, after all is said and 
done, the conservative, peace-wishing element in Mexico. u90 
This fact only added fuel to the ever growing fire of ac-
cusations that many of the clergy were assisting Huerta with 
both arms and money.91 
" Immediately Woodrow Wilson wired the American 
88 Baker, IV, 276. 
89 Stephenson, 238. 
90 O'Shaughnessy, 10. 
91 Carleton, Beals, Mexico, ~ Interpretation, B. W. 
Huebsch, Inc-, New York, 1923, 169. 
charge d'affairs, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, to notify the pro-
visional government of Washington's reaction: 
The President, shocked at the 
lawless methods em~~yed by Gener-
al Huerta is deeply distressed ••• 
The President believes that an 
election held at this time ••• and 
under the present conditions as 
they now exist would.have none of 
the sanction with wh~ch the law 
surrounds the ballots ••• The Presi-
dent would not feel justified in 
recognizing a President so chosen. 92 
34 
Huerta replied by action: A typical Mexican election under 
his supervision, which provided for his reelection. Wilson 
had been defied. Within four days Bryan notified the diplo-
matic officers of leading foreign powers: 
that it is his (President) immedi-
ate duty to req~ire Huerta's re-
tirement from the Mexican Govern-
ment, and that the United States 
must now proceed to employ such 
means as be necessary to secure 
this result; and ••• we will not re-
gard as binding upon the people of 
Mexico anything done by Huerta ••• 
The President hopes that the Gov-
ernment to which you are accredit-
ed will see fit to use its influ-
ence to impress upon Huerta the 
wisdom of retiring ••• 93 
If Great Sritain could be brought over to support 
92 Foreign Relations, 1913, Bryan to Nelson, 838. 
93 Ibid., Bryan to certain Diplomatic Officers, 856. The 
word, President, is the author's insertion. 
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Wilson's policy, the acquiescence of the rest of Europe was 
assured. Mexico, probably, could forthwith be reduced in 
reality to the statute of a protectorate of the United States. 
, . 
But "the British felt they had a cau\e; for complaint with the 
American Government, on the matter of the canal tolls; the 
American Government, on the other hanq, felt that the British 
were hampering Wilson's policy in Mexico". 94 Clearly a basis 
for bargaining existed. These considerations no doubt led 
the British to send Sir William Tyrell, secretary to Sir Ed-
ward Grey, to Washington, ostensibly to visit the British am-
bassador, in reality to discuss Mexico and Panama Canal 
tolls. 95 On the following day, November 14, the British min-
ister in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, in union with other diplo-
mats advised Huerta to yield to the President's demands. Yet ~ 
Englishmen were still a trifle baffled at Washington's sup-
port of Carranza and Villa, "hose chara.cters to all appear-
ances were just as tarnished as Huerta's. Wilson, whereupon, 
declared that "Carranza was the best of the three, and Villa 
was not so ~ad as he had been painted".96 
.. ' 
After Europe's apparent turn about, Wilson became 
94 Charles Seymour, Intimate Paper! 2! Colonel H~, It 
Houghton, Mifflin Co_, Boston, 1926. 
95 Baker, IV, 288. 
96 Henrick, 204-5. 
, 
36 
more confident in his "watchful waiting" policy, but the dic-
tator knew the European powers were not opposed to him, and 
did not want him to accept their forced advice. 97 Huerta's 
. 
. ;;. .. ., 
continued negotiations with powers across the sea made Lind 
even more insistent on his plea for armed intervention or at 
least some support for the Constitutio~l forces, but Bryan 
strongly urged the President to continue his non-intervention-
ist policy. As a compromise, ?iilson gave his blessing to Civil 
War by lifting the arms embargo on February 3, 1914, for the 
benefit of the Constitutionalist forces. In fact, this meant 
that Villa and Carranza would now receive munitions openly 
from the United states. 98 In the violence that ensued, a 
British subject was killed and the United States was finding 
it more difficult to refrain from action. 
The situation daily grew more tense, with the result 
~hat a slight indiscretion of a Mexican soldier developed into 
an international crisis. On April 9, 1914, at the port of 
Tampico a subordinate offic,er arrested seven American sailors 
stepping ashore from a tender to buy supplies for the U.S.S. 
e-> 
Dolphin. Two men were also ordered out of the tender flying 
the American flag. The whole group was marched through the 
97 Bemis, 177. 
98 l!U&., 177. 
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town when they met a superior of£icer, who had them quickly 
released with an expression of regret, in which Huerta later 
joined. Admiral Mayo then demanded of General Zaragoza that 
. . 
,1- .. ; he publicly hoist the American flag in a prominent position 
on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns, which salute 
was to be duly answered by this ShiP.9.9 Wilson gave his en-
dorsement to this preposterous demand. Huerta's offer to 
arbitrate, in accordance with the provision of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, consequently was declined by the United 
states as tta subject in no circumstances fit for discussion 
by such a tribunal as that of the Hague tt • lOO 
At this crucial moment, April 20, 1914, President 
'l1ilson "entirely at his easettl01 appeared before Congress to 
ask approval for armed forces: 
99 
100 
101 
102 
.. 
The incident cannot be re-
garded as a trivial one ••• I, 
therefore, ask your approval that 
I should use the armed forces of 
the United States in such ways 
and to such an extent as may be 
necessary to obtain from General 
Huerta and his adherents the full-
est recognition of the rights ~nd 
dignity of the United States.1 2 
Foreign Relations, 1914, 451-52, 474-76. Fletcher to 
the Secretary of the Navy. Wilson to Congress. 
~., 466. Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, 468. O'Shaughnessy 
to Bryan. 
~ York Times, April 21, 1914. 
Foreign Relatio~, 1914, Wilson to Congress, 474-76. 
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The President outlined in detail the events which led up to 
the disturbances at Tampico. In so doing, he magnified the 
occurrences, and deliberately lied in order to strengthen 
, . 
his case against Huerta. In descritrhg the Tampico affair 
Wilson stated that a few days after the incident had oc-
curred, an orderly from the U.S.S. Mi~nesota was arrested 
at Vera Cruz while ashore in uniform to obtain the ship's 
mail, and was for a time thrown in jail. Wilson was aware, 
or should have been, of Admiral Fletcher's report, submitted 
April 16th, which indicated that the mail orderly had been 
immediately released by the Mexican judge, and therefore had 
never been in jail. The sailor was only taken to the jail 
because he could not speak Spanish to state his business to 
the officer in the street. "The attitude of the Mexican au-
thorities", stated Fletcher, "was correct; there is no cause 
for complaint against them and the incident is without sig-
103 
nificance" • 
Congress was not at all enthusiastic in their re-
• 103 Admiral Fletcher to Daniels, April 16, 1914, Foreign., 
Relations, 1914, p. 465. If Wilson ordered the troops 
into Mexico without reading Fletcher's message, his 
negligence is inexcusable; if he did read them, as he 
must have done, he deliberately lied in his message to 
Congress. 
, 
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ception of the President's message. Although the resolution 
received an overwhelming vote, the preceding debate caused 
104 Wilson much concern as to the ultimate outcome. After 
the removal of the decorative fri1i.·~he real motive for the 
bombardment and occupation of Vera Cruz was evident. It was 
not any insult to the flag, but the message from Consul Can-
,.. 
ada of Mexico advising that a cargo of machine guns and am-
munition, consigned to the Mexican Government, would be un-
loaded at that port on April 21st: 
The thing that determined action 
••• was the feeling that if the 
ammunition was landed it would 
strengthen the usurping presi-
dent and increase the loss of 
life in Mexico and that later 
the guns might bio~urned upon 
American youths. 
All contending factions in.Mexico, including Carranza, re-
sented this intervention. In fact, when the bodies of the 
nineteen bluejackets, sacrificed in this action, reached the 
United States, one wonders how Wilson could have been seri-
ous in stating before Congress: tIThe people of Mexico are 
entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own 
way ••• tt .106 
104 ~ ~ Times, April 21, 1914. 
105 Josephus Daniels, 1M Life 2.! VioC!)drow Wilson, 183. 
106 F.~reign Relations, 1914, Wilson to Congress, 476. 
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Were it not for the Deus ~ machina mediation of-
fer by the three leading South American powers, Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, Wilson would have found his policy termin-
, . 
ating in the dead end alley of war.· ~agerly Wilson and Bry-
an, in conjunction with the members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, accepted this La\in American offer. 
The reaction at home and abroad, especially in South America, 
was unmistakably favorable. !h! Springfield Republican could 
not have been more enthusiastic: 
The incident is worth hun-
dreds of tours of South American 
capitals by our Secretaries of 
state, with innumerable speeches 
on Pan-American solidarity. It 
is worth dozens of Pan~American 
conferences. For an act like 
this crystallizes fine words and 
elOquent periods into a landmark 
of Pan-American diplomacy. It 
establishes a prece~o~t; possibly 
it opens a new era. 
As the Conference at Niagara Falls with the ABC 
powers progressed, Wilson became more determined to dominate 
it: 
" The object of our confer-
ences now is to find a method 
by which the inevitable can be 
accomplished without further 
bloodshed. By the inevitable 
we mean not only the elimina-
tion of Huerta, but the comple-
107 ~ Springfield Republican, April 28, 1914. 
.... 
tion of the revol.ution by the 
transfer of political power 
from Huerta to those who rep-
resent the interests and as-
pirations of the people ••• 108 
, . 
;;. .. , 
4l. 
Negatively the President was also an obstacle to the medi-
ators by his refusal to use his influence in having Carranza 
cease hostilities during the Conferen,e. On the other hand, 
Huerta was most cooperative. He offered to resign, provid-
ing his successor would be a neutral, and the ABC powers, at 
President Wilson's request, agreed to,mediate, but an unex-
pected obstacle to this solution presented itself when Car-
ranza refused to submit his pretensions to arbitration. 
t'He would not accept the intervention or even the initiation 
of any foreign government in the internal affairs of the Re-
public. nl09• Bryan stepped in and by doubtful diplomacy ,.. 
saved the situation by backing Carranza. And when reminded 
that he had pledged himself to support the Mexican delega-
tion in naming a neutral candidate, he replied: 
When you can't keep a prom-
ise, you can't keep it, and that 
is all there is to it. I donttllO want to hear any more about it. 
108 Foreign Relations, 1914, Bryan to the Special Com-
missioners, 506. 
109 ~xcelsior, Dec. 2, 1925. 
110 Ibid., Sept. 2, 1925, Editorial of Salado Alvarez. 
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When it was suggested that a civilian be chosen to fill the 
provisional presidency, Bryan became still more emphatic: 
"Not Carranza must be provisional president, and permanent 
president" .111 Without a doubt the·~'tcretary of State' 8 
stand was due to Lind's insistent demands that the temporary 
president be nan avowed Constitutionalist".112 Yet it i8 
.. 
difficult to reconcile this method of filling an elective 
office with Wilson's passion to make the world "safe for 
democracy"'. 
This unqualified support of the Constitutionalist 
leader was something of a mystery to the powers abroad, who 
criticized constantly the savage banditry of the Mexican 
leaders. Wilson, consequently, was at pains to rectify their 
notions: 
" 
The thing which seems to me moat 
important now with respect to the 
Mexican business is that over 
there (Europe) the people should 
get a more Just and correct view 
of Villa. Carranza I believe to 
be honest ••• a person who can be 
counted on to try and do the 
right thingsl l13 
In time he would be forced to admit the rectitude of the ~ 
European views. 
III Ibid., Nov. 16, 1925, Editorial of Salado Alvarez. 
112 lQreign Relations, 1914, 523, also, 505, 512. 
113 Baker, IV, 347, Wilson to Page. 
, 
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The agreement which after interminable discussions 
was finally reached on June 24th was far indeed from carry-
ing out Wilsont s program, but it indirectly fulfilled many 
, . 
of his desires. War was avoided; Hffe*ta resigned on July 
15th; and the way was prepared for Carranza to step into 
power on August 2~st; but more than a 1r else, the ABC Medi-
ation powers, with the cooperation of the United States, 
helped to bring appreciably nearer a concert and harmony of 
the western world.I~4 
The world acclaimed Wilson for his diplomatic tri-
umph and applauded his policy as a definite victory for hu-
manity, but the President was not deceived. From July 1914, 
to October, ~915, Carranza, Villa and Zapata took turns in 
overrunning Mexico City. A vociferous minority in the United~ 
states gradually increased their cry for intervention to pro-
tect the life and property of Americans. Wilson foresaw that 
if the Mexican problem were not settled before the war in 
Europe ended, there would be solid grounds for foreign inter-
vention. 115• As a last resort the President called again upon 
r South America to advise on what regime to support as a pro-
visional government pending honest election. "Mexico is ap-
114 Baker, IV, 350. 
115 Bemis, 180. 
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parently no nearer a solution~, Wilson tragically admitted, 
"than she was when the revolution was first enkindled. tt11.6 
The Ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and 
. 
the Ministers from Bolivia, Uruguay ida Guatamala met with 
Secretary of state Lansing on October 9th, 1915, earnestly 
hoping to prevent the intervention Wilson was contemplating.ll? 
• Within two days the delegates decided that the Carr~cista 
party was the only party possessing the essentials for recog-
nition as the de facto government, and they so reported to 
their respective governments. On October 19, 1915, the 
united States government recognized Venustiano Carranza as 
the Chief Executive of Mexico,118 in the hope that inter-
national support of his government would enable him to re-
store peace. Simultaneously President Wilson proclaimed an 
embargo on arms to Mexico, except for shipments made to the 
newly organized government. 119 
Villats reaction to such recognition was an indig-
nation overshadowed only by his defiance against our country. 
He sought revenge by taking American lives on American soil, 
.. 
with the ulterior motive of causing armed intervention by the 
116 Foreign Relation§, 1915, 694. 
117 ~bid., 695. 
118 Foreign Relations, 1915, Lansing to Parker, 771. 
119 ~., 760-82. 
45 
united States. His dream was to have all Mexico rally under 
his standard to beat off the Colossus of the North. When 
this outlaw murdered sixteen young American engineers working 
. 
for Carranza, Congress was for arme~ ~ntervention, but Wilson 
t d th Fi t Ch " ~'thl "~" t· 120 accep e e rs ~e~ s wor ess prom~se o~ JUs 1ce. 
villa's raids into New Mexico were the straw that broke the 
'. camel's back. When Wilson called out the militia to pursue 
Villa into Mexican territory, intervention became reality. 
Carranza bitterly condemned the American invasion on Mexican 
soil and he warned that Hthe move could easily lead to wartt • 121 
In June) war was almost declared when several clashes occurred 
between some men of Per.shing's command and Mexicans at Parral, 
and a collision with a force of Carranza's troops at Carriza1. 
The United States President still determined to 
keep peace, adopted Lansing's suggestion of a joint Mexican-
American co~nission to reach an understanding. The net re-
sult of the New London Conference was a victory for Mexican 
diplomacy: The withdrawal of American troops from Mexican 
territory; the restoration of full diplomatic relations be-
-
tween the two countries; and the decision to rigorously patrol 
the borders against further raids. 
----,---
120 Bemis, 181. 
121 Foreign ~tions, 1916, 486. 
122 Stephenson, 313. 
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When immediate di~~iculties were smoothed over, 
Wilson concentrated his attention upon the national campaign 
~or the pre~idency. A~ter his re-e~ection, the break with 
.. ,;, 
Germany came. Step by step, the United States was gradually 
sucked into the European maelstrom. Wilson was eager to 
have an understanding wi th Carranza .... When the Mexican Con-
gress assembled as an electoral college and made Carranza 
president, and a new constitution was drawn up, Wilson quick-
ly granted de jure recognition to Carranza by exchanging am-
bassadors on March 3, 1.917. With the ~ormal elevation of 
Carranza to the presidency and the adoption of a constitution 
which embodied many of the re~orms of the revolution, Wilson 
rested content that his principal objectives in Mexico had 
been gained. 123 On April 4, the United States Congress de-
clared war against Germany. For the next two years, the 
Mexican question remained in the background. 
When the United States entered into the European 
con~lict, it was more or less expected that Mexico wou1.d side 
with the allies and the United States, since Carranza's ad-
ministration, a~ter all, owed its existence to President Wil-
son and the United States. This was not to be the case. Far 
from itl Carranza came out almost immediately in favor of a 
123 Bemis, 1.82-1.83. 
47 
"most strict neutrality". The folly of President Wilson's 
policy soon revealed itself. The Mexican Ambassador at 
Washington, Bonilla, declared: 
~. Our chief aim is to remain 
neutral. To us this is not only 
a just but necessary policy. 
Mexico's position is not like 
that of other countries, •• If the 
question of national honor or 
Mexico's sovereign rights were 
involved, a deliberate policy of 
self-sacrifice might be neces-
sary. But the belligerent coun-
tries have not given us cause for 
resentment, and our interests 
have not been injured, nor have 
they been seriously threatened. 
We cannot afford to participate 
in the war on one side or the 
other if we can possibly avoid 
it. Our policy is, therefore, 
one of peace and reconstruction 
as against war and ravage. 124 
Mexico, however, did not maintain a strict neutral-
ity, but, in fact, lent a willing ear to German intrigue. 
Carranza, moreover, sought to undermine the influence of Wil-
son in Latin America, and issued decrees which brought down 
upon him the implacable enmity of American vested interests. 
For instance, at a time when the uninterrupted flow of oiL, 
from the fields of Tampico was essential, Carranza took steps 
to interfere in the oil industry by issuing edicts in pursu-
ance of Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1917 which gave 
r 
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direct dominion over subsoil product. to the nation. 125 This 
was to mark the great oil controversy between Mexico and 
American-British interests. The publication of the Zimmerman 
, . 
,1- .-. 
note also cast grave suspicions on Mexico's sympathies. 
Such a policy was the expression of gratitude to 
the man 'and the nation that placed Cqrranza in power. Yet a 
statement of Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps a bit extreme, more 
justly shifts the blame from the First Chief to the White 
House Head whose efforts unhappily changed the course of a na-
tion and later a world: 
Mexico is our Balkan Penin-
sula, and during the last five 
years, thanks largely to Mr. Wil-
son's able assistance, it has been 
reduced to a condition as hideous 
as that of the Balkan Peninsula 
under Turkish rule.126 
For almost ten years, the financier, colonist and 
statesman were absorbed in this Mexican drama directed by 
Woodrow Wilson. Through the study of government documents, 
newspapers and the research efforts of historians, we have 
been able in this first chapter to obtain a clear enough per-
" r-
spective to Justify critical Judgments on the dramatis Rer-
sQn~!, who appeared on the Mexican stage during the critical 
125 Ibid., 523-524. 
:iIIi'I 
126 Record, 65 Cong. 3 Sess., LVII, App. 377. Rep. Norman J. 
GroUlClof New York quoted part of T. Roosevelt's last 
message to the Ame~ican people. 
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·' 
years of that nation three decades ago. Yet the political 
and economic problems were not the only issues at stake. 
Revolution, and then, religious persecution added to the al-
. 
ready existing complications. The C~~ch could not remain 
silent, as long as the sword of injustice caused Mexican 
blood to flow. 
The secular press, perhaps, was not completely 
aware that the majority of Mexicans were more concerned with 
policies infringing on religious liberty for themselves, 
than on concessions granting tax reductions to American 
capitalists. The religious-minded in the United states, too, 
quite naturally, anxiously regarded the moral implications 
of the two governments' policies. Thus, while a Chicago 
Tribune was blasting Wilson's wavering measures, or a New 
York World applauded the President's apparent strategy, the 
religious press was influencing the political views of its 
readers by the editors' criticism of the religious conse-
quences of '.1ilson' s Mexican policy. Since the Protestant 
pre ss, howe'ler, b earned wi th approval on our Administration t s 
rejection of the Catholic dictator, Huerta, while the Catho-
lic papers vehemently disapproved of Wilson's friendship 
clasp with Carranza and Villa, the tools of anti-clericals, 
the policies of the religious press aimed at influencing po-
50 
litical action are deserving of a special study. 
" 
"', 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROTESTANT PRESS ON WILSON'S POLICY 
, . 
.. .-, 
By 1910, the Protestant missionary was no stranger 
in Mexico. His first beachhead had been established, when 
he entered that land with Bible and.tract in hand in the 
wake of the American armies in 1846. Progress was slow. 
Then, Diaz in the 1880's opened the Mexican gates to colon-
ists, merchants and tycoons from the North. Soon, Sunday 
schools, churches, publishing houses and institutions of 
higher learning were found in the larger cities. By 1902, 
sixteen denominations had established camps to war on the 
Roman Catholic Church. In 1916, due to the favor of the 
revolutionary leaders, there were six hundred Protestant , ... 
churches and places of regular worship and four hundred Sun-
day schools with a total enrollment of over forty thousand. 
While the number of conversions was insignificant in the 
-
light of the years of labor and money spent, yet the fact 
remained that the Protestants under Diaz had been tolerated 
• 
.. 
and encouraged by some of the revolutionist leaders. The 
horizon seemed bri~ht, even rosy, after Huerta's downfall 
and Carranza's rise to power. It was only natural then, 
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.' 
that the Protestants in the United States after investing so 
much in men and money in the Mexican missions should follow 
the political maneuvers during the revolutionary days with 
, . 
the keenest interest. ,.,. .. " 
The whole world in fact watched with an interested 
and critical eye the apparent victory.of absolutism over 
democratic institutions when General Diaz was sworn in on 
December 5, 1910, for the eighth time as President of Mexico. 
Yet all was not well, for the tremor of revolution could be 
felt. The ceremony indicated this as it took place quietly 
with none of the pomp and publicity usual on such occasions, 
nor were the people allowed to collect in crowds in the 
streets. A general air of uneasiness seemed to pervade the 
capital, when the Commissioners were sent to negotiate with 
the revolutionary leaders ways and means of bringing the 
present disturbance to an end. 
Hardly had the echo of the inauguration died away 
when the presses of the world were set in motion to blare 
forth the event. Diaz once again came to the fore as thou-
" 
sands of editors favorably or unfavorably evaluated his lite, 
his works and Mexico's future. Nor was the Protestant press 
silent. For as the editor of the Presbyterian Ba~ empha-
sized: ttProtestantism has had place in Mexico only during 
.... 
53 
the last twogenerations».l This statement well explained 
the strong backing the paper had given the General in the 
July elections: 
, . 
Government by th~ ~onstitu­
tion was his platform.- Mistakes 
were made, but Mexico was gov-
erned and prospered ••• No one can 
question that his rule has been 
far more efficient than~y with 
changing Presidents could have 
been. He had encouraged democ-
racy too, looking forward to the 
day when the nation might be 
really self controlling ••• The Ad-
ministration of Diaz is not demo-
cratic. It could not be with the 
widespread indifference among the 
masses. 2 
The Baptists, who were also active in Mexico and knew on 
which side their bread was buttered, in the Standard loudly 
proclaimed Diaz as tithe great general, the greater presi-
dentu • 3 The refrain, however, was quite different on the 
editorial page of the Southern Methodist Review: ~e (Diaz) 
educated people in helplessness - he is a short sighted and 
self blinded egotistH • 4 
The growing revolutionary opposition at the time 
• 
of the inauguration gave strength to the Methodis~ geviewta 
1 Presbyterian Banner (Pittsburgh), Dec. 15, 1910. 
2 Presbyteri~ Banner, July 14, 1910. 
3 Standard, (Chicago), Baptist, July 9, 1910. 
,4 Southern Methodist ,Quarterly Revi,2, (Nashville), Oct. 
1910. 
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attitude and indicated that, perhaps, Diaz's greatness was 
exaggerated. The Standarg, though, was quick to explain that 
the unrest in Mexico was ttnot due to any failure of Diaz to 
. 
serve his country well ••• but becaus~~ party believes that he 
has served his country long enough~.5 The undenominational 
QPristian Herald, always conservative until the direction of 
'. the wind could safely be ascertained, preferred to diagnose 
the revolt as "leveled less against Diaz personally than 
against the unrepublican and autocratic system he repre-
6 sents~. In direct opposition to the 'Southern n~ethodists too, 
their northern brethren of the Christ1Sll Advocate could see 
no reason for being on the defensive: 
The greatness of Porfirio 
Diaz is seen in the fact that he 
has taken oath as President of 
Mexico for the eighth time. Of -
course he exercised autocratic 
power at various times. Had he 
not done so confusion worse con- 7 
founded would have been the result. 
This optimistic note was sustained by the Presbyterian ~anner , 
in reporting that during one of the President's public appear-
ances " ••• tne air was also full of acclamation and applause. 
It was a genuine, spontaneous ovation".8 Emboldened by the 
5 Dec. 3, 1910. 
6 Christian Herald, (New York), Dec. 7, 1910. 
7 Qhristian Advocate, (New York), Methodist, Dec. 15, 1910. 
8 Jan. 5, 1910. 
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.' 
general press support, the Christian Herald became enthusi-
astic: 
President Diaz in his abil-
ity and his officialaQministra-
tion is one of the moi!'bi" remark-
able men in the world ••• order 
will be speedily restored in the 
revolutionary districts and the 
nation will hav9 continued peace and prosperity." 
In his election platform Diaz had promised several 
democratic innovations, and when their fulfillment was de-
layed, the Independent cooled in its attitude toward the 
President. It thought that if ttDiaz is convinced that justice 
requires a distribution of land, he should not wait for the 
revolutionists to lay down their arms, but should take meas-
ures at once to make the proposed reforms effective".lO With-
in a month its policy became actually hostile when the editor ~ 
remarked that "President Diaz did well for twenty or thirty 
years, but it is time that he stepped down from the Presiden-
tial chair ... l1 
DIAZ RESIGNS 
I~ rapid fashion the Ingependent's wish came true, 
.. ' 
and Diaz's resignation was an accepted fact. The Protestant 
9 Jan. 25, 1911. 
10 Independent, (New York), Congregationalist, Mar. 24, 1911. 
11 April 24, 19l1~ 
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press changed horses rapidly, but the Christian Herald was 
not afraid to give the great ruler a final eulogistic fare-
well: "His rule has been that of the iron rod, but he had 
12 made Mexico a nation". But when ~:archy, bloodshed and 
destruction continued to rule the day, the press now and 
again could not refrain from reminiscing about the peaceful 
.. 
prosperi ty under the deSl)otic Diaz. "It is not too much to 
say", recalled the Standard, "that Mexico moved forward two 
centuries in her material welfare during the thirty-six'years 
of Diaz's reign" .. 13 tfhile the Q.htistian Q!!ntury remembered 
that "under the benevolent dictatorship of Diaz the nation 
was held in restraint ••• but order and happiness were main-
tained among the people" .14 Not even time, however, could 
mellow the tone of the Methodi~~ Review towards Diaz, and 
years later, 1916 to be exact, while this paper was trying to 
win favor for Carranza, its readers were informed that: 
••• while Porfirio Diaz came into 
power as a liberal by means of a 
revolution; he ended his career 
as a reactionary and a favorite 
of the clericals and the foreign 
" investors .15 
12 June 10, 1911. 
13 Nov. 15, 1913. 
14 Nov. 6, 1913~ 
15 July, 1916. 
.. ' 
-
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Mexico has usually been cursed with bloodshed when-
ever there is a change of her first executive, and the effort 
to supplant Diaz was to prove no exception. With the conse-
. 
quent injury to foreign interests i~ rife and property in 
Mexico, President Taft was being forced to take action. The 
sending of troops to the border under .the pretext of maneuv-
ers was his initial move. The Christia:n lldvocate was among 
. the first of the religious press to discuss this vital proh1em. 
Its editorial column implicitly told the President to send 
the troops into Mexico by holding that "the United States 
must protect the property of foreigners or forfeit the use of 
the Monroe Doctrine".16 The President too, received a nod of 
a;>proval from the Standard "for his wise move in the sending 
of troops to the border, where they are ready to intervene if ~ 
necessary tt.17 But what was most surprising was the vigorous 
support of the Christian Herald at such an early date: 
.. 
The Christian Herald and 
its readers do not approve of 
war and we chronicle with reluc-
tance anything in the nature of 
a warlike demonstration; but the 
present instance is one of a 
great power using its moral and 
material influence for the pres-
ervation of order and the pro- 18 
tection of human life and property. 
16 March 16, 1911. 
17 March 18, 1911. 
18 March 22, 1911. 
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Seldom does a Washington move meet wi th universal 
accord, and the Independent's reaction helped to make Taft's 
latest step no exception. While the necessity of sending 
troops to the border was fully acknow~~dged because Europe 
insisted on the protection of her investments, nevertheless, 
this paper asked "why did Taft attempt to disguise or conceal 
.. 
his sending of the troops to the border7~19 This was the 
first step in the evolution of the Independent's isolation-
ist attitude, which developed greatly within a month. Now, 
the Illi!~m!~ says that "peace depends on Diaz's resigna-
tion~, yet strongly warns the President that 
••• this is the business of Mexico 
not for us. We have no present 
right to intervene and can antici-
pate no occasion which will re-
quire it ••• The days of war for 
terri~8rial expansion ought to be 
past. 
So desirous was the Independent for peace that Taft's efforts 
in early May to bring about a temporary armistice between 
Diaz and Madero brought forth an encomium of our President: 
ttIt has been fortunate for both countries that the occupant 
of the White House is a patient and just man, having a sen~ 
of humor and well endowed with common sense".2l Taft had won 
19 March 24, 1911. 
20 April 24, 1911. 
21 May 4, 1911. 
-
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a new friend, and it was a difficult friendship to win. And 
so complete was this victory, that even when the armistice 
collapsed, the Independent was willing to consider the neces-
. 
sity of intervention because "we arl ~onfident that Mr. Taft 
will deal with the situation calmly and wisely".22 
MADERO IN POWER .. 
Generally speaking, the policy of the Protestant 
Press changed with the reversal of Diaz's fortunes. The 
editorials of the Qh!istianlierald as usual were so tempered 
that later they could be interpreted as a defense for the 
winning side: 
There is not a member of Ma-
dero's staff who does not overtop 
him in inches, but the silent lit-
tle fellow is easily the leading 
and controlling agent among the 
turbulent spirits that surround. 
He is "Provisional President" but 
should the revolution succeed as 
now seems probable, Madero will 
step aside promptly for some one 
of more statesmanlike cali~re and 
larger public experience. 2 
As the Madero movement gathered momentum, so did the C4ristian 
" Herald's enthusiasm "for the great little Mexican, who yet 
r 
may be hailed as the liberator of the South Republic 'from 
petty despotism and narrow ecclesiasticismu • 24 The Presby-
-----,---
22 May 11, 1911. 
23 May 24, 1911. 
24 June 21, 1911. 
60 
~erian ~~nner lost no time either in jumping on the bandwagon 
of the apparently triumphant Madero as it assured its readers 
that "Mr. Madero has certainly won not only the confidence 
. 
but also the affections of those wit~~hom he has come into 
contact".25 
By August"this turncoat poliiY b'ecame even more 
easily explainable when the Presb~~ian Ban~ highlighted 
"Mr. Madero's assurance that he would not reward the Catholic 
Party for their support by abrogating the laws of Juarez lt • 26 
The Christian Advocate, too, was most jubilant because "Madero 
had thus far demonstrated his sanity and strength fl while "the 
Catholic attempt to form a national party failed". 27 Al-
though the Indepe~g~nt had advocated Diaz's resignation, not 
until Madero's success at the polls did it come around to ad-
mit reluctantly that "while Madero is not the greatest and 
wisest of men, he was the logical candidate of the revolution 
and he deserved to be electedtt • 28 Nevertheless, one couldn't 
blame its editor for prophesying that "in addition to the dif-
ficulties of the situation, the failure to fulfill his ex-
travagant promises would lead to Madero's downfall tt • 29 .. ' 
25 June 29, 1911. 
26 Aug. 4, 1911. 
27 Oct. 19, 1911. 
28 Oct. 6, :1.911. 
29 Sept. 7, 191:1.. 
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This inability of Madero to keep his extravagant 
election platform was the blow that aroused the opposition 
with consequent loss of life and property. Again the ugly 
. 
head of intervention seemed ready t~ ~ise. The Christian 
agvocate again was early to raise the war whoop: IhNar would 
be bad, but our citizens must be prote,.ctedtt • 30 The peace 
loving Presbyterian Banner continued to urge all concerned 
"to give Madero two or three years to work out his reform'f .31 
Madero was even interviewed by the !Adependent on the pos-
sibility of peace, but it was not able to share his optimis-
tic view.32 Such pessimism became justified as 1912 drew to 
a close and conditions grew more unsettled, and the cry for 
immediate reform more vehement. The Inde12endent was certain 
that Washington would ttadopt a firmer policy".33 The fore-
cast was literally fulfilled, when Taft in February, 1913, 
demanded prompt relief of the chaotic conditions caused by 
the revolt under the leadership of Reyes and Felix Diaz. 
According to the Preggyterian Banner, this message was an 
"u1timatumff • 34 The Independent mournfully read the message 
.. 
30 Jan. 4, 1912. 
31 March 13, 1912. 
32 Aug. 1, 1912. 
33 Dec. 26, 1912. 
34 Feb. 20, 1912. 
.'" 
, 
in the same light, yet it hoped for the best because 
Mr. Taft's attitude toward Mexico 
during the revolution ••• was char-
acterized by patience and good 
judgment. Such is h~s..attitude 
now, and we are glad"t~ hear that 
the members of both parties in 
Congress are in agreement with 
him • 
••• Intervention in Mexico would 
mean war ••• We believe that war 
would be little short of a cal-
amity ••• Every effort not forbid-
den by the dignity of a great na-
tion and its regard for citizens 
abroad must be ex3erted to avoid such a conflict. 5 
Then it concluded with a wish that later did become a 
62 
reality in the ABC Mediation Conferences at Niagara Falls: 
••• the cooperation of the un-
biased South American Republics 
should be sought for any efforts 
to mediate or conciliate in Mex-
ico. 36 
During these critical days the Baptist Watq~ was satisfied 
with the policy of the Administration, which was holding out 
against 
.. 
••• some of those rasher citizens 
who call for intervention in be-
half of order ••• but fortunately 
the Government at Washington has 
not yet sought glory in that di-
rection. 3 ? 
35 Feb. 20, 1912. 
36 Feb. 20, 1912. 
3? Watchman, (Cincinnati), Baptist, Feb. 20, 1912. 
.. ' 
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HUERTA APPEARS 
After February 18th, Mexico presented an entirely 
new problem: Generals Huerta and Diaz had overthrown Ma-
. 
dero's government. 
.. . ;., 
Since there seemed to be a peaceful day 
dawning on the distant horizon, the Watchman hailed ttthis 
coup as one of the most sensible thin~s that has been done 
in connection with the present uprisingtt • 38 But Huerta im-
mediately lost all chance for favor when he murdered ex-
President Madero and his Vice President Suarez. The Pres-
byterian Banner succinctly summed up the immediate reaction 
of many people: liThe world is shocked at the evident foul 
taking off of Madero and Suarez and expects little of 
Huerta and his accomplicesn • 39 The editorial of the Chri§-
tian ~dvocate was merely an echo of that of the llimn~: 
" 
The killing of Gustavo Ma-
dero under a fictitious charge, 
followed by the murder of Ma-
dero and Suarez under similar 
pretenses, has shaken the con-
fidence of the world in the 
sincerity ~d honesty of Gener-
al Huerta. 
The Inder2~ndent referred to the incident as ttan atrocious .. ' 
murder f1 ;41 while the Christian Century doubted tf if the 
38 Feb. 27, 1912. 
39 Feb. 23, 1913. 
40 Feb. 27, 1913. 
41 Feb. 27, 1913. 
-
, 
64 
executors of such a treacherous plot could be moved by senti-
ments of civilized patriotism or humanitytto42 As usual there 
was a less damning attitude in the observation of the Chris-
. 
tian Herald that the deaths occurre& ~ 
-
••• under circumstances that indi-
cate a deliberate assassination 
plot. The slim pretext that the 
shooting occurred durint; an at-
tempted "rescue" by Madero's par-
tisans has been put forth by the 43 
gQvernment but finds few believers. 
This story was also quite indigestible for the Independent, 
especially when the commander of the "escort" accompanying 
the victims "was promoted";44 and it became convinced of its 
suspicions when after ttnearly six months have passed, Huerta 
still has refused to hold an investigation into Madero's 
death".45 Two years later, however, the Sherlock Holmes edi-
tor of the Presbyterian ~anneF condescended to explain to 
those still baffled that "in Madero's death you will find in 
the background the Roman Catholic Church using the adventurer, 
Huerta, a s the cat' s paw for the acc:omplishment of her own 
ends".46 
" 
Madero was dead, yet the question of his greatness 
42 Christian Century, (Chicago), Disciples of Christ, 
Mar. 20, 1913. . 
43 March 5, 1913. 
44 April 10, 1913. 
45 Aug. 21, 1913. 
46 May 27, 1915. 
-
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was still debated. ~When time enough has past to permit ot a 
right perspective, we believe that justice will be done his 
memory~ was the eulogy of the +ndeQ~dent.47 But most of the 
other papers preferred to ttlet time:weittough pass" before com-
mitting themselves to an evaluation of Madero. How impolitic 
it might prove to alienate oneself from Huerta1 It was only 
.. 
after the dictator's power evidenced serious weakness that 
the ~tandarq voiced its opinion "for Madero as an exceptional 
man ••• He died a martyr to the cause of humble natives".48 
The Watchman-~x~miner took up the chorus in lamenting that 
"Mexico's greatest loss was in the foul murder of Madero, an 
unselfish patriot and a martyr to his efforts to redeem Mex-
ico tt • 49 A feature article in the New Age by Jose Castellot, 
the Grand Commander of the ~Jasons in Mexico, leaves little 
doubt of its sentiments: 
" 
With the faith 0 f the in-
spired with the fortitude of the 
Apostle, Madero scattered every-
where his Gospel of love, of com-
munity of good ••• But he was an 
apostle rather than a ruler, a 
dreamer rather than a st~tesman. 
Madero could not keep the prom-
ises made, nor check the natural 
47 March 6, 1913. 
48 Jan. 3, 1914. 
49 Wat~~~-Examiner, (Cincinnati), Feb. 12, 1914; 
The WatchmaQ was affiliated with the Examiner. 
, 
reaction caused by the disillusion-
ment of the people.50 
INTERVENTION OR ANNEXATION 
66 
The downfall of Madero ens,o',araged many people to be-
lieve that the only solution of Mexican problems was annex-
ation under some form. The once peace-loving IndeRend~, 
now completely dissatisfied with the Jharchy south of the 
border, could see 
absolutely no reason w'hy, if any 
portion of Mexico should be an-
nexed it would have to remain as 
a subject of possession with no 
hope of admission to statehood. 
This would put an end to her prob-
lem. 5l 
The next week, however, the editors moderated their policy to 
an offer of United States' help in union with several South 
American nations, and it concluded in a manner quite baffling 
to its previous week's readers with the warning that "we must 
-
keep hands off, however much Americans may desire annexation 
and even intervention lt • 52 During the next week, just to main-
tain some consistency, it urged "President Wilson to follow 
Taft' s poli~y of non-intervention".53 But two weeks later .. ,a 
flicker of the old light must have returned for the paper 
50 N ew ~S!!, (Washington), Masonic, Feb. 1915. 
51 Feb. 20, 1913. 
52 Feb. 27, 1913. 
53 March 6, 1913. 
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could not see "how it would be conside!'ed intervention, if the 
northern states wanted to secede from Mexico and become an-
nexed to the United States't .54 The Christian Centurx failed 
. 
to see eye to eye with the lBdepende~t~and offered a solution 
on an entirely different pattern: 
During all this what has the 
Uni ted. states done? Sh# has done 
nothing worthy of her ideals or 
her precedents ••• Her diplomatic 
measures have .been anything but 
creditable ••• if our government 
had played a stronger hand the 
life of Madero might have been 
spared, and the reforms which he 
advocated might have been sub-
stantially accomplished. It 
would not have required interven-
tionl ••• We do not favor war ••• Now 55 
only the churches can bring peace. 
S. G. Inman, the missioner, who later appeared before the 
United States Senate's Investigation Committee on the Mexican -
Affair, confirmed the Qgristian Centurx's policy in a special 
article stating that 'fintervention would not solve Mexico's 
problems any more than the 'iron hand' did - but only the re-
ligion of Jesus Christlf • 56 It is the same Mr. Inman, who is 
six weeks la~er featuring another article on the virtues of 
54 Mar. 20, 1913. 
55 Mar. 20, 1913. 
56 April 20, 1913. 
, 
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Carranza, the new patron of his Protestant Institute in Mex-
ieo lf • 57 
Vii th Woodrow \-lilson's inauguration in March, all 
. 
eyes were turned towards Washington;'iir expectation of a 
formal statement of policy. There were hints of opposition 
to Huerta given in his early addresses, but nothing was 
• defini tee By July, the press was impatient. According to 
the ~hristian Advocate's sense of justice 
••• it is an inconsistency for the 
United States to recognize the 
Chinese Republic, concerning the 
desirability of which there is 
room to doubt, while d~nying the 
same favor to Mexico. 58 
The irritation of the Christian !!erald at Wilson's failure 
to provide a Mexican program was put as forcibly as its con-
servative policy would allow at this early stage of the new 
Administrationl 
" 
Our Government has been pa-
tient and forebearing - perhaps 
too long - but a point has now 
been reached where further toler-
ance ceases to be a virtue and 
the adoption of a firm and defi-
nite policy becomes an imperative 
duty. We owe it to other powers, 
no less than to ourselves ••• This 
does not necessarily mean inter-
vention. 59 .1 
57 July 3, 1913. 
58 July 10, 1.913. 
59 July 30, 1913. 
.' 
-
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While the Watchman deplored the Administration's inaction, yet 
it became alarmed at the report of Secretary Bryan's greedy 
desire to annex our southern neighbor, and if the report was 
true, it warned him of the ttchimera11p '~hat would result. 60 The 
only point the Standard wanted to insist on with the President 
was that "war with Mexico must be avoided at all coststt.61 
• The ~ndependent, however, still retained its patience with 
Wilson because 
Presumably the Administration has 
complete knowledge of the elements 
in the situation. And it is the 
Administration, with the aid of 
Congress, that must decide what we 
shall do.62 
The diplomatic world was more than surprised when 
the action of the White House Head was restricted to sending 
a personal representative to Mexico to report secretly to _ 
him on affairs there. His choice was the unfrocked, divorced 
clergyman, William Bayard Hale. The Watchman, now disgusted, 
sarcastically referred to Hale as the diplomat, who 
• •• having been in the count~ two 
months natl1raJJ),,63 knows all about 
the country, the people and the 
remedies needed. So President Wil-
son has taken his advice rather 
60 July 30, 1913. 
61 Aug. 16, 191.3. 
62 July 31, 1913. 
63 In the original, the word was in italics. 
.' 
than that of an accredited repr~­
sentative of the United States. 4 
MISSION OF LIND 
70 
Hale's mission resulted in,the recall of the Ambas-
sador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, which the Presbyterian 
Banner considered as lithe first step in President Wilson's 
Mexican policy".65 Enamored by the d\batable achievement of 
his first representative, the President decided again to ig-
nore the counsel of Congress, and instead, send another per-
sonal agent to Mexico, John Lind. His success in Mexico was 
most doubtful as far as the Independent could see: 
Ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota, 
special representative of President 
Wilson and adviser to the United 
States Embassy, cannot be regarded 
as a man having exceptional quali-
fications for the mission •• ~We pre-
sume that Lind was selected by 
Secretary Bryan, whom he greatly 
admires ••• It seemed to us that the 
work might better have been done 
by a commission of eminent A~5ri­
cans clothed with authority. 
The Presbyterian Banner, nevertheless, believed that "things 
are more optimistic in regard to the Mexican situation now 
that Lind has arrived in Mexico Cityu.67 There was a hopeful 
.. ' 
note heard from the ~stian ~ald too, because 
64 Aug. 21, 1913. 
65 Aug. 7, 1913. 
66 Aug. 14, 1913. 
67 Aug~ 14, 1913. 
-
Lind is said' to be a practical, 
clear-headed man; and although 
the sending of a personal envoy 
on such a mission is a striking 
innovation in diplomacy, the re-
sult of the experiment may prove 
it to have been whol~·-.Justified. 68 
71 
Two weeks later, though, the optimism of the PresbyteriAn 
Banner was considerably dampened when Huerta refused Lindts 
.. 
proposals. Sadly it quoted a Mexican Dailys 
John Lind has come to Mexico to 
assure the election against v. 
Huerta •• ' .now there is not an 
honest Mexican soul, who will 
not vote for Huerta ••• President 
Wilson has taken it upon himself 
to crystallize the popularity of 
Huerta until he has become the 
incarnation of n~gional dignity 
and sovereignty. 
When the bright sun of peace fail.ed to break through the 
blackness of anarchy two months later, the Independent looked_ 
on the appointment of Lind as ~an irregularity ••• which was 
highly offensive to, irritating and humiliating to the Mex-
ican nation".70 
To save face and his c:ontrol of Congress, the 
President ~as forced to cover over the blotch, that was the 
.. ' 
Lind mission. His scheme was a message to Congress. In this 
68 Aug. 20, 1913. 
69 Sept. 4, 1913 - herein is quoted the "I! Diario~ Aug. 28, 
1913. 
70 Nov. 13, 1913. 
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talk he not only If took the members into his confidence, but 
he painted the re~&on for the Lind fiasco in the lively col-
ors of a humane mission. This message was greeted by the 
. 
Christian Iierald as "the plain and thl!.dorned recital of a 
humane and worthy effort which meets the general approval of 
the country".71 The Indepen~ent was also temporarily won 
.. 
over by the address: "The American people have reason to be 
proud of President Wilson's address to Congress ••• he coun-
seled patience ••• we should do well to follow his advice".72 
Even prouder was the §~an~~ that 
••• at least one great nation can 
inaugurate a new kind of diplo-
macy in which moral considera-
tions have a place, and we believBa it will be ultimately successful.or 
Even after two months of no success, its exuberance was not 
lessened: 
It is a noble policy. The Presi-
dent should be given a fair 
chance to work out the giant task 
he has set himself that the na-
tion may be worthy of its motto, 
uIn God we trusttt • 74 
The boastin~ of the Christian Century sounded like a school-
boy, holding that "President Vlilson in his dealings with 
71 Sept. 10, 1913. 
72 Sept. 4, 1913. 
73 Sept. 6, 1913. 
74 Nov. 8, 1913. 
73 
.' . 
Mexico is standing upon a principle more advanced than has 
ever before formed the basis of international policy".75 The 
faith of the Independent, however, was greatly shaken in Wil-
son' s purely humane in.tentions, when;p~e of its special cor-
respondents wrote from Mexico that the President was affili-
ating himself with Carranza. He asked: 
.. Is Carranza in any way super-
ior to Huerta? Has he not bloody 
hands? •• In refusing to ever rec-
ognize Huerta, the administration 
has violated our usage an~6the 
dictates of common sense. 
In his dealings with Mexico, Wilson had placed great 
stress on the necessity of popular elections in that land. It 
was this aspect of his policy that caused the Watchman-
Ex~~iner to take pause; for if four-fifths of the nation was 
under the dictator's control, it seemed reasonable to advise 
If President Wilson not to urge popular elections nowtt • 77 Yet 
Wilson would not accept advice, and the elections were held. 
-
The edi toria~ column of the f,resbyterign ~~ told the re-
sult: tiThe dread spectre of a dictator has arisen in Mexico".78 
The Indep.!m:~ wrote that "Huerta has made himself dictator 
.. ' .~.there remains not even the pretense of constitutional gov-
75 Nov. 13, 1913. 
76 Dec. 11, 1913. 
77 Sept. 18, 1913. 
78 Oct. 16, 19~3. 
74 
ernmenttt• 79 The Watchman-E~~miner now sat back with the ttl 
told you solt attitude as it commented that "only 10,000 out 
of 80,000 vo"tedtt ; it also added that tfthe Catholic Party 
. 
had the majority, but the election ~a~ not constitutionally 
valid lf • 80 And two issues later it referred to the elections 
as Ita farce". 81 
WAR THREATENS 
The result of Huerta's defiance of Washington's 
order for a more democratic form of government by his con-
trolle~elections was to raise the intervention issue again. 
The question was asked, and an answer was given by the In-
de..J2enden t: 
What is the duty of the United 
States in this fateful crisis? 
Patience ••• to avoid war ••• Firm-
ness in protecting property and 
persons ••• ~d disinterestedness 
of motiv,e. 2 
The Advance counseled its readers to ltfollow Wilson and Bry-
an who are disposed to do the right thing ••• yet let us be 
calm and pray for peaceu • 83 The Christian Centurl was well 
.. 
79 Oct. 23, 1913. 
80 Oct. 30, 1913. 
81 Nov. 13, 1913. 
82 Oct. 23, 1913. 
83 Advance, (Chicago), Congregationalist, Nov. 13, 1913. 
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aware o£ the "critical situation", as well as our obl:::igations 
to "protec t the interests of Americans in Mexico tf , ye"lt it re-
minded its readers that 
••• it is a good time ~o~ Ameri-
cans to keep calm ••• We have been 
hurried into at least one war if 
not two, in response to men who 
showed more ability to shout 
than to exercise good s~seM.84 
In the next issue the readers were warned against ttthee jingo 
press •• ~and demands for war o£ big munition £irms like. 
Krupps, Armstrong, and Maxims, ••• as well as the sentimcents 
o£ army and naval officers".85 The strongest o£ all WTarnings 
against intervention was that of the Christian Advoca~e, who 
£rankly told Washington that "there has not, at this v, riting, 
appeared any excuse for the introduction of American soldiers 
86 
on Mexican soiltt • 
Wi th the advent of 1914, the nation as a who Ie 
still was determined to have peace. And when the lnde:oendm 
heard that the Administration was considering a change of 
policy leading to intervention, it sharply admonished ~ashing-
ton that 
Intervention means war. War 
means an expenditure of millions 
o£ dollars, the loss of untold 
lives, and a consolidated hatred 
84 Nov. 20, 1913. 
85 Nov. 27, 1913. 
86 Nov. 20, 1913. 
r 
on the part of all Latin Ameri-
can countries. Patience, and 
still more patien~e ••• must be 
our watchword ••• 8 
76 
The Christian Herald, though, tel\'j;,hat "while that nation 
stands tor peace, it also stands for justice tl , and because 
we tailed to take that attitude previously ttentanglements in 
our diplomatic relations now prevail~.88 
Wilson did change his policy and it was just as the 
~ndard had foretold the previous November, when the editor 
"figured that the next step is inevitably litting the em-
bargo tt • 89 On February 3, 1914, the Standard's prophecy came 
true with the raising ot the Embargo on Arms to Mexico, which 
thus enabled the border states, according to the Presbyterian 
Ban!!~ "to SUPL)ly immediately 30,000 troopsH.90 The act re-
sulted in a mild furor, which was a juicy morsel for the 
hungry press. The Independen~ analysed 
.. 
The President's order lifting the 
embargo ••• as a logical and natur-
al and proper outcome of his pol-
icy towards that distant country 
••• The President has removed the 
handicap which hampered the forces 
opposed to the blood-stained 
usurper in the capita1 ••• The United 
87 Jan. 13, 1914. 
88 Feb. 11, 1914. 
89 Nov. 22, 1913 .. 
90 July 14, 1914. 
States will continue its wise 
course of "watchful waiting".91 
77 
The Watchman-Examiner interpreted this move as Wilson's way 
of saying ttnow fight it out and may the best man win lt • 92 
. .,. .., 
"By this act of the President", the Christian Centur~ dog-
matically asserted, "we are actively allied with the rebels~93 
Only sadness and sarcasm however coul! be found in the Ch!1!-
tian Advocate's leading editorial: 
In the year of Our Lord, fight 
on, is the practical significance 
of the President's proclamation 
lifting the embargo ••• it has kind 
of an ironical flavor in view of 
our boast that we are a Christian 
nation.94 
The Christia1'\ Herald too, could see only nthe tragic pos-
95 
sibili ties in the new situation not pleasing to contemplate!t 
Common sense and hard-headed reasoning characterized the 
Advance's attack on the situation as it urged us "to pause 
and take out our pencils before we talk too much about war 
with Mexico or any other nation. War costs too much".96 
This editorial was followed with proper acknowledgements by 
the Christian Century, which calculated that 
91 Feb. 16, 1914. 
92 Feb. 12, 1914. 
93 May 14, 1914. 
94 Feb. 26, 1914. 
95 Feb. 18, 1914 
96 Feb. 26, 1914. 
-
••• the amount which the world 
pays for post war in interests 
a1one ••• if gathered into one 
pile of one dollar bills would 
make a ~tack fifty-two miles 
high ••• 7 ._ ' . 
... .., 
War, too, was the fear of the Presbyterian Banner, for 
••• if Huerta admits his powerless-
ness to check the lawlessness of 
Carranza and Villa becduse of the 
help given to the Constitutional-
ists by our government, it would 
leave President Wilson n~8a1ter-
native but to intervene. 
78 
The White House, however, was confident that if 
Huerta could be removed from power, there would be no need 
for intervention, much less war. It was common knowledge 
that Englandts support of the dictator was one of the main 
obstacles to making the President's plan a reality. Wil-
son, therefore, was determined to have his friends across 
the sea step into his line of policy. The string our wily 
executive pulled on this occasion to remove our British 
brethren from Huerta's support was the repeal of the free 
Panama Canal tolls for the coastwise steamers of the United 
States. Since such maneuverings smacked of backroom po1i-
.. ' 
tics, few of the religious papers cared to associate them-
selves by comment, or were-totally unaware of any connection 
97 Mar. 5, 1914. 
98 Mar. 19, 1914. 
79 
between the Panama Canal and Mexico. The Presbyterign Banner 
~as of this latter class, in addition to the fact, that it 
could not conceive of a Presbyterian President dirtying his 
. 
hands in sordid politics. Its indiga~ion then knew no 
bounds 'Then Senator Jones of Washington accused \Vilson of 
bargaining the Canal toll for British support of his Mexican ,. 
policy: 
"Mr. Wilson said even if he wanted 
to he could get no suggestion 
from the British Minister on the 
subject of Mexico wi th a tfCO~k­
screw" ••• His (Senator Jones) 9 
false statement traveled with 
seven league boots over the world 
and lodged in thousands of minds 
where it will never be overtaken 
by truth. Men in public places 
••• should inquire into the truth 
of damagi~ rumors before spread-
ing them. 00 
The Christ~~~ Qentur~, however, judged the affair in the 
light of good diplomacy, since 
••• the truth is that American 
and Great B~itain need and are 
certain to need each other's 
friendship. Our relations 
with Mexico are far from satis-
factory and Mexico and Japan 
are maintaining an appearance 
of friendship, which inclines 
the United States to make the 
most of its friendship with 
99 Insertion of the proper name is the authort s. ~oo Mar. 6, 1914. 
.' 
Great Britain ••• England can help 
us much with Japan because she 
is friendly with that nation.~Ol 
TAMPICO INCIDENT 
. 
80 
An incident, insignificant·1:h itself, occurred that 
added just one more element to the Mexican mess, and resulted 
in serious consequences. On April 21, 1914, President Wilson 
• 
asked Congress for troops to force Huerta to offer the de-
manded apology for the alleged flag insult. The Advance, 
caught in the wa.ve of patriotism, upheld the demand that tt'the 
American flag receive an unconditional salute of 21 guns as 
reasonable and dignified and the refusal to comply would be 
a national affront tt • 102 It was a case of having your cake 
and eating it too, when the Watchman-Examiner made clear that 
"without a doubt the insolence of the usurper should be re-
buked, but it will be a calamity if we are plunged into 
war"" .103 The Christian Advocate was of the opinion that ftthe 
Government of the United States has been treated with intol-
101 Reb. 26, 1914. 
102 April 23, 1914. The ""flag insult" refers to the Tampico 
incident, where through misunderstanding, some Americans, 
sailors, were momentarily arrested. Admiral Mayo de-·' 
manded an unjust flag salute, which Huerta refused to 
give. President Wilson backed his Admiral to the extent 
of asking Congress for armed forces. Cf. Chapter I, 37. 
103 April 23, 1914. 
-
81 
erable contempt by Huerta and his menials".104 The issue was 
so grave in the eyes of the Livin~ Church that the editor for-
got its strictly religious policy for a moment to write: ttlf 
war must come, it will at least be agreed that the United 
states did not seek it".105 As was expected, the Christian 
Herald voiced its opinion against the dictator in the obser-
.. 
vation that "the time has come for us to draw the line. Huerta 
must mend his ways and begin by saluting the flag he had in-
su1ted~106 Even the Christj.!¥l Century was willing to endorse 
the use of force ftto run down the murderer and bandit who has 
heaped indignities upon the United States".107 In the next 
issue, the Christian Herald came out openly in the same strain 
and maintained that Ifwhile it was not an advocate of war ••• 
·when it becomes inevitable, nothing remains but to face it".108 
Another approach too, was offered to justify the mobilizing of .... 
armed fore es in the Standard's reflecti on that ttthe saluting 
incident was a mere culmination. 
rather than a specific act ••• MI09 
104 April 2~, 1914. 
105 April 25, 1914. 
106 April 29, 1914. 
107 April 30, 1914. 
108 May 6, 1914. 
109 May 9, 1914. 
It was Huerta's attitude 
82 
This fanatical patriotism in support of Wilson and 
the flag, however, was not universal. To the Presbyterian 
Banner goes the honor of attacking the patriotism of war ad-
vocates. Although in the beginning)'i 1;. was almost apologetic: 
"There is some feeling, if intervention had to come, it would 
have been better to wait for a more worthy occasion~;110 
• when its editors, during the n ext week, saw how many papers 
were infected by this war fever, they fel tit their duty, 
insofar as their Presbyterian loyalty to the President would 
allow, to reveal the awful truth that he had used the flag 
salute as a pretext for war: 
••• it was their regret that the 
President did not wi thhold his 
hand longer, especially as the 
immediate occasion of action wai 
qnly S!1 inte~I!.S~ionaI !ierernony. 11 
The influence of these editorials spread rapidly. The Stand-
~ reconsidered its initial stand, and now "regretted the 
loss of life caused by the occupation 0 f Vera Cruz, especially 
since ample apology had been given by Huerta at Tampico" .112 
The IndeRendept merely echoed the sentiments of the Banner: 
" 
Serious causes exist for a 
vital interest of the United 
States in Mexico ••• But are we to 
tell our children in years to 
come that the people of the 
110 April 23, 1914. 
111 April 30, 1914. The underlining is the author's~ 
112 May 2, 1914. 
.' 
united States in 1914 had no 
better reason for entering a 
neighboring country and kill-
ing its people than a dispute 
about a salute ••• You do not 
need il~team hammer to crack 
nuts. .• '..., 
83 
In a leading article of the same issue, the reason for the 
President's action is revealed: 
• •• • the President probably saw 
that his policy of "watchful 
waiting" was a failure when he 
heard that Huerta had received 
a loan of 60 million dollars. 
So he brought on a wail~y the 
seizure of Vera Cruz. 
There was no surprise in the Chris"ti,ian Century's us.ing 
another paper's policy, but it was amusing, after its last 
outburst, to witness the superior air it adopted, when it 
realized that Itthere was something pathetic about the wave 
of passion and war fever that ha~ swept over the country be-
cause of the irritating and insulting conduct of a half-breed 
Indian".115 And the following week it seemed to be laughing 
at itself, when it reflected that "as a matter of fact the 
Tampico incident was not deserving of such serious consider-
ation and biuster".116 The Advance, too forgetful of its r 
previous war cry, now warned its readers tlnot to be egged on 
113 May 4, 1914. 
114 May 4, 1914. 
115 May 7, 1914. Another example was given on p. 78. 
116 May 14, 1914. 
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1~7 by loud mouthed politicans and by covetous capitalists". 
Later in an editorial on the eighteen blue jackets who died 
at Vera Cruz, its note was not a hollow sound, b~t a prayer-
ful plea to all Americans to learn ~rem their recent mistake: 
Let there be no war, if we 
can have an honorable peace. 
Let the nation bare its head 
and ride in solemn and~ilent 
procession behind these eight-
een coffins. If we shall have 
learned to pause and consider 
before taking some rash step 
that might plunge us into a 
preventable war, these eightisn 
will not have died in vain. 
ABC Mediation 
Whether the nation wished to send their sons to 
fight south of the border or not, these lads would have had 
to answer the bugle call of duty, except for the timely in-
tervention of three leading South American Republics. Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Chile, the famed Mediation Board, of-
fered to mediate the differences between the two nations. 
For the moment war was averted. Strangely, though, the 
Christian Advocate was not too enthusiastic about "the good 
offers of the South American Republics ••• which are well iR-
tentioned, but cannot accomplish all the sentimentalists 
117 May 7, 1914. 
118 May 21, 1914. 
I 
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assume possible or probable~.119 It was pure expediency too 
that prompted the Standard to consider the offer "as a brief 
respite tor our Government from l;ts anxious predicament at 
120 Vera Cruz". 
.• "7 Fortunately, the other pap ers had cheerier 
outlooks. The Christian Herald expressed the confident belief 
that "although the task of the ABO' ... Representatives was not 
easy ••• yet the friends of peace everywhere have reason to wel-
come the new development as a hopeful sign of the progress of 
the peace movement".121 Satisfaction was manifested by the 
Advance with a pun on the "ABC mediation as being rather sim-
ple for so great a nation, but one can afford to begin with 
the alphabet for the sake of peace".122 Yet none could touch 
the Independent in exuberance: 
.. 
The splendid action of the ABC 
powers gives bright promise of 
a solution of the immediate 
problem of the avoidance ot war 
with Mexico. It contains the 
germ of a possible solution ot 
all the great problems that har-
ass the people of Mexico ••• Wil-
son and Bryan in accepting the 
offer show a political genius 123 
equalled only by their humanity • 
For the Christian Q~nturx "this board was - it is - theO"only 
119 April 30, 1914. 
120 May 2, 1914. 
121 May 3, 1914. 
122 May 7, 1914. 
123 May 4, 1914. 
.' 
hope' •• 124 The tone of the Presbyterian Banner was also mild 
as it "welcomed mediation";125 but even that enthusiasm 
died down in the dread that "Carranza would prove to be the 
fly in the 0 in tmen t" .126 Again the .!, £Ving Church dep'arted 
from strictly religious issues to make clear to the medi-
ators that 
.. 
••• the Tampico incident and that 
connected with Mr. O'Shaughnes-
sey's mail are not the chief is-
sues, but rather Madero's assas-
sina tion due to Huerta ani2~e 
welfare of our citizens". 
Then when the avoidance of war for the time passed from the 
dream stage to reality, the Ind~endent, whose confidence 
was ne ver shaken in the Mediation Board in the darkest hours, 
surpassed all in sounding its praises: 
The Niagara Falls Mediation 
Conference is likely to prove 
one of the most important mile-
stones in the progress of New 
World civilization ••• The war is 
averted. But something even bet-
ter has been accomplished. Not 
only do Mexico and all Pan-Ameri-
ca perceive the disinterestedness 
of the United States ••• but the na-
tions of America unlike the na-
tions of Europe can work disinter-
estedly and in harmony for the mu-
tual prospe~~y and peace of a 
hemisphere. 
124 May 14, 1914. 
125 May 7, 1914. 
!~~ ~~el~l'l~lt~· 
128 June 1~, 1914. 
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CONDEMNATION OF HUERTA 
Peace might be restored to Mexico, but it could 
only be temporary unless a leader was elected who had the 
. 
confidence and control of the people~~ Huerta, Carranza and 
Villa were the three possible choices. The Standard was op-
posed to Huerta from the beginning, chiefly for his "curry-
ing favor with the Catholic Party and attempting to 0 btain 
its support ••• the official influence is being felt against 
evangelicals tt • 129 By June, 1914, the Standard had stooped 
to mudslinging in its denunciation of Huerta as 
••• the drunken sot who ia im-
passible even as a decent 
representative of a barbarous 
state to make no mention of 
him as the head of a fi5i-
civilized government. 
When the pressure from Washington finally resulted in the 
dictator's resignation, the Christi~ Heralq, which had been 
quietly but persistently agitating for interference in Mex-
ican affairs, expressed its satisfaction in that frequent 
half-assured manner: "What looks like a tremendous victory 
for the highest idealism in international affairs has been 
r 
won by the final elimination of Uuerta".13l A:tter the world 
saw that the ex-president was sincere in his resignation, the 
129 Mar. 13, 1914. 
130 June 13, 1914. 
131 July 29, 1914. 
88 
beaten dictator no longer provided press material except for 
those papers, whose delight is to bring a skeleton out of 
the closet. 50 one reads in the ~ Age of the following 
. 
year that in Huerta was Itthe retrog;a~ation toward military 
dictatorship so abhorred to the principles of modern civili-
~ationtt.132 The Baptists too found a Feat difficulty in 
forgetting Huerta, and the Standard conjectured that 
••• had the United States recog-
nized Huerta we should have ly-
ing at our door tod~ not only 
the grievances of Villa, but 
the accusations of 16 millions 
of Mexicans that we compounded 
a felony and shared in one of 
t~e gre~test crimes of modern 
t llne s .. J.33 
Perhaps, the sharpest of all the attacks on the Mexican Gen-
eral was that of the Methodist Review, whose ulterior motive 
was to make the darkly tarnished Carranza appear brilliant 
by contrast: 
" 
Thanks to the sensitive con-
science, the wise forbearance, 
and the superhuman foresight of 
the noble man seated in the 
White House at Washington, the 
red-handed Huerta was refused 
recognition by the United 
5tates ••• Huerta was another 
Diaz.. 
The tool of the autocrat, 
the blood-thirsty, spectacular 
132 Feb~u .. , 1915. 
1.33 Jan. II 1916. 
Huerta surprised, shocted and 
finally terrified the great 
sober-minded masses of the 
United States, and they were 
not slow to approve of the 134 
policy of President i'l.il:son • 
.. ..., 
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It should be understood, however, that Victoriano 
Huerta was not a universal outcast. For shortly after the 
ttflag incident", the Christian Century.ran a brief series of 
pro-Huerta articles in the hope that these might lower in 
some degree the war fever heating the blood of the American 
people. The first written by a college Professor pointed out 
that 
••• as a matter of fact, Huerta 
has shown remarkable control. 
His con4uct in his dealings 
with the United States and Wil-
son has been characterized by 
~~~~!~~~ ~~ ~r;~~:!~;~~~!35e-
The second was the work of ' a well known Mexican miner who 
showed that in his experience "the laborers ha ve been content 
-
to have Huerta for their President ••• and as far as they are , 
able to think on large questions, have wondered what the 
trouble is between Huerta and the United states tt • 136 The 
most positive appraisal of Huerta was the eulogy of the Pre§-
byterian Bgnner, which frequently would print the truth, even 
134 July, 1916. 
135 May 14, 1914. 
136 May 21, 1914. 
Fred Starr of Chicago U. was the author. 
Irving Herr of Mexico wrote this article. 
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it it was contrary to its pet policies; and the following edi-
torial was all the mare positive, because it was an answer to 
137 the unjust tirade ot the Standard against Huertat 
· 
••• Huerta was not le~~emarkable 
a man than Diaz. It anything he 
was more remarkable. But he lived 
at a later date ••• Huerta has been 
much misrepresented and much mis-
understood. Not a tew 'ave sup-
posed him part Indian and wholly 
an ignorant peasant and a drunken, 
brutal sot to boot. Throughout 
the past tive months he has shown 
himselt to be what he was, a 
gentleman, an~8istocrat ot the 
highest type. 
CARRANZA, THE VICTOR 
After Huerta resigned, the leadership ot Mexico was 
lett to Villa and Carranza to tight over and Zapista, a most 
unlikely choice. The silence ot the Protestant press gave 
indications ot battlement; both the prospective candidates 
were bandits and unscrupulous ones at that. It became essen-
tial to back the right horse, tor a wrong choice might prove 
disastrous to their future missionary work in Mexico. With 
the tuture of both ot these men so uncertain in 1914, little 
was said ot them in the papers, except for the Christian ~­
tury, which occasionally highlighted the tavor shown by Car-
137 This is the June 13, 1914 editorial quoted on p. 87. 
138 July 23, 1914. 
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ranza to the Protestant Biblical Institute.139 Once the 
,Qhristian Advocate went out to boost Carranza "as the most 
1 .p b . h' t b1 t' M . tt 140 capab e o~ esta l~s ~ng a s a e governmen ~n. ex~co ; 
but in December it was calling him an'..,ttupstart1t .141 All Car-
ranza enthusiasts however were embarrassed by the Independ-
ent's query concerning tithe blood on Carranza's hands tt .142 
According to the Presbyterian Banner "~arranza was proving 
himself a most stubborn customern • 143 Villa, too, during 
these days would have found it difficult to fill his scrap-
book with clippings from the Protestant press. V/ith the ex-
ception of the Watchman-Examiner, which looked up to him as 
tithe man to bring permanent peace tt ;l44 and the Standard's 
evaluation of him as ttthe ladder by which Carranza alone could 
rise",145 kind words were wanting. Several papers in fact 
looked down on "this barbarianu .. 146 
Carranza, however, was going to find 1915 a banner 
year, because a combination of Washington propaganda, Villa 
brutality and the New London Conference provided him with ex-
cellent, but not too stable stepping stones to reach the reins 
-----..-.. '-
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
Sept. 19, 1914; Oct. 24, 1914. 
Sept. 24, 1914 .. 
Dec .. 3, 1914. 
Dec. 13, 1914 .. 
July 23, 1914. 
Dec. 10, 1914. 
Jan. 23, 1915. 
Christian Herald, April 12, 1914; Christi~ Advocate, 
Oct. 1, 1914. 
.... 
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of p·ower. Then, another factor came into play, which almost 
universally united the Protestants in his support. It was 
the Catholic opposition in the United States to the recog-
nition 0 f this persecutor. The Chrk~ian Herald was among 
the first to realize the significance of this new era, when 
it rejoiced that 
.. 
••• Carranza has urged all true 
patriots to combine their 
strength against any reestab-
lishment of the Church ••• Mexico 
is getting free. 147 
The open Carranza support came after the New London 
Conference, when the United States, in union wi til a large 
number of South American Republics, recognized the First 
Chief as Mexico's new president. ttLight begins to dawn" was 
the Presbyterian ~annert~ reaction;l48 while the Watchman-
m.~aminer now hailed Carranza as "most trustworthy» .149 Now 
that the ground seemed secured with United states' recogni-
tion, the ~§~ian Herald abandoned its conservative re-
straint: 
The American people are 
.. glad to greet Carranza as 
President of Mexico ••• From all 
that can be learned Carranza 
stands for the people of Mex-
ico ••• His success will mark 
~47 May 21, 1915. 
148 Oct. 10, 1915. 
149 Nov. 14, 191&. 
, 
not only the beginning of a new 
history 0 f Mexico, but an ad-
vanced step in the history of 
liberty, democracy, clean busi-
ness and clean1~8vernmentt 
Viva Carranza1 . ' . 
. .., 
·' 
In its jubilation the Christian Advoca~e also managed to 
strike a sarcastic note against Catholics: 
It is Cardinal Gibtons who 
sets the tone, and the wail has 
been taken up all down the line. 
Why is the good Cardinal pity-
ing Mexico?~.Order has been re-
stored to such a point that 
President Wilson and his advis-
ors feel justified in recogniz-
ing the existence of a de facto 
government ••• All signs ¥&int to 
a dawning of a new day_ 
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~ere it not for their agreement in endorsing Carranza's per-
secution 0 f the Church, one would wonder if the Advocate and 
Standard were talking about the same man. For the Stand~rd 
voiced the opinion that 
••• for other reasons (than the 
persecution of Catholics)~52 
we are against recognition -
Carranza does not control the 
country ••• Carranza has become 
a white hope which is neither 
very white nor very promising.153 
150 Nov. 10, 1915. 
151 Dec. 9, 1915. 
152 Taken from the previous context of the article. 
153 Nov. 13, 1915. 
-
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THE VIILSON" STAR 11 ANES 
The year 1915 too centered attention on Woodrow 
Wilson in the Mexican problem, but he would perhaps have pre-
ferred less notoriety. The nation wai'becoming irritated not 
only at keeping the Mexican sore open by his "watchful wait-
ing" policy, but by causing it to fester wi th his occasional 
.. 
meddling, which in time would demand mediation from outside. 
In high rage the IndepeI!den.;t thought "it high time the Presi-
dent took the country into his confidence and let them know 
what he has in mind" .154 Two months later when the si tuation 
was growing darker, the explanation demanded of Wilson by the 
Independen~ was even more difficult to give, for 
why we send the American Navy to 
Mexican waters to demand a re-
dress for an incidental insult 
to the American flag, and yet 
have done nothing to protect the 
lives and property of foreigners 
- American and otisswise - in 
Mexico territory. 
Soon there was grumbling, when it complained that "Wils'on in 
translating his convictions into action has fallen into seri-
i • 156 ous nconsistencies". On the other hand, the AdVance pre-
ferred "to hold Woodrow Wilson in high regard", while it 
154 Nov. 30, 1915. 
155 Jan. 25, 1915. 
156 Feb. 25, 1915. 
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blamed Itthe Administration for holding a policy in Mexico 
marked by great unsteadiness of purpose and not a wholly open 
mind tt • 157 Then, when the anarchy became so widespread during 
. 
March, 1915, the Independent advocat8d""a new policy: 
••• the time had come when a strong 
hand from wi thout must be laid up-
on the clashing factions that 
peace may be restored •• iBut it ~g~t 
be a Pan-American intervention. 
The Presb~teri~ Banner was in full sympathy with such a 
measure and was certain that 11 even the President is weary of 
his watchful waiting policy and is on the p oint of interven-
ing" .159 The return 0 f the dread spectre of war was the straw 
that broke the back of the Christian Herald's patience with 
the President's policy, since it was convinced that 
••• the bloodshed in Mexico could 
have been prevented ••• for in the 
matter of foreign relations and 
in making decisions that might 
lead us into war, the Constitu-
tion ••• gives far too much oppor-
tunity of inde~66dent action to 
the President. 
The Protestant papers were momentarily won back by 
the President with his recognition of Carranza and the hope 
.' 
for peace; but such prospects soon vanished with new and more 
157 Feb. 11, 1915. 
158 Mar. 22, 1915. 
159 June 3, 1915. 
160 June 16, 1.915. 
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vigorous attacks of Villa against the First Chief. The 
Christ~ Herald, however, as the newly recognized President's 
staunchest supporter, begged that "Carranza be given a fair 
. 
.... 
and ample opportunity of his proving his ability to cope with 
the situationtt • 161 Yet after Carranza refused to cooperate 
with us in preventing Villa's border t~w.n raids, the Stand-
~d predicted that 
our unpreparedness in coping with 
the si tuation is' certain to be an 
important factor in the popular 
decisions next November as to who 
will be the nei~2President of the 
United States. 
The crisis actually became so serious after a skirmish be-
tween Carranza's soldiers and American forces, that even the 
Christia~ Herald doubted Carranza's peaceful intentions and 
admitted that 
••• once again the country has 
be.en brought to the verge of war 
.Hif it is war, let tlS face it 
bravely and unflinchingly, know-
ing that we have so~~t nothing 
but simple justice. 
The continued insults of Carranza to our Govern-
ment were fast sacrificing him his popularity in the United 
States. Nevertheless, he still had a few champions in the 
161 Jan. 26, 1916. 
162 May 20, 1916. 
163 July 5, 1916. 
,.'" 
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northern republic, among them the Methodist Revie~. Yet when 
one considers the chaos in Mexico during th is pe r1 od, its 
editor made the Review appear quite ridiculous by allowing an 
article to be printed that heralded ~ke 
••• gradual spread of the arts of 
peace under his leadership which 
is proving beyond all doubt that 
in Carranza we have a man of su-
perior personal qualiG~es and of 
lofty statesmanship. 
The Christian gerald, however, was wise as well as loyal and 
it was well aware of the possible harm wrought to the cause 
by a direct defense. So it drew on the ever-rich reserve of 
favorable sentiment: It blamed Carranza's troubles on the 
misrepresentation of the Catholic Church: 
The attitude of the revolu-
tion to the Church has been the 
subject of a long campaign of 
misrepresentation which forms 
the basis of a concerted attack 
by the Catholics of this coun-
tryon Mr. Wilson's policy ••• An 
example: The atrocities of 
which the Carranzistas - these 165 
are insignificant and negligible. 
It was only the world war that saved Carranza. The 
~ iure recogni ti on extended to our next door ne igh bor on., 
March 3, 1917, was not an admission of Carranza's success in 
the Presidency, nor endorsement of Woodrow Wilson's policy -
164 July, 1916. 
165 Aug. 9, 1916. 
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for we had just abandoned the pursuit of Villa a month ago in 
utter disgust with Mexican affairs - but it was a move of 
expediency to allow the President to devote his energies to 
. 
Europe. The Protestant press, almos~ tniversally accepted 
with satisfaction the formal recognition as the finale of 
the whole sorry business. The Standard, though, could not ,. 
fool itself, and an article in early 1917 summed up perfectly 
the result of Woodrow Wilson's years of meddling: 
The Carranza movement which 
was hailed as the dawning of a 
new era, has but plunged the 
country deeper into the night of 
chaos, and utter hopelessness. 166 
That the Protestant press considered the PJexican 
crisis of great moment and our President's policy wise is a 
self-evident conclusion. The Catholic press too viewed the 
tragedy of our southern neighbor with concern, even a deeper 
concern, because the Mexican nation racked by revolution and 
overrun with anti-clerical politicians was traditionally 
Catholic. In the past, the Catholic press generally had re-
. 
frained from editorials on political issues, but Wilson's 
" 
support of the tools of the anti-clericals, Carranza and 
Villa, had exhausted the patience of even the most long-suffer-
ing of the Jobs, who edited the Catholic papers. An investi-
166 Jan. 13, 1.917. 
, 
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gation of these Catholic papers then, will enable us to ex-
• 
amine the other side of the tapestry on which was woven the 
intricate and confusing pattern of United States-Mexican 
politics.167 
• 
167 Since the tone of the Protestant press, generally spehk-
ing, was definitely anti-Catholic whenever the interest 
of the two conflicted, it is evident that the opinion 
of the Catholic press will differ. 
Examples of extreme bigotry in some editorials of a few 
of the Protestant papers have been included in the ap-
pendix. 
.' 
CHAPTER III 
THE ATTITUDE OF THE CATHOLIC PRESS 
While the Protestant was a ·etranger t,o Mexico, the 
. ..., 
Catholic was at home, for the nation was Catholic. This 
phenomenon is easily understood, if one knows that the Span-
iard had been the conqueror. This codbuistador might have 
lusted for gold, but he also thirsted for souls. Wherever 
he raised the Spanish flag, the missionary planted Christ's 
Cross. Nor did the Mexicans refuse to take up His Cross. 
When our armies entered Mexico in 1846, they found the Faith 
still thriving in city Cathedrals and wayside shrines. Many 
Catholics in our armies found it difficult to fight against 
their brethren of the same Faith, and some even deserted. 
The editors of the Catholic press in this country, ~ 
nevertheless, were invariably in favor of the United States 
Government's policy, in spite of the fact that Whig Journal-
ism consistently belabored the Administration and condemned 
the war. Most of the Catholic papers seem to have committed 
themselves; consciously or unconsciously, to somewhat the 
." 
same policy. The principles underlying this policy can be 
grasped from the following representative editorial: 
100 
A press, particularly a Catholic 
press, to be free should have no 
communion with political parties; 
not even the most remote; for, 
if it has ••• the freedom of opin-
ions under considerat±~n becomes 
falsified, and is converted into 
a sort of trumpet for tho'se who 
patronize the paper. 
The Catholic press should, 
therefore, be as caref~l not to 
suppress public opinio~against 
the abuses of ttthe powers that 
be", when they affect the rights 
and privil.eges of the Catholic 
body, as it is in not giving cur-
rency to crude and ~founded 
charges against it. 
~Ol 
.' 
Concretely, though, the policy might briefly be described as 
being the publication, sometime at the beginning of the war, 
of an editorial in support of the government and stating the 
Catholic attitude. After that, however, there was litt~e 
constructiye effort on the part of the press to build up a 
spirit favorable to the war. This was not due to a change 
of attitude or a loss of interest. Possibly, it was the re-
sult of a more dispassionate and clearer consideration of the 
justice and necessity of the war by those who dictated the 
4 
policies of the papers. Secondly, there was an honest regret 
that the war was being fought against a Catholic country.· 
Finally, the anti-bellum bias which was directed against the 
1 Catholic Observer, ~oston, June 5, 1857. 
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Mexicans by the sectarian and public press was a source o~ 
resentment. Al~ three of these reasons may not have held in 
the case of each paper, but certainly, each of them had its 
, .... 
influence upon some one paper. It must also be remembered 
that the Catholic press as such was ~omparatively young. 
Most of the papers referred to here h~d had a more or less 
short, or even a spasmodic career. rt seems unwarranted to 
subscribe to the idea that the Catholic press aligned itself 
with the administration as a mere matter of policy_ However, 
in view of the ordeals through which Catholics had passed 
very shortly before at the hands of religious bigots, who 
burned their churches and attacked their priests, it wou~d 
not have been strange if the papers had felt disinclined to 
t ·· i 2 par 1C1pate n any controversy. 
The period between 1910-~9l7, however, presented an 
entirely dif~erent picture. Internal revolutions were Mex-
icots chie~ problem, until our meddlings threatened to engulf , 
both nations in a war. As in the Ii'irst Mexican War, a patri-
otic fervo~ swept over the Catholic press when our soldiers 
marched into Mexico. When the Washington Administration, 
2 Sister Blanche l~rie M~Eniry, American Catholics ~ ~ 
War With Mexico, Catholic University, Washington, D.C., 
1937, Chapter II, Attitude of the Catholic Press, 13-33. 
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though, decided to mo~lify the Mexicans by abetting an anti-
clerical government, even the papers, which previously had 
confined themselves to the recording of conversions, ordin-
.• ,,;, 
ations, church building, and local trivials, felt bound to 
raise their voice in protest. '1'his growing consciousness of 
the Catholic editor's duty to protest;gainst political pol-
icies, which threatened moral harm, marked out the Catholic 
press during this period. 
By the end of ~9l0, the peace that Diaz had 
brought to Mexico was suffering from his despotism. at the 
turn of the century, the ~acred Heart ~iview had endorsed 
Diazts regime, for ttc.ompared with New England towns in moral-
ity, home comfort, and wel~ being, the Mexican towns make 
such a good showing~,3 yet within ten years many young Mex-
icans were c:onvinced that the democratic government of New 
England was preferable to many of their ttessentials of well-
being". The ~ Maria, being North of the Rio Grande, was 
able to express what many Mexicans judged better to keep in 
their hearts: 
When one of the very great-
est men of his time rules with 
wisdom and justice - it is cer-
tainly employing the phrase to 
3 ~ed Heart Beview, Boston, Feb. 10, 1900. 
signify what its very antithesis 
would better express.4 
Except for America and a few scattered editorials like the 
I 
one above, little information on th~~xican situation, how-
ever, could be gleaned from the Catholic press. America 
sensed that Mexico, like an active volcano, was on the verge 
j-
of eruption; and after it watched with a pitying eye the 
eighth inauguration of Diaz, it uttered a tragic forecast 
which was to be fulfilled to the letter: 
In our opinion, the aged 
President did not know when to 
quit. He had made Mexico. When 
he came in the people welcomed 
him. He responded to their 
hopes, expectations ••• What last-
ing glory would have been that 
of Diaz if he had recognized the 
signs of the times and had grace-
fully bowed himself off the 
stage while the audience was still 
good natured or at least tolerantl 
And now in the bitterness of his 
heart, he hears the hurrahs of 
yesterdayschanged into the curses 
of today. 
Yet there were still ardent admirers, who could not 
conceive of-a defeated Diaz. America, though; could read the 
minds of the people, as they watched their oil and other re-
sources leave the country under foreign management, and so it 
4 ~.!t Maria, South Bend, Feb. 7, 1910. 
5 Americ~, New York, Dec. 3, 1910. 
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bluntly remarked that " ••• many judge with misgiving the con-
cessions to foreign capital".6 The confirmation of this ob-
servation came with the resignation of Diaz's cabinet early 
in 1911, and America concluded that even Diaz ttrecognized 
the evil" and Itadmits that there is now public opinion in 
Mexic ott. 7 And when Diaz resigned, it bid him farewell with 
a sigh of relief: • 8 "Adios Diaz ••• Man can now speak". 
As anarchy took a firmer hold on Mexico in the 
years that followed, the Catholic press, which by then had 
become far more alert to world issues, would occasionally in 
a reflective mood manifest more of an appreciation for the 
old peaceful days of Diazts reign. An editorial in the 
Catholi£ gerald typified this trend, as it recalled that 
ttunder Diaz this one thing could be said - there was order, 
9 if there was very little law". The Month also echoed the 
refrain that ftDiaz had been somewhat arbitrary in his rule, 
but he had kept the country in tranquillity and growing 
prosperity for over thirty years rt .10 Extensi on felt, though, 
6 Dec. 24, 1910. 
7 April 15, 1911. 
8 April 29, 1911. 
9 Catholic HeralQ, Sacramento, Oct. 10, 1914. 
10 Month, London, June, 1916. 
I 
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that Diaz had destroyed Democracy by suppressing the nationts 
will which had once placed him in power, and consequently, 
the Mexican people could find expression only in the ~Sword".~~ 
. 
.... 
The shock of the Mexican revolutions, however, was 
felt around the g~obe, because of the immense amount of for-
eign capital invested in Mexican resou~ces. In the United 
States the advocates of annexation were causing the murmur 
of intervention to become audible. America tried to convince 
itself' that ttthese hazy and foolish dreams of conquest - if 
they exist ••• are entertained by irresponsible individuals to 
12 the exclusion of men in authoritytt. By March, it was 
a~armed at these "irresponsible individuals", and the editor 
was of' the belief that al~ reasonable precautions should be 
taken by our government in proper regard for our nationa~ 
dignity to "prevent our citizens from burying themselves too 
13 
earnestly with the household affairs of our neighbor". 
When the danger of United States' intervention aad 
passed and revo~utionary activity attendant on the resignation 
of Diaz had .subsided, the ~ ~aria expressed its gratitude to 
President Taft for 
••• having done all in his power 
to prevent a war. It is easy to 
~~ Extension, Chicago, Feb., ~915. 
12 Jan. 7, ~91~. 
13 March 18, ~911. 
see what might have happened in 
the circumstances had the occu-
pant of the White House been a 
man of diffe1ent training and temperament. 4 
10? 
;,.., 
With the renewal of the war threat, the Sacred B~s~~ Review, 
however, became indignant at Hthe Yellow Journals that took 
us into war against Cuba, and are tryi~g to engage us in war 
against Mexico".15 And in November it continued the plea 
for peace identified with this weekly, as its readers were 
warned that if we fight Mexico, her divided factions will 
unite against us, and concluded with the nation's desire for 
peace: tfThe Great Body of American people don't wantwar".16 
The Catholic Telegraph, however, stated that it would not 
comment on the trend of events, but that it would reprint a 
few paragraphs from a critique of the situation in the Balti- ~ 
more ~ for December 11, 1911. In these, the ~ blamed 
Washington for hatching the revolution as a means of forcing 
Diaz into exile, and for permitting President Zelaya of 
Nicaragua to escape to Mexico in a Mexican vessel. l ? 
MADERO IN POWER 
With the resignation of Diaz, all eyes were focus'ed 
14 June 17, 1911. 
15 Aug. 30, 1911. 
16 Nov. 8, 1913. 
17 Catholic Telegraph, Cincinnati, Dee. 14, 1911. 
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on his successor. While America had grown unfriendly to 
Diaz, from the very beginning it distrusted Madero: 
But alasl Madero with the 
Presidential bee in.ll,.'i.s bonnet 
has furnished the occasion for 
a fresh source of suspicion and 
dissatisfaction against the 
United States ••• His recent revo-
lutionary spasm callei for a 
larger outlay than he could af-
ford ••• the money came from an 
outside source.18 
Yet reason, not prejudice, guided America's Mexican policy; 
. 
the rational rather than the emotional element was preponder-
ant in its editorials. This was well exemplified in its edi-
torials full of grave doubts on the universal suffrage meas-
ures endorsed by Madero, which, generally speaking, received 
such acclaim in the United States. It felt that universal 
, 
suffrage at that time was "not prudent tl , for the Mexicans in 
their intense patriotism are attracted by an "individual -
not the system he stands for".19 Hence some petty military 
leader thus elected may dispel "all the roseate dreams of re-
form, liberty and popular governmenttt • 20 Amer i ca too, influ-
18 Dec. 24, 1910. In the June 17th issue, Ameri~§ printed 
an editorial in which the Madero Government claimed the 
revolution cost but $300,000. America's editor granted 
the possibility of the claim, yet as it was shown in 
Chapter I, America's suspicion was justified, and even 
correct, if the Standard Oil Company was guilty of at-
tempting to finance the Madero Revolution. 
19 April 8, 1911. 
20 April 15, 1911. 
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enced other periodicals; one of them was the Fortnightly B£-
view, which also had little faith in the successful future 
of the new Mexican leader. For it, the new dictator was a 
. 
weak character and his rise to powe"ftv,as a mere accident. 
21 
"Viva Madero meant only down with Diaz, nothing more". 
Yet strange to say, the following week, America, 
.. 
a.fter a perusal of Madero's platform, changed its tone and 
enthusiastically exclaimed that 
If Madero, the triumphant 
revolutionist, is indeed a 
dreamer and an enthusiast, his 
manifesto to his country is far 
from showing it ••• There is no-
thing of the fanatic and fre~2 
zied partisan in such advice. 
After an overwhelming election made this man President, who 
twel ve months previous was the leader of what seemed an im-
possible revolution, the Sacred Heart Review could not re-
frain from admiring him as "no ordinary mantt • 23 
After his election, Madero struggled for two years 
to effect his proposed reforms, but Mexican patience had its 
limits, and the people's accustomed expression of political 
• 
dissatisfaction was uttered by a volley of guns. .' The Catholic 
papers gave only casual mention to Mexican political affairs. 
21 ~Qrtnightly Review, St. Louis, July 15, 1911. 
22 July 22, 1911. 
23 Nov. 18, 1911. 
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The overthrow of the Madero government failed to cause any 
great stir, and even his murder provided editorial matter for 
but a few. The Sacred Heart Review, however, was evidently 
. 
moved and seriously doubted Huerta's·e~planation to Wilson 
that Madero and Suarez were shot by their comrades in a res-
cue attempt. 24 A few years later the Extension also voiced , 
the opinion that Hit was a crime to murder them~.25 
The Monitor of San Francisco, though, had acquired 
evidence from another quarter and was convinced that 
••• whatever the facts of the Mex-
ican situation, one point is 
clear, The Free Masons are de-
termined to have the head of Hu-
erta for his alleged killing of 
Madero. But those who know say 
Huerta is innocent. No matter 
his doom ha~6been sealed in the 
lodge room. 
Since the world at large refused to let the incident die of 
its own accord, the Fortnightl~ Review in 1916, felt obliged 
to print a defense of Huerta, testified to by a well known 
Mexi can Bishop, who had personal contact wi th Huerta's cab-
inet. This 'paper held emphatically that 
Huerta at a cabinet meeting posi-
tively and vehemently refused to 
24 March 1, 191.3. 
25 Feb., 1915. 
26 Monitor, San Francisco, Dec. 6, 1913. 
listen to a proposal to kill Ma-
dero ••• After Huerta left, the 
Cabinet decided on Madero' 6 
death; 
and it concluded with an explanatory~ote: 
. ..., 
••• Huerta did not punish them, 
because of a previous ungua2~ed 
promise tto stand b~ them'. 
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The deep silence of the cat~olic press, generally 
speaking, during the first years o~ revolution, and especially 
after Madero's death, gave rise to the insinuation that the 
Church condemned the Revolutionist movement. ~ic~, though, 
saw the blessings in this adversity for "it sounded the alarm 
for the C~itllolics to rise from the:ir lethargy of years tt • 28 
In real amazement the Extel1sion wondered why the Church would 
be anxious for the downfall of a man, who had given Mexico 
some semblance of fair and honest elections and seemed to fa-
vor religious liberty.29 The Q,atholi,£ News claimed reliable 
evidence that "the Catholic Church was entirely innocent of 
intrigue against the unfortunate Madero". 30 
Madero's death was to prQve no blessing for Huerta, 
4 
, ... 
for it brought down on his head the opposition of the Washjng-
ton Administration. This stand was going to serve as the 
27 June 15, 1916. 
28 Aug. 16, 1916. 
29 May, 1915. 
30 ~olic l!~, New York, March 4:, 1916. 
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springboard for the attack of the Catholic press in the com-
ing years. Among the first of the weeklies which strove to 
convince Wilson of' his error was America. As far back as May, , 
1913, it warned that "~ failure to recognize the Huerta Gov-
ernment will leaq. inevitably to American intervention'" .,31 
Again it rose to Huerta's defense in ~swer to the serious 
charges hurled against him by the non-sectarian and Protest-
ant presses: 
Huerta's program is the only 
saving and reasonable one ••• The 
picture of Huerta is most reassup-
ing. He seems to be the man of 
the hour and is far from the blood-
thirsty usurper that he is pre-
sented to be by n§~ wholly disin-
terested parties. ' 
~VILSON 'S SF ECIAL AGENTS 
In Washington, Wilson replied to the cry for action, 
as we have seen, by sending a personal representative to Mex- -
icoe The silence of the Catholic press on William Bayard 
Hale's mission was broken by the Catholic Mind in an article, 
which proved to be a perfect mirroring of Catholic opinion. 
It contented itself in calling him 
••• a preacher of unenviable no-
toriety, who flitted through the 
country, associated with Masonry 
and priesthaters and having re-
31 May 31, 1913. 
32 Aug. 16, 1913. 
--------------------....... 
ported to Washington, boasted in 
a published article that he has 
decided Wilson against Huerta- _. 
which accusation was never de-
nied. 33 ' . ..... 
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Hale's mission also resulted in the recall of the Mexican Am-
bassador, H. L. Wilson. While it did not commit itself' either 
.. 
way on the President's action, ~.r..i_~ in fairness rep orted 
that the Ambassador in his appearance before the Senate inves-
tigation Committee had completely won over a prejudiced Sen-
ate. 34 
The next step of the Washington Administration was 
not less unpopular: John Lind was apPointed the new confiden-
tial agent of Wilson. In a most unconvincing manner .a!!!..§l:ill 
added that "it based hope on the Lind missionn • 35 The Catholic 
press reaction was delayed, as was usual on the whole Mexican 
question. Then, late in 1914, the Catholic M1~ in a fiery 
article was indignant at Lind's partisanship and breach of 
faith in siding the Constitutionalists with smuggled arms, as 
was proved by a series of editorials in the New York Herald 
36 • Tribq.n-.-!!_ The very same charge was rei tera ted by Ameri~,~ 
and it further demanded that Ifsomebody must speak·t in Washing-
33 Oct., 1914. 
34 Aug. 9, 1913. 
35 ,Aug. 16, 1913. 
36 Feb. 1914. 
, 
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ton to explain such acti.on by one of its officials.37 The 
ExtensiQB. considered him a "bigoted representative tl for his 
ac.quiescence and even encouragement of "exiling and murder-
ing of nuns".38 As the months passe~~the voice of this same 
periodical grew louder and sharper; in a year's time Lind 
was the target of some truly cutting s~rcasm: 
As long as he kept his mouth 
closed we surmised that there was 
much wisdom hidden somewhere in 
his head ••• when Mr. Lind opened 
his mouth to speak, he revealed 
the vacuity concealed in the 
sphinxlike solidity of his head. 
We have queer ambassadors these 
days.39 
While the criticism of the Catholic ~ was more dignified, 
it was not less sharp in describing Lind as "cutting a sorry 
picture tt • 40 In the estimation of the Brooklyn Tablet, all 
of Wilson's foreign troubles were due to the incompetency of 
his so-called diplomats.41 
Lind's mission ended in complete failure, when in 
October 1914, the dictator defied Washington's demand for a 
democratic election. The m Maris; sensed that the President's 
• 
pride had been injured and so it pleaded "on the part of wi~-
37 July 4, 1914. 
38 Nov. 14, 1914. 
39 Feb. 1915. 
40 July 2, 1915. 
41 ~~00k1I£ ~~, Brooklyn, New York, Dec. 18, 1915. 
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dom ••• to heed the warning against intervention in Mex.ico tt • 42 
In a brief editorial the Catholj~ Telegra£h voiced approval 
of President Wilson's previous effort~ to avoid war and warned 
;, ... 
the ttJingoes" that the horrors, destruction and cost of war 
should give them pause before urging intervention, and urged 
43 them instead to support the President'. humane policy. 
The President, however, al tared some of th'e humane 
aspects of his policy, when he lifted the Arms Embargo in 
February 1914. Disapproval took a year to reach print, and 
then, the ill Maria accused our government of prolonging the 
44 
reign of terror by lifting the Embargo. When the Qatholic 
~ protested, it was far stronger, because in early 1916, 
the United States seemed unable to avoid a Mexican war: 
This murderer Villa, it may be 
worthwhile remembering, is the man 
who with Carranza, in the early 
days of the uprising against Huerta 
was aided by Wilson's watchful 
waiting policy that allow~g ~ 
and ammuni11Qu to be shipped from 
the United States. No doubt the 
verx guns which his followers ~h2] 
~ Americans with last Monday were 
those the Wilson Policy 2ermitted 
Vi1lg ~Q ~ecure.4~ 
42 Nov. 21, 1913. 
43 Jan. 14, 1914. 
44 June 10, 1915. 
45 June 15, 1916. The underlined words are those of the 
thesis wri tar. 
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WAR CLOUDS APPEAR 
The Embargo, however, did attract more attention to 
\filson' s policy, which the Fortnightly R~view characterized 
as "that of watchful drift".46 Then: ~he Tampico incident 
occurred, which resulted in further changes in policy and the 
sending of troops to seize Vera Cruz •• The con~rete reality 
of war, blood and death, gave the Catholic press the sadly 
needed jolt required to wake it up. With one hundred per 
cent support of our Government's action, the qatholl£ ~­
graph decl.ared that there was no other course but to appl.y 
force, and it was sure that "Mexico will come to understand 
that our action is a blessing in disguise ••• and based on fra-
ternal solicitude ••• We support Wilson's diplomacy".47 The 
~qlic N~ also breathed deeply of the patriotic air and 
exhaled denunciation of Huerta's refusal to salute the flag 
as tthumiliating to the United Statestt ; then, in purest sim-
pli~ity went on to boast that the first public utterance in 
aupport of the President has come from the Catholic Club of 
New York CitJy, and it concluded with whole hearted su.pport 
of the President's effort "to maintain the dignity and honor 
of our beloved country".48 It was a most reluctant editor of 
46 April 15, 1914. 
47 April 23, 1914. 
48 April 23, 1914. 
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the Baltimore Catholic Review that joined in the flag waving 
as he informed his readers that patriotism demands support of 
. 
the President, yet "we hope that further bloodshed will be 
. 
avoidedtt • 49 
..... 
That this editorial was inspired by a sense of 
duty to the country became evident after one read another edi-
torial on the same page, which stated ~at "the right to in-
tervene in Mexico ••• does not seem to be ours".50 In turn, the 
Brooklyn ~ablet confined itself to pointing out some aspects 
of Catholic patriotism. 51 The real high note in Wilson laud-
ation, though, was sung by the editor of the Qstho~ic ~ 
in commemoration 0 f the eighteen blue jackets who gave their 
1ifes' blood at Vera Cruz: 
President Wilson has made an 
address that has thrilled the na-
tion ••• It was the first step in 
the achievement of that noble aim 
that these yg~g men honored fell 
last Monday. . 
An action, nevertheless, that might have meant war, 
was a sure source of irritation to a few such as the Sacree 
Hear~ Revie~, who were among the chief advocates of peace. It 
regretted that the Washington Administration "did not keep.~ts 
temper a little longer", and then it indulged in sarcasm: 
49 May 2, 1914. 
50 May 2, 1914. 
51 May 16, 1914. 
52 May 16, 1914. 
.... 
The resolution of Congress dis-
claims all hostility to the Mexican 
people; but a shell from a ten inch 
gun does not $top to differentiate 
between a number of th~ Mexican 53 
people and a follower.~ Huerta. 
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While the Western Catholic limited itself tlto hoping and pray-
ing for peace tt , 54 the Michigan Catholic perceived no reason 
,. 
for ~ugar-coating the truth: 
Wart The ominous word has gone forth 
and some of our brave lads have already 
given their magnificent youths for -
what? Few of us really know, while 
most of us resset Admiral Mayo' s un-
wise haste ••• 
By ~9l6, the Brooklyn !ablet felt the same, as it pOinted back 
to Vera Cruz "as Mr. ~Vilson' s Water~oof1. 56 
Mr. Wilson would have discovered Vera Cruz to be his 
Waterloo long before 1916, if he had not been saved from a 
Mexican war by the timely intervention of Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile to arbitrate the two nations' difficulties. With 
this offer the Sacr~ Heart Revi~ revived its peace hopes;57 
while the Catholic R!!!S8 and Fortnight~~ Review59 rejoiced 
that a war had been averted. 
53 April 25, 1914. 
54 !,!stern Catholic,Quincy, Ill., May 8, 1914. 
55 Michig§n ,Qatholic, Detroit, April 30, 1914. 
56 July 1, 1916. 
57 May 2, 1914. 
58 May 2, 1914. 
59 May 15, 1914. 
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Although the war threat had given place to peace 
hopes, the Catholic press, henceforth, became keenly inter-
ested in the Mexican question. Wilson's policy was now a 
.... 
common editorial topic; a subject of the most loyal defenses 
and the sharpest attacks. After May 1914, however, the de-
fenders were few. It surprised nobody,. to find the Sacred 
Heart Review complaining that the punishment of Huerta for 
his refusal to salute the flag had been superseded by a so-
called war of service.60 For the Fortnightly Revie~ the Mex-
ican horizon was brighter, yet it still doubted the wisdom of 
much of Wilson's policy.61 As for America, it could see ab-
solutely no reason to compliment the 
••• Presiden t for his a tti tude 
towards Mexico, which has been 
a puzzle to the country at 
large. From the very beginning 
his friends and foes alike have 
been dissatisfied with his 
sphinx-like reticence ••• Neither 
equity nor law justified the 62 
sending of our army into Mexico. 
The President's puzzling policy stirred up only more 
disfavor, w~en it proved powerless to curtail Vibla's crimes. 
In exasperation the Brooklyn Tablet hoped that the protests 
from the British and French Governments would cause Wilson to 
60 June 13, 1914. 
61 June 7, 1914. 
62 June 6, 1914. 
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realize that more definite action must be taken to preserve 
life and property in Mexico. 63 A warning, th ough', was ~­
icat~ message in its all too true prediction that Wilson, in 
receiving Carranza delegates, and in·;ssuring them of sincere 
friendship, was going to find himself "in an extremely embar-
rassing position before long"; 64 while. two weeks later it la-
mented that the Washington authorities have put themselves in 
such an awkward diplomatic position by "playing the part of 
65 the protecting aegis" to a rascally horde commanded by Villa. 
These same outrages also were too much for the patient Indi-
ana Q~lic, which wished to arouse other papers to protest 
against the Wilson Administration for its responsibility in 
66 placing the Constitutionalist in power. The opposite view, 
though, was still held by the Catholic ~elegraph, Democrat in 
sympathy, which still believed that the moral influence of 
Wilson's policy in union wi th the ABC mediators would compel 
the Constitutionalist to show some justice to the Church. 67 
If Wilson's effort to help Mexico in the fall of 
1913 was the index of the Catholic press influence, it would 
• 
have been a miserable failure. Yet this did not discourage 
63 July 25, 1914. 
64 Aug. 1, 1914. 
65 Aug. 15, 1914. 
66 Indiau~ £atho1i~, Indianapolis, Aug. 15, 1914. 
67 July 30, 1914. 
ow. 
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the papers from continuing to remind Washington of its duty. 
The Catholic ~graph by September, 1914, was gradually los-
ing its confidence in the panacea of Wilson's policy, so that 
, 
it called upon the American Federatlo~ of Catholic Societies 
"to utilize its influence to the utmost to obtain effective 
action from WashingtonM• 68 To the Monitor, it seemed a con-
i 
tradiction that America prays for peace for a war torn Europe, 
while at the same time "she grasps in friendship the bloody 
hand that harasses the :Mexican peoplen • 69 The Fortnight1I' 
Review pointed the accusing finger at our Government as being 
responsible for the Carranza outrages, which followed on the 
heels of Huerta's removal from power.?O A completely differ-
ent aspect, however, was considered by the Extension, which 
shifted the blame from President Wilson to "ourselves", be-
cause our government is a representative organization. 71 
PRESS PROTESTS INCREASE 
As long as Woodrow Wilson preferred to overlook the 
atrocities committed by the followers of Villa and Carranza, 
his favor with the Catholic press continued to wane. Even the 
" 
Canadian Catholics were disgusted with the President's fa:t:J..ure 
68 Sept. 24, 1914. 
69 Oct. 17, 1914. 
70 Oct. 15, 1914. 
71 Nov., 1914. 
, 
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to act. But one of their papers, the Catholic Record, became 
more annoyed with the passivity of the Catholic papers in the 
United States than with the President: 
But so far wi th t'h~ excep-
tion of America and the protests 
of the Federation o~ Catholic So-
cieties, and the feeble bleats 
from a few newspapers we have 
heard nothing. Perhaps,·they 
don't wish ••• to embarrass the 
government or are too persistent 
in devQtion to Job, their patron 
saint. 72 
The following week a few more papers, perhaps stirred by the 
challenge, expressed their sentiments. Disgust colored the 
Boston Pilotts comment on our government's absolute indi~~er-
ence to the most brutal outrages taking place at our very 
door. 73 In this observation the BrooklYl! Tablet, in contrast 
to the Catholic Record's charge, concluded that "the Catholic 
newspapers of the country seem pretty unanimously to have come 
to the conclusion ••• that the time has come ••• to voice protest 
to the Administration in washingtonu • 74 While out West, the 
voice of the Intermountain Catholic was heard complaining, be-
• 
cause those in Washington failed to take notice that Catholic 
.' 
Americans were demanding protection of their co-religionists in 
72 Catholic Record, London, Canada, Nov. 1, 1914. 
73 Boston Pilot, Boston, Nov. 12, 1914. 
74 Nov. 21, 1914. 
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Mexico. 75 The Newark Monitor, in its turn, attributed the 
source and continuance of 
rather than to Washington 
Mexican anarchy to Mexican Masons 
pOliticians. 76 The reply of the 
..... 
~. ~~ulletin, however, asked why the papers were so si-
lent, when reliable evidence had been offered to ,prove that 
priests were being murdered and nuns +avished by Villa and 
Carranza bands177 America, though, encouraged its readers 
with an optimistic forecast baaed on Secretary of State Bry-
an's promise that 
••• when the time arrives for 
recognition the Department of 
State assures you that the 
question of religious freedom 
in Mexico wil17Seceive due consideration. 
After the President's annual message to Congress in 
December, 1914, the country's attention was again drawn to 
, .... 
his foreign policy, for in this address he failed to mention 
the Mexican situation. Many of the Catholic papers began to 
doubt the President's sincerity. Just previous to the address, 
the Brooklyn Tablet let it be known that all were most anxious 
• 79 to know the President's foreign plans. This inexcusable' 
omission was immediately made the theme of the none too 
75 Interm2.!mtain £atholi£" Salt Lake City, Nov. 12, 1914. 
76 N'ewarl} li1onitor, .Newark, l'Iov. 15, 1914. 
77 ~. ~ By11etin, St. Paul, Nov. 11, 1914. 
78 Dec. 5, 1914. (This promise was never kept). 
79 Dec. 5, 1914. 
j 
friendly Sacred Heart Review's next editorialt 
Treating of our foreign p 01-
icy the President says: "We are 
at peace with the world" ••• Mr. 
,Wilson may congratul~~. himself 
and pat himself on the back •• ~but 
this country represented is di-
rectly responsible for all the 
crimes •••. in Mexico, and the mem-
ory of them like the gGPst of 
Banquo, will not down; it wil180 not be hidden by fine phrases. 
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The President also received a quiet reminder from America 
that when we entered Mexico there was at least some semblance 
of law, but when we left itt here was nothing but chaos.8l 
Even the faithful Catholic. I.!legrB:l2h was al ienated from the 
President: 
••• before God and the world Mr. 
Wilson is rigntly held respons-
ible for the regime in Mexico. 
While pursuing a course of 
'watchful waiting' we earnestly 
hope that we will not be co~2-
pelled to wait much longer. 
Nor could the Denv~ B~ister interpret the message in any 
other light than that the Administration was trying to take 
refuge behind the excuse of non-interference. The editor 
then demanded that the Administration adopt immediate measures 
to undo the evil already perpetrated, or accept full responsi-
80 Dec. 12, 1914. 
81 Dec. 12, 1914. 
82 Dec. 10, 1914. 
.' ~25 
bility for the crimes of the Constitutionalists.83 
EVALUATION OF HUERTA 
During the troubled days ?f 1914, however, Wilson 
was not the only personage connected with the Mexican story. 
There were also three leading Mexicans featured in the- crra-
matis Eersonae: Huerta, Villa and Ca~anza. The leading role 
was assumed by the dictator, Huerta, in the tragedy of his 
own fall from power. While our Administration was expending 
great effort to secure a change in the Mexican Government, 
the Extensi~n suggested that it would do better if it spent 
more time asking itself ttafter Huerta - What, instead of 
after Huerta - Who".84 The Sacred Heart Review, while far 
more sympathetic to Huerta than Wilson, nevertheless, was ir-
ritated at the narrow minded, rather than rational, editorial~ 
written by some of 
••• the esteemed Catholic corres-
pondents, who h ave found reason 
for Wilson's opposition to Hu-
erta ••• because he is a Catholic 
••• and his tacit approval of 
Carranza ••• because he is anti-
Catholic. Let us have some com-
mon sense in our comments on the 
President and his attitudes 
toward Huerta. His statesman-
ship may be at fault ••• He may 
have the Mexican bull by the 
83 Denv~r~egister, Denver, Dec. 26, 1914. 
84 Feb., 1914. 
wrong horns; but he deserves bet-
ter than to have SUS~!cions cast 
upon his good faith. 
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Our Government's treatment of Huerta during the 
Tampico incident served to tighten tllt bonds of friendship al-
ready existing between Huerta and several of the Catholic 
weeklies. Wilson was rubbing a sore siot in h is unjustified 
opposition to Huerta. In the mind of the Brookl~n Tablet Hu-
erta was no worse than those Mexican officials whom we were 
befriending. Therefore, the Administration should clean up 
Mexico thoroughly or allow Huerta to rule. 86 In the eyes of 
America, the Tampico incident boomeranged on the President, 
for 
Our Government has refused 
to recognize Huerta ••• yet a na-
tion was asked to make repara-
tion through its chief officer. 
Here is recognition ••• Such a di-
lemma is e~~arrassing for the 
President. 
The Baltimore Catholic Beviey judged it only fair to keep in 
mind Huerta's courtesy towards the United States, in spite of 
naIl the rio.iculous fuss ••• caused by that little ttempest in 
the teapott - the Tampico incident".88 
85 March 28, 1914. 
86 April 25, 1914. 
87 April 25, 1914. 
88 Catholic Review, Baltimore, Aug. ~,19l4. Henceforth, 
only the title Catholic Eeview will be used. 
-
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Huerta's resignation found the majority of the 
Catholic papers also unable to join in the universal joy of 
the secu~r and Protestant press. The Cath21!£ Bevie~ did 
not hesitate to throw the damp rag an~such rejoicing by the 
reminder that the flight of Huerta was not the end of Mex-
ico's trouble, but only an introduction to a worse state of 
.. 
existence under the government of Carranza and Villa. 89 In 
an issue a month later, it appealed to the President's sense 
of fair play by asking him to go before the people and "ad-
mit his mistake".90 
Although its effort reaped no fruit, the Catholic 
press continued to defend Huerta in the hope of eventually 
convincing the President of his mistaken policy. To the 
Columbiad, it seemed that the Catholic press was failing to 
influence Washington because a greater power, the Masons, 
was interfering with any attempts to secure Huerta's recogni-
tion by Wilson. 9l This opinion, too, was held by the Catholic 
Mind. 92 In the opinion of the Sacre~ Heart Review, Huerta was 
no worse t~an the men whom our government favored;93 while the 
89 Aug. 1, 1914. 
90 Sept. 9, 1914. 
91 Co~umbiad, New Haven, Oct., 1914. 
92 Oct. 1914. 
93 Nov. 14, 1914. 
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Catholic Standard ~ Times was disgusted with the Administra-
94 
tion's support of two "ex-bandi ts of the most repulsive type tt • 
A positive approach, though, was adopted by Michigan Catholic, 
.. ., 
which quoted our diplomat, Nelson O'Shaughnessey, as saying 
that "Huerta has been grossly vilified by the press of the 
95 United States ••• He is not the drunkard.he is made to appear". 
Even from across the sea Huerta was recognized E,S Mexico's man 
of the hour, who had been rejeeted. 96 
Huerta, however, was not considered the Mexican 
panacea by all Catholics. There were exceptions. With much 
delight would Wilson have read the Catholic li2.!:thwes,t ~rogre.§.§., 
which confirmed his policy: 
There are some who think that 
Huerta was a devout Catholic and 
the protagonist of the Catholics ~ 
of Mexico. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth. The United 
S~at9' did right in not recognizing 
h~m. 
The General was also soundly spanked by the pro-Wilsonian half , 
of the sometimes divided Catholic Review's editorial staff, 
which spoke~of him as 
94 Catholic Standard ~ 1ime.§" Philadelphia, Dec. 19, 1914. 
95 Nov. 21, 1914. 
96 Month, Jan. 1915. 
97 Catholic Northwest Progress, Seattle, Oct. 31, 1914. 
••• scoundrel, unworthy of the po-
sition he has usurped, full of 
savage instincts which he lets 
loose, and condemned by the Presi-
dent of the United ~sates, Huerta 
must be eliminated. .'< 
..... 
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While the Fortnightly Review opposed Carranza, it challenged 
the pro-Huerta papers to offer proof that the former dictator 
,. 
would have established a permanent peace, if they were going 
to make such statements. 99 The dispute that followed added 
nothing of note to what was already known. IOO Both the 
Qathol~£ ~, and the Month, however, strongly held that Hu-
erta was "a just and competent ru1ertt101 and "would have 
brought order to Mexico ft • 102 
VILLA, THE BANDIT 
Huerta also sh ared the newspaper headline s during 
1914 with the second lead in the Mexican tragedy: Villa, Ita 
bandit without conscience, a bloody murderer for hire tt • 103 
Like two weights poised on a balance, he rose when Huerta fell. 
Strange to say, the reputedly clever Wilson was grooming this 
reprobate to take over the reins of government. This was too 
much for the Catholic Hind, which held that this likely co.-
--,----
98 July 4, 1914. 
99 April 15, 1916. 
100 May 11, 1916; June 1, 1916. 
101 Jane, 1916. 
102 July 22, 1916. 
103 Americ~, Mar. 13, 1913. 
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testant for supreme authority was an Ifignorant illiterate, a 
bandit and a murderer".104 If Wilson was really going to 
shake hands with Villa, America thought it should be called 
to the attention of our Government t~t a violent anarchist 
recently arrested in Spain had letters on his person, which 
proved he had been. in frequent communication with the Mexican 
105 
rebels. • 
What really worried the Catholic press, though, was 
the prospect of United States' recognition of Villa. The 
alarm was sounded by the Catholic N~: 
A government ••• with Villa as 
a dominating influence could not 
logically be recognized by the 
United States. Mr. Wilson, to be 
consistent with himself, could 
not shake hands wi th one who in-
dulges in murder by wholesale. 
The future of Mexican Constitu-
tionalism demands the elimination106 of Villa in a political quantity. 
On the same day, too, the Baltimore Catholic Review sounded 
the same alarm. lO? There were no bouquets for President Wil-
son for wise diplomacy either by the Catpolic Bulletin, which 
frankly acknowledged that the United States knowingly or un-
. 
knowingly, has allowed itself to be placed in a position of 
104 June, 191.4. 
105 June 6, 1914. 
106 July 4, 1914. 
10? July 4,1914 •. 
I 
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abetting "the so-called Constitutionalists in their unholy war 
of rapine, murder and especially of aiding the cut-throat like 
Villa~.108 At the moment when Villa's star seemed to be set-
ting over the White House, the Catholic Pkeview's former meek 
disagreement gave way to a terrified scream. lOS 
The mention 0 f Villa immedtt.. tely bro ught up the as-
sociations of Carranza and the Constitutionalist cause. Thus 
Carranza was assigned a minor supporting role by the Catholic 
press during 1914. Yet his connection with the Constitution-
alists would prepare his way for prominence in the coming 
years. At that time the Constitutionalists' outrages seemed 
to be leading to intervention. The M5U:ning ~ asked: ttShall 
such things be tolerated under the protection 0 f the American 
flag?"110 And when American Catholics became the subject of ... 
ridicule for their defense of the persecuted Mexicans, the 
Catholic li!~ minced no words in informing the abusers that 
"since the Government of this country aided the Constitution-
a1ist to gain the upper hand ••• It ought to interfere to pre-
vent such barbarity as is practiced there today. III 
OPPOSITION TO WILSON 
Villa and Carranza might be the immediate instru-
108 July 18, 1914. 
109 Aug. 22, 1914. 
110 Morning §~, New Orleans, Sept. 19, 1914. 
111 Oct. 24, 1914. 
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ments causing all this chaos, but many felt as the Montp did, 
th2.;t the President's apathy had furnished the moral encour-
agement and the material means of innumerable and unspeakable 
brutalities.112 • This editorial ser;e£ as an introduction and 
index of what the Catholic press had in store for the Presi-
den t during the coming year 0 f 1915. rrequently he was going 
to find himself embarrassed by editorials like those 0 f the 
~ightly Review which asked him what he was doing to pre-
vent the outrages in ~irexico; or why had he broken his promise 
made through Secretary Bryan to make religious freedom a 
prime consideration in extending recognition to Mexico~l13 
The London Catholic Month thought the only so lution the Presi-
dent could offer would be intervention, and it proceeded to 
justify such an action on grounds quite novel to pagan 
America: 
••• It is a delicate matter for a 
British Journal in present circum-
stances to criticize any detail of 
the American Administration, but 
we are sure that those in the 
States feel as we do ••• While there 
was a prospect of restoring order 
in r,!exico under the strong rule of 
Huerta, President Wilson brought 
pressure to have him dismissed and 
succeeded ••• Yet now the President 
112 Jan. 1915. 
113 Jan. 1, 1915. 
wants to give them ~reedom in 
their own a~£airs ••• Wilson 
stands by and asks - Am I my 
brother's keeper? Just as the 
individual is bound to give 
help to the neighbor .UlJ.justly 
attacked, so the Sta~e~must 
succour a neighbor state 
plunged in disorder which it 
cannot itsel~ remedy. The 
Christian Doctrine on the sub-
ject was plainly decla~d by 
Pope Pius IX in 1860 when in 
the Encyclical Novos ~! ~ 
he condemned the prii4iple of 
ttNoJl-Intervention tt • 
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While this barrage of accusations was laid down, 
one of the good words spoken for the President presented an 
interesting aside. During this period of Catholic discon-
tentment with existing Mexican policies, a malicious rumor 
spread rapidly and far that Wilson had insulted Cardinal 
Gibbons at an interview. The Baltimore Catholig fievi~, the 
o~ficial organ for Cardinal Gibbons, which always strove to 
keep the Catholic Mexican protest not only on a factual, but 
also a fair basis, gave front page prominence to the refuta-
tion of the charge of Wilson's disrespect. The article mere-
4 
ly recorded an interview with Monsignor Russell, who accom;: 
panied the Cardinal to the VlThi te Ho'use: 
I (Monsignor Russell) can 
say if the President addressed 
the Cardinal as "Mr. It .... For I 
114 Feb., 1915. 
, 
was not more than two feet from 
the President during the whole 
interview ••• and I did not hear 
him.115 
. 
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Just to prove its fairness, it allaw'id the pro-Wilsonian edi-
tor to write an editorial soon afterwards, which quoted the 
words of Cardinal Gibbons that ttarme<\, intervention must never 
take place. We who have the interest of the country at 
heart approve of the present Administrationts cours~n.116 
The Catholic World, however, preferred to face the 
cold facts, and it told the President he must either inter-
vene or remain out altogether and leave Mexico to the Hex-
icans. ll? The President was also reminded by the ~atholic 
~ that it was no mere platitude that "no democracy can ex-
ist which to satisfy the tyrannical injustices of 2 per cent • 
of its population, tramples on the dearest rights of 98 per 
cent as is being done in Mexico n • llB Yet it seemed to the 
Brooklyn Tablet that the President was too timorous and waver-
ing in his Mexican pOlicy.119 
CARRANZA CONDE1.mED 
• 
..' The spotlight for 1915, though, Was chiefly focused 
115 Mar. 6, 1915. 
116 Mar. 29, 1915. 
II? March, 1915. 
118 May 11, 1915. 
119 May 22, 1915. 
, 
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on Carranza, not Woodrow Wilson. Once Carranza gained a 
foothold, he rose swiftly. His rapid rise to power and the 
eventual headaches to the Washington authorities found no 
.-
cause for sympathetic response from the ~4tholic ~, be-
cause our Government had been responsible for his being in 
authori ty. 120 Ap1eric~ sketched Carra~za as an "intolerant 
demagogue wedded to a blind tyranny, which w ill always find 
expression in acts of oppressive violence and vindictive-
ness".121 To the ~ooklyn T~blet it seemed a thing of wonder-
ment how the Constitutionalists could perform actions far 
more insulting to our flag, to human justice and decency than 
Huerta ever dreamed of committing, and yet have our govern-
ment justify such behaviour1122 
The Carranza opposi ti on truly grew in volume, when .... 
indications in Washington turned towards Carranza's recogni-
tion. Immediately the Mexican question was treated with 
graver concern in t he editorials of the Catholic press. In 
mid May the Catholic Review decisively protested against such 
-t' 123 recogn~ ~ont In its turn, the Extension, edited by the 
now famous Bishop Kelley, tried to drive home to the Govern-
120 Feb. 20, 1915. 
121 Mar. 10, 1915. 
122 April 10, 1915. 
123 May 15, 1915. 
ment the importance of such a step: 
It is perfectly true that the 
American Government is the protect-
or of Mexico; and that no other 
government i~ the wor~d~will act 
on the questlon of recognizing Mex-
ico until Washington acts ••• The 
pledge of the Government on the 
question of religious liberty is a 
pledge that can be kept.,.It is a 
pledge that must enter i~2~ the 
question of recognition. 
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In early October, the Catholics' hopes began to 
change further, not to gold like the early autumn leaf, but 
rather to a November withered brown, when Secretary Lansing 
and the representatives of the South American Republics 
seemed agreed on Carranza as Mexico's presidential choice. 
When this report reached America's editor, he made no effort 
to aoften his sharp admonition to Washington that such recog-
nition would be against the principle of international law 
. 125 
and in discord with the standard set by the Unlted States. 
While the editorial of the Catholic Review breathed disappoint- , 
ment, yet it concluded with a half-hearted, flickering hope 
that "the Pr~sident' s judgment would not bind to so ignoble 
~6 ~ 
a choice". The Brooklyn Tablet, however, spoke forth-
rightly as it summed up the hard truth that 
124 June, 1915. 
125 Oct. 2, 1915. 
126 Oct. 9, 1915. 
I 
II, 
••• there is no dodging it, if the 
President recognizes the Carranza 
Administration, the only inter-
pretation possible is that he 
openly ignores the wishes of six-
teen million Catholic .<>i tizens 
and repudiates the promises made 
by the State Department last De-
cember ••• and has forgotten the 
~rinciplel~~ which our government 
loS based. 
• 
In its next issue the headlines flared: 
Carranza Recognition Will Be Open 
Insult 1~8Catholics in the United 
States. 
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According to the conservative Catholic ~ one could only 
t ' C t h' h . H t 129 ques loon arranza s C O1.ce over t e superl.or uer a. 
On October 19, 1915, the recognition was a fact, but 
it was not so easily digested by the Catholic papers. It was 
then that bitterness crept into the Catholic ~' comment, 
because Carranzats guarantees were more highly regarded in 
Washington than the word of responsible American citizens.130 
Both the Catholic T~legra~h131 and the Sacred H~ E§view132 
attributed this shameful recognition to the efforts of a group 
of powerful and influential Carranza backers in Vlash ington • 
127 Oct. 9, 1915. 
128 Oct. 16, 1915. 
129 Oct. 23, 1915. 
130 Oct. 23, 1915. 
131 Oct. 21, 1915. 
132 Oct. 23, 1915. 
... 
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Yet in a less polemical, but possibly more devastating attack, 
the Wholic World wounded deeply all of the Wilson advocates 
among its readers by the simple remar~ that after Carranza's 
.... 
recognition people had good cause to be disappointed in an 
idealist, who had abandoned his fundamental principle. 133 
While in the mind of the editor of the ~ Maria, the recog-
nition resolved the President's action into an embarrassing 
dilemma: !tIf President Wilson is informed about what Carranza. 
has done in Mexico, his action is unaccountable. If he is not 
informed, his ignorance is without the least foundation~.134 
Perhaps, though, the strongest criticism of Wilson's latest 
diplomatic venture was expressed in the Michigan Catholic: 
The Chief Executive made a 
grave mistake in recognizing Car-
ranza. The United States has no 
right to foist a government on 
the Mexican people, and I assert 
there is no evidenc e t ha t the Mex-
ican people want Carranza. 
In the recognition ••• Mr. Wil-
son is setting up in Mexico a gov-
ernment which does not derive its 
power 'from the consent of the 
governed' but from the consent of 
• Mr. Wilson. 
He acted contrary to the 
spirit of our institution and the 
well grounded conviction of our 
people. And he is giving the sup-
port of his high office and name 
____ 0 __ 
133 Catholic World, New York, Nov., 1915. 
134 Nov. 7, 1915. 
... 
to a principle which now our 
Congress is positively forbidden 
to embody in Law • 
••• We clearly await the day 
of election and in an orderly 
way recordl~gr disapir~bation at 
the polls. 
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Although Carranzats recognition was universally op-
posed by the Catholic press, neverthe~ss, a few of the week-
lies deemed it the duty of good Catholics to submit to author-
ity. The Qstholic Review was among the first to accept the 
new decision and like an obedient son stepped in line: ~fe 
136 
no longer kick ••• We obey the will of our Chief Magistrate"; 
and it reiterated this message the following week in a 
stronger refrain: 
It becomes our duty to ac-
quiesce, to be submissive. We do 
not think the decision is wise. 
It is manifestly, though, not for 
us to berate and blackguard our 
President and his advisers for 
this decision ••• It is ours now to 
work with the President~d help 
. for the best in Mexico. 
Although the For~qightlY Review138 and the Little Rock Guard-
ian139 refused to acquiesce in the recognition, nevertheless, 
", 
they thought it unfair to blame the Wilsonians entirely for 
this move, which was endorsed by several supposedly Catholic 
135 NOVe 4, 1916. 
136 Oct. 16, 1915. 
137 Oct. 23, 1915. 
138 N"ov. 15,1915. 
139 Guardian, Little Vol. 5 
140 
.' 
nations of South America, and our representatives. 
TUMULTY SCHEME 
With the Presidential election soon coming up, 
Woodrow 'Nilson became alarmed at the· ~owing hostility of the 
Catholic citizenry_ His justified anxiety gave hirth to a 
scheme that sadly backfired on its preiidential inventor. 
The instrument used: The retiring Mr. T~~ulty, the Presi-
dent's priyate secretary; the kernel of the scheme: Mr. Tu-
multy's letter to his obligingly inquisitive friend, in which 
the whole Mexican persecution is explained away as an over-
exaggeration. The whole stupid plot was exposed in a few 
sentences by the Brooklyn Tablet: 
We are not surprised at the 
action of Mr. Tumulty in trying 
to whitewash the President in his 
attitude towards Mexico and out-
raged nuns ••• Already he sees ••• 
the Catholic vote threatening his 
future ambitions. He must pre-
pare to square himself with the 
Catholic population of the coun-
try. Who is a better tool than 
his secretary? The isolated 
Catholic in the White House haa 
succumbed to the weight of the 
white-necktied category. The 
bolt has been shot, not by the 
Presbyterian President, b~40by 
the Catholic man, Friday. 
." 
The Catholic News, too, read between the lines of Tumulty's 
--,-----
140 Dec. 1, 1915. 
.. 
141 
letter and drew the same conclusion. 14l Since it put on its 
rose colored glasses, as was customary when reading a Wil-
s,onian document, the ~h.gliq Revie!! found some justifica-
tion for Tumulty's cause, but thought~t unwise of the Secre-
tary to try to knock the foundation from the Catholic criti-
142 
cism by declaring his case rested on proven facts. While 
.. 
the CatholjQ Transcrigt, thundered out against such "small 
• t 143 . 1 . 144 and unstatesmanlike tact~cs', the Fortn~ght y Rev~ew 
and the EXlll1si..9..n145 predicted that this campaign document 
would cost him votes at the polls. 
After the Tumulty schemes had died an unhappy 
death, the President learned from this experience that the 
Catholic press did have a strong voice, when raised in pro-
test. He consequently decided it would be better to let 
events follow a more natural course. The Catholic [~ grew 
more annoyed with President Wilson's ttamazing complacency" in 
treating the Mexican situation. 146 The Church P~ogress also 
warned the President that he would have to answer for the 
further per~ecution of the Church in Mexico.147 Again the 
141 Dec. 4, 1915. 
142 Dec. 18, 1915. 
143 .Q.gtho:l::h£ Transcript, Hartford, Vol. 18, #25. 
144 Jan. 1, 1916. 
145 Jan. 1916. 
146 Dec. 11, 1915. 
147 ~-£h Progress, St. Louis, Dec. 11, 1915. 
.... 
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cry of intervention tra.velled across the sea, as the Month 
called the President to task in dogmatic English 'phraseology: 
It is quite unintelligible to 
the Americans how theix President 
could be impelled to·recognize 
Carranza ••• 
We can understand the reluct-
ance of Mr. Wilson to intervene in 
the affairs of a neigh~oring coun-
try. But surely there are limits 
to the principle of non-interven-
tion, and those limits are reached 
when a neighboring state 1 ike the 
United States refuses to act 
though with abundant means to com-
pel the submission of a few anar-
chists who are oppref4~g the 
country by violence. 
I 
There was another source of opposition to the Car-
ranza recognition, and that was not the pens of editors, but 
the bullets of a bandit, the bullets of a slighted Villa. It 
was the srune Villa, who seemed to be forcing the Administra-
tion to fulfill the P4,qnth's desire of intervention. Without 
even seeking a pretext, Villa began taking the lives of Amer-
ican citizens. To add fuel to the fire, Carranza encouraged 
the war trend, when according to the ~.2.li..£ ~ !the 
blocked the~ President's efforts to catch Villa tf ;149 and bJ" 
.-
150 April, it accused Carranza of openly aiding Villa to escape. 
After Villa's raids made it patent to all that Wilson's 
-----~ 
148 Jan., 1916. 
149 Jan. 24, 1916. 
150 April 29, 1916. 
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"placation of Carranza" policy was a complete fiasco, the ill 
Maria quoted a scorching condemnation of it by Cardinal Gib-
bons, who no longer restrained himself by any over-patriotic 
defense of the Administration: ...... 
The ultimate destruction of 
all authority in Mexico is the 
logical result of the policy of 
the present Administrat~n from 
its very inception: Only parti-
sans or those who are hopeless 
blockheads Vlill gainsay this; 
and it should be borne in mind. 
How unlikely the deplorable 
conditions of Mexico is to improve 
under Carranza is plain from his 
acts ••• He is a wily rascal. inter-
vention will come in the end. 51 
The Fortnightly Review, however, was skeptical 
whether the interests of the United states would be secured by 
intervention;152 yet the Catholic ~ demanded some change in 
tactics because of the miserable failure of the present pol-
icy.153 Caution, though, was advised by the Ave Marig, due to 
hero worship of Villa by his considerable following.154 
During this crisis in the first half of 1916, one 
paper, the Brooklyn Tablet, deserves a special mention for the 
keen interest shown, and the sharper criticism expressed, 
151 Jan. 29, 1916. 
152 March 25, 1916. 
153 April 15, 1916. 
154 May 13, 1916. 
.. ' 
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on the Mexican situation. In early January, intervention was 
the theme running through its editorials. Carranza's insol-
155 
ence should not go unpunished; a week later Villa's murder 
of sixteen Americans would certainlt torce Wilson to abandon 
h ' h" hf 1 it' l' 156 A th . ~s muc r~d~culed watc u wa ~ng po ~cy. s e Wl.n-
ter gave way to spring, it kept recalling to its readers the ,. 
seriousness of the situation. It conjectured that Carranza's 
hope of remaining in power depended on Wilson's reelection. 
Then, in June, the Tablet~~ attack took on new vigor as the 
two governments ostensibly drew further and further apart. 
When the Administration momentarily checked the official 
pressure on Carranza, the Tablet rolled its tongue in its 
cheek and ventured to explain that tlpolitics has delayed this 
week the development of a crisis ••• The National Democratic 
Convention is in session".157 
Mexico continued to defy Wilson, and the Tablet 
became openly disgusted at the President's willingness to be 
insulted.158 The clash of Carranza's and Pershing's troops, 
however, s~emed destined to force Wilson to declare war. 
.... 
With condescension varied only by acrimony, this paper as~ured 
155 Jan. 4, 1916. 
156 Jan. 11, 1916. 
~57 April 29, 1916. 
158 June 17, 1916. 
the President of Catholic loyalty and support: 
Wi th all your fault s, we 
Catholics will stand by you ••• chief 
of which was forgetting what yes-
terday's pol icy was ...... 'you c ouldn' t 
keep us out of war wl~ the tempor-
ary truce you made • 
••• The newspaper men know, of 
course, that he never had a policy 
••• He tried to keep us out of war 
only to plan us into it. 
If you had known what was in 
the back of your mind in the sev-
eral yesterdays of Villa, Carranza, 
Embargo, Vera Cruz, Blockade, John 
Lind, and other silent Murphys, 
the country would not be today in 
the mess of your meddling. 
We Catholics,will fight for 
you against Catholics because it 
just happ ens that you are, thanks 
be to God, only a few months more 
President of the country of whic!s9 
we Catholics are loyal citizens. 
145 
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If one reads the other Catholic papers during the same period~ 
however, the Tablet appears far less radical, for even the 
~.2.1:.is Review accused the President of lying in "his con-
demnation of reports to be false ••• which he knew well to be 
true".160 
~lthough the most serious threat of war was averted 
in July, the Mexican disorder grew worse. Most of the 
Catholic papers had given up all hope of Presidential action. 
The Sac~~d ..!!eart lleview in a defeatist a tti tude complained 
159 July 1, 1916. 
160 July 11, 1916. 
146 
.' 
that Carranza's influenge was greater in Washington than in 
161 his own country. The Catholic Press protests declined in 
number. The terrible reality of abandoning the Mexicans com-
...... 
pletely to the Constitutionalists, however, inspired the ~ 
Mari~ to write a f~nal series of editorials in a spirited de-
nunciation of Wilson and his dreaded Pilicy. More and more 
each editorial bared the rancor concealed in its heart; sar-
casm developed into bitterness; disgust turned into despair 
of governmental action. 162 With the November 4th issue the 
series concluded with a summation of its previous arguments 
and reached a climax in a stinging rebuke aimed at the 
••• attempts of interested politi-
cians to defend the Administra-
tion ••• which are as futile as 
they are dishonest ••• That the 
present Administration is largely 
responsible for existing condi-
tions in Mexico is a fact of 
which the proofs are superabund-
ant ••• Effort to conceal them is 
an insult to an intelligent 
voter ••• By recognizing Carranza 
••• the Administration incurred 
the responsibility for Mexican 
anarchy - a responsibility which 
no am~~t of whitewashing can re-
move. 
'" 
Although judged by the final results, the combined 
161 Aug. 4, 1916. 
162 Sept. 23; Oct. 7; Oct. 24, 1916. 
163 Nov. 4, 1916. 
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efforts of the Catholic press seemed to have influenced Wil-
son relatively little, nevertheless, as l~ng as he was a 
presidential candidate for reelection in 1916, its comments 
caused him many a sleepless night, if -the Tumulty incident is 
an index. As a matter of fact this concerted disapproval of 
the President's policy did cause many good simple Catholics 
• to wonder if in conscience they could vote for one who had 
aided a persecutor of the Church. The Baltimore Catholic Re-
~iex took great pains to make clear that while it was permis-
sible to vote for President Wilson, yet this did not prove 
the Catholic press' protest against Wilson's unjust Mexican 
164 policy wrong or unreasonable. Nor was it unusual to find 
some small town Republican politician exploiting this gold 
mine for potential votes. Such tactics, as far as the Fort-
B~ghtly Review could predict, would hurt the Church more than 
it could possibly help it.165 The Brooklyn ,Iablet, hovlever, 
with no sympathy for the Democratic leader, quietly slipped 
into an editorial on Mexico the suggestion that tfCarranza's 
arrogant demands ••• may hurt Wilson on election dayn.166 
Woodrow Wilson, though, was reelected, and the 
Catholics still received little consolation from his foreign 
164 Sept. 2, 1916; Sept. 23, 1916. 
165 March 15, 1916. 
166 Oct. 7, 1916. 
..... 
I 
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policy. The Michigan Cathol~q recorded that "the re-election 
of President Wilson has caused the calamity howlers to wail. 
Another four years of Woodrow Wilson's policies is not pleas-
. '. 167 ing to those who would provoke our ne!ghbors tt • In his ef-
forts to write off the whole Mexican headache Wilson gave 
recognition to Carranza on March 3, 1917, while distant 
.. 
thunder of V{orld War cannons drowned out the vo ice of protest. 
~rics, nevertheless, like Banquo's ghost, returned to haunt 
Wilson and his colleagues; and yet it was more terrifying, 
for its editor still had a voice, a prophetic voice: 
All Americans who are not 
Democratic know that a particu-
larly savage revolution has been 
in progress for several years ••• 
The Democrats will learn this 
fast as soon as igg Republicans 
get into office. 
The Republicans eventually did take over the reins 
of government, but the damage had been done. Unfortunately, 
all the Catholic press' prophecies of tyranny and destruction 
were fulfilled to the letter. From these experiences, the 
rather mild Catholic press of the turn of the century gradu-
~ 
ally discovered it had a voice. Unlike the secular press,'" 
though, its editors denounced government actions according to 
the norm of absolute prinCiples, rather than submission to a 
167 Nov. 16, 1916. 
168 April 7, 1917. 
party line. Although~the Catholic press ultimately failed 
to prevent Wilsonts recognition of Carranza, it did force 
him to make some honest efforts to try to procure religious 
.... ; 
as well as political liberty for the Mexican people. 
0" 
. ... 
CONCLUSION 
United States diplomacy is.~sically related to 
the protection and enforcing of American rights. These in-
terests and rights, in turn, have been concerned chiefly 
with territorial desires, trade, comme:ce, economic develop-
ment and the protection of lives and property. In Mexico, 
the dominant interest of the United States between 1821 and 
1850 was territorial; after the Civil War, emphasis changed, 
and the dollar bill motivated the economic penetration of 
our citizens into Mexico. Under Diaz, foreign capital and 
colonists were so encouraged that Mexico by 1910 was in the 
process of becoming Americanized. 
As a result of the enormous economic stake which 
our citizens have in this neighboring land, the United 
States has an important responsibility in the protection of 
those interests. These interests and rights as a rule have 
been most favored in Latin America, wherever a strong execu-
tive has wielded the big stick to stabilize his government~ 
The threatened collapse of the Diaz regime, therefore, of-
fered a direct challenge to our government. Under the cir-
cumstances, the Taft Administration contemplated direct in-
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tervention to check the rising current of revolution. The 
presence of our troops on the border to awe the rebels into 
submission was as useless as tissue paper used to check a 
whirling spring flood, for Madero at the moment was riding 
high on the crest of the wave of popularity_ By 1910, the 
disintegration of the political dam prftecting the Diaz re-
gime was too great to stem the tide of economic and social 
upheaval. Taft had to bow to the inevitable-
Madero, unfortunately, was a weak executive, and 
it was counter to the best interests of the United states to 
tolerate him very long. The diplomacy of the United states 
between 1911 and 1913 was at best one of half-hearted support. 
Daily, it became more evident that the Department of state 
would have preferred a stronger individual at the head of the 
Mexican government, and would welcome a change. The greatest 
complaint against Madero, however, came from Ambassador Wil-
aon who had little use for-the Mexican President. Henry L. 
Wilson actively looked around for the "strong executivett , 
whom he foqpd in General Felix Diaz and General Victoriano 
Huerta. When the disaffection in the army grew - an indica-
tion of the doom of any administration in Mexico - Wilson, 
translating the desires of the State Department most liter-
ally, gave his support to that element in Mexico, which he 
.... 
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believed would be most ~likely to support American economic 
interests. Accordingly, he overstepped the bounds of his 
functions as a diplomat and actively took part in the counter-
. .., 
revolution which caused the overthrow of Madero's Administra-
tion. 
When President 'flilson assumej office in March 1913, 
he represented the antithesis of the policies pursued by Taft. 
The new President had an aversion to "dollar diplomacy!', and 
economic penetration; he was deeply suspicious of Ambassador 
Wilson. liis policy towards Mexico, therefore, was to be to-
tally at variance with the previous administrations from 
Hayes to Taft. Since he would not tolerate the sanctioning 
of ttmilitary despotism" in the interests of American economic 
and financial expansion, he attempted to overthrow the 
ufrankenstein" creation (Huerta) of American diplomatic pol-
icy, as he called it. At the same time, Wilson attempted to 
introduce "democracy" in a country which had never known the 
meaning of the word, but, by destroying the "strong" force in 
Mexico, Wilson inevitably weakened commercial and economic 
interests in the country. 
The crucial mistake made by President Wilson was to 
oversimplify the Mexican revolution itself. The President 
narrowed down the conflict to a struggle between democracy and 
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despotism, whereas the revolution was a product of numerous 
diverse tendencies, which has little to do with democracy as 
such. A number of factional leaders, jealous of each other's 
. 
power, pushed forward distinct and ~~times conflicting 
revolutionary programs. It was inevitable that American in-
tervention, which supported one faction, would cause deep and 
.. 
lasting hostility among the other rival factions. This is 
precisely what happened. The deep and lasting stain, though, 
that further blotted the record of the Wilson Administration, 
resulted from supporting a faction led by barbarous bandits. 
The net result of Wilson's policies in Mexico, 
therefore, was to weaken the country further, prolong the 
revolutionary disturbances, intensify the Catholic persecu-
tion, and create chaos worse confounded. In the long run, 
American interests and rights were sacrificed. 
Such significant events naturally furnished the 
daily papers with spectacular headline and editorial fodder 
for years. The same was true also of the religious press. 
From the very first reports of the revolution, there were 
some Protestant papers which carried the "story". In the .. ' 
dawning days of the twentieth century the Protestant weeklies 
had large circulations and played an important part in influ-
encing every day life. These papers coul4 be found in the 
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city alum, the suburban~ mansion, or country farm. Many a 
large city daily envied the circulation of a p~er like the 
Qhrist1m! Herald of New York which sold Over a million copies 
. 
..... 
weekly; many a small denominational paper printed editorials 
that were accepted dogmatically by its readers. 
The paper's policy was generilly determined by the 
editor independent of any Church hierarchy. For example, the 
Southern Methodist Quarterly Review soundly condemned Diaz, 
while the northern Methodist brethren represented by the 
Christian Advocate predicted true greatness of the same man; 
and the Watchman was practically oblivious of the crisis 
south of the border until it became affiliated with another 
Baptist weekly, the Examiner. There were two factors, how-
ever, that did influence these editors: The incipient 
Protestant missionary movement into Latin America, and their 
foe, Catholicism. Any leader that favored Protestant activ-
ity was championed as the saviour of the Mexican nation. 
This factor helps to explain the fulsome praise of Diaz by 
the Baptist. and Presbyterian papers, whose missionaries were 
." actively engaged in this southern republic, and when Madero 
officially let it be known that CathOlics would receive no 
favors, his Protestant support, too, notably increased. Al-
though Huerta's despotism in itself' was cause f'or opposition, 
several editors considered his Faith an added crime. This 
was one of' the reasons President Wils,on' s anti-Huertan pol.-
icy found favor in the Protest~t press, but as long as his 
diplomatic measures seemed destined to end in war, whole 
hearted backing was withheld. It was ~nly natural, though, 
that the Presbyterign Banner would be in full agreement with 
Woodrow Wilson, a church member, yet by the time of Carranza's 
recognition, most of the weeklies were just as expressive of' 
their approval of'.the President's diplomatic measures. In 
justice, theref'ore, one might claim a very definite relation 
between the almost unanimous Protestant praise of Wilson's 
recognition of Carranza and the equally unified Catholic dis-
gust and opposition to the same policy. By 1916, though, the ~ 
White House Executive had alienated some of' his Protestant 
f'riends. And yet one might wonder whether the Baptist papers, 
the Watchman-Examiner and the Standarg, abandoned the Wil.-
sonian machine near election time out of' sheer exasperation 
with the bungling results of the President's policies, or be-
0" 
cause the other presidenti~l candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, 
was a devout Baptist. 
A more objective treatment of the whole question, 
however, was attained by those papers, which did not repre-
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sent an active missionary interest in Mexico. On this score, 
the policy'of the Congregationalist Independent deserves no-
tice. Its isolationist stand througpout these hectic years 
was paralleled only by the pacifist policy of the Catholic 
§,gcred Heart Review. Except for the Tampico incident and 
the war clouds that gathered after Ca.ranza's recognition, 
when t he President was severely rebuked by the Independenj;; 
for his frequent diplomatic blunders, ita loyalty to Wilson 
could never be questioned. Such a paper with no int erests 
at stake could afford to take an independent stand, if the 
occasion demanded. 
For sheer influence, though, the most powerful of 
all the Protestant papers was probably the undenominational 
Christian gerald of New York ~hich was read by at least two 
million people weekly_ Since it was undenominational, no one 
Protestant sect was patronized or unduly favored in its edi-
torial columns to the offense of other Churches. Thus, its 
policy in the early stages of any question was generally 
conservatiV"e until it could ascertain which wa:y the wind blew 
for the majority of the Protestant brethren. It followed in 
saluting Diaz; then it recognized the leadership of Madero; 
it attacked Huerta; the editor held back momentarily in en-
dorsing Wilson's Mexican poliey, but eventually stepped in 
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line, and by t he time Carranza was recogn ized, few more ex-
treme backers could be found. The paper literally was a slow 
starter, but a strong finisher. 
.... 
Although the Protestant press had no doctrinal 
unity to hold it together, in the maj'or issues of the Mexican 
crisis, such as the resignation of Hutfrta and the recognition 
of Carranza, there was a fairly consistent and unified front. 
On the one hand, in view of the difference of opinion on 
Diaz and other questions of world interest where religion was 
not directly involved, and on the other hand, in c'ons ider-
ation of the almost universal anti-Catholicltrend character-
istic of all the Protestant papers of this day, one could not 
go far wrong in holding that the editors favored far less 
\'1ilson's "watchful wai tinglf policy in itself than the anti-
Catholic eftects it would bring about. 
The Mexican question, however, was of even more im-
portance to the Catholics of the United States than to Pro-
testants, for the Mexican Catholics were the scape-goats of 
the anti-cl~rical revolutionists_ Religion then, rather than 
." 
-
politics, explained the ever-mounting interest and eventually 
the 1 iberal editorial space given to the Mexican chaos in the 
Catholic press_ This position became evident beyond all doubt 
1 ct. author's note at the end ot Chapter Two. 
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with the America editor's statement of the paper's Mexican 
policy which would have been unanimously accepted by the 
Catholic press: 
.... 
The Mexican problem has a 
triple aspect, political, econ-
omic and religious. The last 
aspect only has been our con-
cern. 2 • 
This factor helps explain the silence of the early revolu-
tionary days, when the religious issue was not of paramount 
importance to the revolutionists. With the exception of 
weeklies like America, ~ Maria, and the Sacred B~~rt Revie~, 
coverage of strictly religious and local events characterized 
the news of the Catholic papers. The discovery of the pro-
verbial needle in the haystack would be more likely than a 
strong editorial policy which might involve the ce.nsoring of " .. 
a political move by these latter type weeklies. It was only 
after the Catholic press became conscious of the seriousness 
of our southern neighbors' troubles, that it found time to 
reflect on the Madero uprising and pass judgment •. 
ihe Catholic and Protestant press began definitely 
." to part ways over the question of Huerta's recognition. Yet 
many of the Catholic papers, such as the ~tholic ~ and 
the Baltimore Catholic Review, still refrained from opposing 
2 America, Nov. 21, 1914. 
Wilson's anti-Huerta policy, since they feared the Church 
would be tarred for its lack of patriotism if the Catholic 
press were politically found out of ~ine; and there were a 
few Democratic papers, too, like the ~atholic Telegraph that 
had a child's faith in the President's ttwatchful waiting" 
stand. The President's appointment, ~ough, of unfit and 
anti-Catholic special personal representatives was fast wear-
ing away any bonds of fear or loyalty which held a paper to 
support the existing policies. Yet when one considers the 
relatively large number of Catholic papers and periodicals, 
in the first days of 1914 there were few editorials dealing 
with the Mexican situation. 
Then, the Tampico incident occurred. The interest 
of the whole Catholic press was aroused overnight. Suddenly -
its headlines and editorial pages became alive to the reality 
of the Mexican crisis. The threat of war could no longer be 
ignored. In the initial stages of the new crisis Wilson 
seemed to have scorid a definite triumph as one after the 
other of th~se papers vied to acknowledge its support of his 
." 
war call. The Catholic Review, the Brooklyn Tablet, the 
~holic R~w~, were just some of these promising 100% cooper-
ation. Yet a few editors did not feel their patriotism was 
compromised by protesting against an avoidable war. Hence-
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forth, the Mexican muddle provided important material for the 
Catholic press. 
That the Catholic Press, a~ a whole, sincerely de-
.. .., 
sired peace was evidenced in the enthusiastic welcome given 
to the offer of ABC Mediation Board. It also served as the 
opening wedge for many of the papers ~ oppose Wilsonts war-
provoking measures, which had been supported the previous 
month. As the year wore on and the notorious "watchful wait-
ing" policy failed to heal. the Mexican wound, an impatient 
note seeped into the editorial columns. Wilsonts open ap-
proval of Villa and Carranza proved too much even for the 
most loyal paper. The cry of protest could now be heard in 
England, along the Atlantic coast from Maine to Florida, 
across the plains of the Middle West, even up in the Rockies ~ 
where its echo reached Canada. The Catholic opposition in-
creased proportionately to the Wilson Administration's patron-
age of Carranza. With Carranzats recognition, several papers , 
felt it their duty as loyal citizens to assure the President 
of their acquiescence. When the true significance, though, 
." 
of this strange recognition became evident, and loyalty meant 
handling the hatchet that was hacking the Mexican Church to 
death, ',Vilson looked in vain for Catholic support. 
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Woodrow Wilson suddenly awoke to the power of the 
Catholic press, as he saw his chances for reelection gradu-
ally vanishing as smoke in a summer breeze. The wild Tumulty 
. 
scheme revealed his hidden fear. 3 Btt this plan merely fur-
ther deepened the Catholic disgust with the President's hand-
ling of the Mexican issue. The Fortniihtl~ Review, the ~­
tension, and others branded t'he effort as a cheap campaign 
, 
trick. Villa's untimely raids on American property and life 
helped little in raising Wilson's political stock. In con-
trast with the Protestant press, the Chief Executive would 
find it hard to discover one friend among the Catholic edi-
tors. In fact, the Hichiggn Catholic and Brook1xn Tablet, 
to mention a few, openly counselled his defeat at the polls. 
The entrance of the United States into the World 
War I buried the Mexican fiasco in complete oblivion for the 
time. Wilson thought he washed his hand of the whole affair 
by granting de jur! recognition to Mexican President. He 
then turned the spotlight on Europe. The sincere patriotism 
of the Cathplic press was proved by the diversion of its at-
tention from the Mexican chaos to the new world wide crisis. 
-------
3 Tumulty was Wilson's private secretary, who in a letter 
to a friend attempted to justify the President's Mexican 
policy. Confer, Chapter III, 41-43. 
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A set policy of the Catholic press is manifest it 
one includes the whole era of 19~O-19l7. In the early revo-
lut.ionary days when a minimum of the ,religious element was 
involved, opinion was divided. But when the Church and just-
ice began to suffer as a direct result of Wilson's policy, 
the opposition of the press then beca~ unified. Those pa-
pers, which abandoned their pacifist policy to demand inter-
vention, did so on the grounds that it was the only means for 
Wilson to unentangle the Mexican net knotted by his previous 
meddling. Nowhere could the opinion of the Catholic press 
after 1914 be more compressly found than in the words of 
Ameri£.§:: 
Under ordinary circumstances 
the Mexican would and should have 
taken care of their troubles them-
selves. In this instance, how-
ever, our Government, no doubt 
with the best intentions, made it-
self sponsor for the Constitution-
alist party, thereby incurring 
certain duties. Among these not 
the least is the duty both ot 
righting the wrongs and of pre-
venting further crime. Unspeak-
ably frightful crimes, wanton 
enough to make strong men shudder 
with horror, have been committed 
against priests, Sisters and lay 
people; and America feels that in 
justice both to itself and to 
American citizens who abhor bru-
tality, our Administration should 
.... 
bring every possible moral press-
ure to bear upon the Mexican 
criminals, who have time and time 
again said that they are acting 4 
under the authority ot Washington. 
;p ... , 
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After Carranza's recognition, though, the Catholic 
cause seemed lost, while the Protestant press was convinced 
that the right course had been follow~. Yet that either of 
these presses had been able to exert any influence during 
Wilson's Administration is remarkable, and can best be ex-
plained perhaps by the willingness of many of the readers to 
follow their editor's policies, because of the religious de-
nominational affiliation of the paper. For with a few excep-
tions such as America, Month, and the Christian Herald, the 
ma.0ority of papers and periodicals would be classified just 
above the level of amateur journalism. Since almost all 
these weeklies were limited in appeal to their own dioceses, 
they were by that fact condemned to small circulations and 
small revenue, and were thus barred from doing outstanding 
work. By and large they were edited by small and poorly paid 
staffs tha~were usually grossly overworked and had little 
. 
time and energy for concentration on important matters or for 
striving after journalistic perfection. They seldom at-
tempted to maintain professional journalistic standards, while 
4 Americ~, Nov. 21, 1914. The underlined words were 
italicized in the original text. 
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religious prejudice led them oftentimes into slanting their 
news stories, or mixing editorial comment with news. They 
also overpraised the mediocre, so when a Churchman or a Church 
. 
;,. ... 
institution did something outstanding, there were no words 
left to appraise it. Their editorials frequently showed signs 
of haste, and too often were superfici,l and wordy; too often, 
also, these editorials generated more heat than light. With 
few exceptions, the Catholic organs appeared to be on the de-, 
fensive, when they should have been on the offensive. As a 
group they sought to interest only Catholics, when their true 
success as a pressure organ to influence the State depended on 
their reaching the non-Catholics and godless. 
However, had the religious press, in spite of its 
weakness, been united, the world might well have witnessed a _ 
forward step in modern Church and State relations, for Wilson 
almost revamped his Mexican policy at the insistence of 
Catholic.--if not out of respect for justice, at least due to 
the spectre of a solid religious bloc opposing him at the 
polls. Butathe support of the Protestant press relieved the 
.« 
pressure enough to enable the President to continue his pol-
icy and recognize Carranza. The Catholic press then had to 
rest content with the thought that the Washington Administra-
tion had at least respected its suggestions to the extent of 
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promising that Carranza's recognition would depend in some 
way on the guarantee of religious liberty. However, as time 
proved the worthlessness of Carranza's guarantees, and the 
. 
..... 
tragic truth of the Catholic press' predictions of the tyr-
anny, political upheaval and economic collapse consequent on 
such a recognition, the state perhaps~ust have regretted 
the deaf ear it turned towards the Church's pleas_ 
EPILOGUE 
The publication of the Zi~rman note followed by 
.,...., . 
our entrance into World War I convinced the Mexicans of t!J.e 
folly of a German-Japanese-Mexican alliance. Nevertheless, 
Carranza and his Constitutionalists ma~e it extrem~ly diffi-
cult for the United States to obtain sadly needed resources 
for our war effort. Re12.tions were strained and the termin-
ation of the war made it possible to attempt forcing our 
Mexican brethren into line again. Strong demands for inter-
vention arose and for a If new regime more complacent to 
American capital". In September, 1919, the Fall Committee 
released its reports on the investigation o~ Mexican affairs. 
The se reports, wh ich fi lIed two huge volumes, rep resented an -
appeal for a drastic Mexican policy. Lansing appeared to be 
so drawn over to the side of Senator Fall and his group, 
which were behind the interventionist drive, that his impa-
tience wi th President Wilson's policy became quite notice-
able. 
... 
Lansing's opportunity came when sorm body in north-
ern Mexico seized William o. Jenkins, the consular agent of 
the United States at Puebla. The Secretary of State de-
manded his immediate release. The Mexican government re-
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sponded with a request for a delay, pending a judicial in-
vestigation. Intervention grew imminent. A resolution was 
drafted approving the "Action of the, Department of state in 
reference to the pending controversylt, and a demand for 
severance of all relations with Mexico. The resolution was 
iwnediately referred to the Senate an' to the Committee of 
Foreign Relations. 'Nilson, who was now seriously ill, got 
wind of what was happening and called a halt to the move for 
intervention. Fortunately, Jenkins was released and the 
crisis passed without any mishap.l 
In 1920, the Republican Party came forward in vig-
orous defense of American investments. Its campaign program 
promised to prosecute American claims energetically. It was 
at this critical juncture that Carranza was overthrown by· ... 
Alvaro Obregon, and the agitation for intervention died dovm. 
By the end of 1921, President Wilson's Mexican pol-
icy had run its cow·se. Fundamentally, it was a misguided , 
policy. Instead of stimulating friendship and cooperation, 
i t prolong~d the Mexican revolution, and deepened the sus-
picion of Mexico as well as the other South American Repub-
lics of the ends and purposes of the United States. In the 
final analysis, therefore, Wilson's policies, although well 
1 Rippy, 358-364. 
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intentioned and sincere, must be written down as a complete 
failure. 
These events literally fulfilled the tragic fore-
casts of the Catholic press, and revl£led the wisdom of its 
stand against the recognition of an anti-clerical government. 
When the Protestant interests also began to suffer serious 
.. 
setbacks under Carranza's new Constitution, many of the 
Protestant papers began to echo the Catholic press' protests. 
For many, the halo of Woodrow Wilson now was no longer dis-
cernible. 
.-
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APPENDIX 
Author's Note: 
In treating of the opinian-of the Protestant Press, 
we omitted the frequent and abusive accusations against the 
Catholic Church as the cause of Mexic,o's trouble, except in 
• 
a few instances where the charges directly concerned some 
issue of the United States' p~licy, e.g., in the recognition 
of Carranza. 
For the sake of interest, however, a sample of some 
of these charges is included below: 
Not until the horrible op-
pression 0 f the ruling class and 
the superstitious teachings of 
the corrupt Roman Catholic Church 
are overcome by the spread of in-
telligence and of a pure form of 
Christianity, the light of knowl-
edge, even though but a feeble 
glimmering at first, superseding 
the thick darkness of the people, 
may we hope to see fair play and 
honest elections, and good gov-
ernment. Until then, we should 
not expect too much. 
Watchman-Examiner., •• Jan. 
Whenever the Constitutional-
ist army is victorious, one of 
its first acts is to close the 
Catholic Churches, confiscate the 
convents and advise the priests 
and nuns to leave the country. 
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29, 1914. 
Harsh treatment? Certainly. 
But these men know what they 
are about. They know from 
their own personal experi-
ences and national history 
when the Catholic Church is 
in power ••• lt is the.aesire 
of Rome that Mexico become 
part of the United States. 
What, then, are we to do? 
Let us do all in our power 
to assist the Presiden\ in 
his present policy of peace. 
175 
Christ~ Century ••• Aug. 27, 1914. 
The land baron and the 
priest have continued their 
unholy alliance to keep the 
people in ignorance, super-
stition, and debt. 
Christian g!ntury ••• Mar. 26, 1914. 
Although the Catholic press usually ignored these 
bigoted accusations, periodically an editor felt that truth 
~d justice demanded a rebuttal. A representative reply is 
found in the pamphlet, The ~ of B!Q, .!aE4 Yellow, penned by 
the then Monsignor Kelley, editor of the monthly, Extension. 
But we have, alasl by our own 
greed and our prejudice, made 
government a scorn and insult; 
of the old schools, that once 
were glorious, barracks and 
ruins. We listen and applaud 
when the ttliberals" of every 
camp tell us that the Church 
is responsible for poverty, ig-
norance and lawlessness; but 
• 
we do not listen to the Church 
which gave to Mexico all the 
civilization she possesses, 
when she makes this gentle 
plaint over the noise of mur-
der, debauchery and .. 1.ust: You 
blame me for poverty, .... yet you 
took from me the endowments 
for my hospitals, my orphanages, 
my countless works of mercy. 
You blame me for ignorance when 
you closed my schoo1st stole my 
colleges and suppressed my uni-
versities, which first lit the 
torch of learning among this 
people. You say I have added 
nothing to science and art, but 
you destroyed the art I brought 
with me, burned my books and 
scattered the results of my la-
bor for science to the four 
winds of heaven. You blame me 
for ignorance after forbidding 
me for fifty years to teach. 
You blame me for lawlessness, 
when you destroyed my missions 
among a peaceful and thriving 
Indian population, and gave, in 
my place to the people, the 
thirty pieces of silver with 
which you bribed them to murder 
their fellows. You took the 
cross out of their hands to re-
place it with a torch and a gun. 
Show me one good thing in Mex-
ico I did not give you. Show 
me one genius for whom I was 
not responsible. Show me one 
step in advance I did not help 
you to take. Cut away from 
your country all that I put in 
it, and see what remains. You 
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may thrust me out, exile my 
bishops, murder my priests, 
again steal my schools, dese-
crate my sanctuaries and my 
virgins, but you cannot blot 
our history, you c,~ot erase 
the mark I have left on you -
not in a century of centuries. 
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F~ancis Clement Kelley, The ~ of ~ ~~ Yell2!, Exten-
Slon Press, Chicago, 1917, 73. • 
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